BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//School of Public Policy and Global Affairs//NONSGML Events//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://sppga.ubc.ca/events/event/
X-WR-CALDESC:School of Public Policy and Global Affairs - Events
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:20160415T1632Z-1460737920.6576-EO-19493-2671@137.82.234.16
STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTAMP:20260711T133523Z
CREATED:20160414T212315Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20181017T233019Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Vancouver:20160407T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Vancouver:20160407T173000
SUMMARY: The (Non) Strategic Thinking of Japan’s Decision-makers for World 
 War II
DESCRIPTION: Why did Japan undertake a war from 1937 to 1945 that it had no
  chance of winning? Moreover\, why did it undertake the war when prominent 
 political leaders and journalists\, most notably seven time finance ministe
 r Takahashi Korekiyo and economic journalist Ishibashi Tanzan\, had been pu
 blicly stating for over a quarter of a century that […]
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html: <p>Why did Japan undertake a war from 1937 to
  1945 that it had no chance of winning? Moreover\, why did it undertake the
  war when prominent political leaders and journalists\, most notably seven 
 time finance minister Takahashi Korekiyo and economic journalist Ishibashi 
 Tanzan\, had been publicly stating for over a quarter of a century that Jap
 an not only could not fight the Chinese\, Americans\, Soviets\, British\, C
 anadians\, Dutch\, Indians\, and Australians in a war\, but also that in th
 e process of confronting those powers\, Japan would make itself poorer and 
 military weaker? China in 1937 had a population seven times Japan’s\, which
  made the military pacification of a hostile China impossible. Not only did
  the United States have an economy over five times and an industrial capaci
 ty nine times Japan’s in 1938-1939\, but also it and the British dominions 
 were the primary sources of petroleum and other essential materials for Jap
 an’s war in China. What led the Japanese leaders to think their country was
  a great power—that it could rival the United States and Great Britain—when
  economically Japan was Italy.</p><p class="p1"><strong><span class="s1">Ri
 chard Smethurst (University of Pittsburgh)</span></strong><a href="https://
 cjr.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2016/01/B-29-Superfortress.png" rel="attachment 
 wp-att-3895"><br /></a>Professor Smethurst is Professor Emeritus of History
  at the University of Pittsburgh\, having retired in 2013. He is the author
  of three books of modern Japanese History: A Social Basis for Prewar Japan
 ese Militarism (California\, 1974)\; Agricultural Development and Tenancy D
 isputes in Japan\, 1870-1940 (Princeton 1986)\; and From Foot Soldier to Fi
 nance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo\, Japan’s Keynes (Harvard 2008). Profess
 or Smethurst recently signed a contract with Cambridge University Press to 
 produce a fourth book\, tentatively entitled The Japanese Army in World War
  II. He has also written many articles. For the purposes of this talk\, see
  particularly “Japan\, the United States\, and the Road to World War II in 
 the Pacific\,” in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus\, online\, Septembe
 r 2012.</p><p class="p1">See full poster <a href="https://sppga.cms.arts.ub
 c.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/04/R.Smethurst4716.pdf" rel="">here</a
 ></p>
URL;VALUE=URI:https://sppga.ubc.ca/events/event/the-non-strategic-thinking-
 of-japans-decision-makers-for-world-war-ii/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Vancouver
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
DTSTART:20160313T100000
TZNAME:PDT
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
END:VCALENDAR
