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The Missile Defence Debate: Guiding Canada's Role

Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues

February 15-16, 2001

A statement from Lloyd Axworthy, Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues at the University of British Columbia:

The following report is a summary and analysis of the Consultation on the Impact of National Missile Defence on Global Nuclear Policy that was held Feb. 16, 2001, at the Liu Centre.

The meeting, co-sponsored through the generosity of The Simons Foundation of Vancouver, brought together some of the world's foremost experts on issues relating to nuclear security. Following the daylong discussion, a public forum was held in downtown Vancouver.

This report is meant to summarize the sentiments expressed while being respectful of the fact that much of the commentary and discussion was private in nature. It is intended to provide the Canadian public with a sense of the tenor of the conversations as well as to publicize some of the recommendations of the group with respect to national missile defence (NMD).

The report is meant lo corral informed opinions on policy alternatives to NMD. And to stimulate, if not instigate, a broader public dialogue on this very important issue. Canadians and citizens around the world need to be made aware of the very real consequences should the United States proceed to deploy its proposed missile defence system.

In the spirit of ensuring a more public dialogue, I asked veteran Canadian journalist and foreign affairs specialist Duart Farquharson to sit in on the Consultation and record his overall observations. They lead to some interesting thoughts about how Canada should be addressing this major issue. His report is to be followed by a more detailed academic paper from the Liu Centre, as well as the publication of certain of the presentations made to meeting.

I want to thank all the participants, whose names appear at the end of this report, for their time and effort in contributing so much to open up the public debate. It is my commitment that the Liu Centre will continue to engage these esteemed individuals on this issue.

Lloyd Axworthy

A preliminary report on an international consultation on US Missile Defence hosted by The Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues, University of British Columbia.

February 15-16,2001

The new administration of President George W. Bush appears to be intent on deploying an as-yet technically unproven, minimum $60-billion-dollar, anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system to protect the American homeland from possible nuclear missile attack by a "state of concern."

The U.S. proposal has set off alarm bells in Russia and China, whose governments reject the official version of National Missile Defence (NMD) as insurance against nuclear blackmail by North Korea, Iraq or Iran, or against the accidental launch of a missile.

Instead, they perceive NMD as an offensive American bid aimed at them, intended to demonstrate U.S. global military supremacy.

The controversial plan to destroy incoming ballistic missiles in space with U.S. antimissile interceptors is condemned by many international arms control experts as likely to initiate new missile races, especially in Asia.

Even America's NATO allies worry that by upsetting the long established system of nuclear deterrence, NMD could weaken, rather than strengthen, overall Western security.

And many countries, including Canada, have long rejected the concept of the weaponization of space inherent in the U.S. plan as a perilous progression that would exacerbate global nuclear instability.

A debate that cannot wait

Despite all the international concern, there has been little informed public debate in the U.S., or Canada, about the wisdom of proceeding unilaterally to put aside the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which outlaws the kind of antimissile defence system the U.S. wants to deploy to defend North America.

While the Canadian government has not yet enunciated its views about the continued relevance of the ABM Treaty to the world's strategic stability, Foreign Minister John Manley has said the time has come for countries wishing to influence U.S. plans for NMD to speak up.

He said he made the point at a Feb. 27 NATO meeting in Brussels that, "the result of this (NMD) needs to be enhanced global security, not increased global risk."

Ottawa plans soon to start serious, top-level discussions with Washington.

The U.S. has not yet asked Canada to participate in missile defence, waiting, according to Defence Minister Arthur Eggleton, until Washington has decided what type and how large a system it wants to build. In the meantime, he says, Canada is "open-minded" about the Bush Administration's plan.

It is the view of Lloyd Axworthy, Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, that the time has come for a wide-ranging debate on the issues surrounding the U.S. plan for NMD.

To generate that debate The Liu Centre, with the generous assistance of The Simons Foundation of Vancouver, brought together more than 30 arms control experts from governments and think tanks in the United States, Canada, China, Russia, India and Denmark for a one-day brain-storming session Feb.

16. The British and French governments sent diplomatic observers.

The private session was followed by an evening public forum in which an audience of about 200 university students, graduates, teachers, representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace activists engaged the Liu Centre's panel of international experts with questions and comments, mostly hostile, about NMD.

A clear message came out of the day's proceedings. The deployment of NMD is not inevitable. A serious examination of all the issues, with a persuasive look at policy alternatives, is required before the U.S. makes a final commitment.

Canadians and the other allies of the U.S. have an important, positive role to play in directly messaging the Administration through the bilateral and multilateral organizations to which they belong.

National missile defence is a global issue, not peculiar to any one country There are implications for everyone, everywhere, and for experts of differing disciplines. What is needed is an effective cross-border alliance of all interested parties.

In addressing NMD, Canada must be sensitive to American concerns about terrorist threats and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles. We should be looking seriously at all the options, and proposing our own alternatives.

If, for instance, we accept the U.S. claim that states of concern like North Korea or Iran pose a ballistic missile threat, if only to Japan and Israel respectively, we should come up with a solution to the problem that, unlike NMD, does not cause further nuclear or missile proliferation. It might entail further direct negotiations with the two states.

NMD is not a done deal

The first order of business at the Liu Centre Consultation was the technical question of the strategic feasibility of the NMD systems now under research and development.

The expert consensus appeared to be that the anti-ICBM systems currently envisaged would not work for at least a decade - certainly, they offer no guarantee that the U.S. would be capable of shooting down all incoming missiles in a major attack by a we] I-armed, determined adversary.

An unpredictable state of concern, or a terrorist organization, might be expected then to find other, less sophisticated but more effective means than NMD if it wished to attack the U.S.

An American missile shield would be useless, for instance, against ship-based, low-level cruise missiles or, still more simply, a cargo ship sailing into a major port city with a nuclear bomb on board - or a bomb on civil aircraft, or delivery vans, for that matter. The damage might be more limited, but it would still be deadly.

How far then is the Bush Administration committed to the deployment of a missile shield that would be far from impenetrable?

The way we answer the question - is NMD a done deal? - is important to the internal Canadian debate over whether to participate in the U.S. scheme.

If the Bush administration is indeed inexorably committed to deployment, say the Canadian proponents of NMD, especially those in the military, then it is not only pointless but self defeating to oppose the project.

We would only imperil our relations with our most important ally, and perhaps endanger our security through jeopardizing Canada's role in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

On the contrary, say Canadian critics of NMD, as a responsible partner in both the NATO and NORAD alliances we have a duty to persuade our mighty neighbour and best friend to open up its strategic thinking.

There may be other possible solutions, which would not necessarily upset the nuclear balance. If so, they should be given a fair and serious hearing in Washington.

Yet the question remains: is the Bush Administration still listening to its doubting allies? The thinking of American participants in the Consultation varied as to the degree of current U.S. commitment to NMD. But all felt the U.S. decision making process could, and should, still be influenced by the views of friends.

A former senior advisor to the U.S. State department said some sort of missile defence called NMD is almost certain to emerge. The need is to create a system that doesn't undermine the current arms control structure and is the least offensive to Russia, China and the NATO allies.

An American academic expert predicted that NMD would be deployed, only to precipitate an international crisis that would force the U.S. to back down. Major input from Canada and other allies could help the Bush Administration to recognize its mistake earlier, limiting the damage.

Another American presenter felt the NMD deployment might still be stopped if the Administration agreed to broaden significantly the criteria according to which it will make the decision.

At the very least, once positive alternatives were put forth, the NMD decision might be delayed, perhaps for the duration of the president's first term. Postponement might also be forced on the tax-cutting Administration because it is already over committed to the military in terms of a weakening U.S. economy.

Backing off before it's too late

It was the submission of one American academic that the unilateral deployment of NMD by the U.S., together with the country's advanced offensive capability, would present a severe pre-emptive threat to any potential opponent.

Both Russia and China would be compelled to assume that the American NMD deployment would be operated against them, increasing the U.S. capacity for political intimidation.

Russia, with its own large deterrent force and because it is still a partner with the U.S. in the ABM Treaty, might deny treaty amendments and play for time.

China, on the other hand, with a minimum deterrent force and facing a potential confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan, appeared committed to a more assertive, more immediate reaction but, for the moment, more political than physical in character.

As currently conceived, the professor concluded, the U.S. national missile defence program is unlikely to survive what he predicts will be a hostile overall world reaction.

He was asked whether the current U.S. charm offensive, in which senior Administration officials are visiting Russia, China and the NATO capitals in an effort to moderate the strategic opposition to NMD, might succeed.

He thought not. While Russian agreement to amend the ABM treaty would open the door to U.S. missile defence deployment, he doubted it would be forthcoming.

A Canadian diplomat agreed that if the two signatories to the ABM treaty negotiated amendments, or a new treaty, it would be very hard for the rest of the world to stop NMD's deployment.

Such an American-Russian understanding, however, would be highly unlikely to accommodate the fierce Chinese objections. The question then would be how far, if at all, the Bush Administration would be prepared to go to try and get the Chinese on side.

For his part, the American saw the Administration pursuing its stated NMD goal without waiting for proof of technical feasibility, and with little heed to early world reaction.

Eventually there would be a collision. Only then, with much damage already done, would the U.S. do the right thing and back off to avert a full, potentially physical, crisis.

Theatre missile defence a threat to China

Speaking at the public forum, the Chinese and Russian participants in the private consultation both said they believe NMD is a pretext to allow the U.S. to gain overwhelming military superiority. And that NMD is exclusively targeted at their countries.

The senior Chinese nuclear arms control official said he fears that hard-liners in Washington want to turn his country into their new, post-Cold War enemy. China has about 2 dozen nuclear weapons according to United States intelligence, compared to thousands held by the U.S. China would eventually have to respond to NMD by improving its own nuclear arsenal.

More specifically, China feels threatened by the U.S. development, in conjunction with Japan, of advanced Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems under the NMD rubric.

The Chinese say joint TMD, with Japan, upsets the Sino-Japanese balance of power. The Japanese constitution entitles the country to defend its own territory. Under TMD, that defence is extended to cover so-called adjacent, neighbouring areas. Does that include Taiwan, in Beijing's view an integral part of China?

At the same time, the government of Taiwan is seeking theatre missile defences from the U.S. that would require U.S. satellite communications to be effective. That would create, in the Chinese view, a de facto U.S.-Taiwan military alliance -a serious violation of the 1982 Shanghai memorandum that enabled China to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S.

For his part, the Russian arms control expert said that any U.S. NMD program would not work, would be illegal under the ABM treaty, and would adversely affect all treaties that prevent military competition in space. The world should ensure that it is never deployed.

As an alternative to deal with the real threat of missile proliferation, Russia has proposed the establishment of a Global Monitoring System. Already partially implemented by Russia and the U.S., it is an important development that merits Canada's participation. It is further discussed below.

A few days after the Consultation on NMD at the Liu Centre, Russia unveiled its own proposal for a scaled-down, antimissile defence shield to protect Europe.

The plan, presented in Moscow to Lord Robertson, the NATO secretary-general, calls for the assessment of missile threats, and the elimination of such threats through political efforts. A mobile, tactical anti-missile force would be deployed near a potential aggressor only as a last resort.

Lord Robertson said the plan showed that Russia not only joined NATO in recognizing that there is a threat of missile attack from unstable states, but that they must work together to counter it.

Officials at the Liu Centre welcomed the Russia plan as the kind of alternative proposal to NMD that Consultation participants hoped to encourage governments to put forward. It deserved Ottawa's serious consideration.

The weaponization of space

A major concern raised by a number of participants was how the U.S. deployment of NMD, should it proceed, would affect the international regime sanctioned by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 that restricts the use of space to peaceful activities.

From a purely legal perspective, it was pointed out, the Treaty may not prohibit the placing of non-nuclear defensive weapons in Earth orbit.

But from a political point of view, it was agreed, the national missile defence program is widely seen around the world as amounting to the weaponization of space. The prospect of warfare being conducted in space is welcomed nowhere, it would seem, but in certain offices of the Pentagon.

When the Chinese and the Russians portray NMD as an offensive American bid aimed at them, intended to demonstrate U.S. global military supremacy, they are talking about the plan in this context of a much larger military program said to be primarily devoted to offensive technology.

And it isn't just Chinese paranoia! Not if you read the disturbing comments from the American military displayed on the Internet daily at the US Space.com site.

The web site text is reinforced by a document called Joint Vision 20-20 that is authorized by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Together, said an American participant in the Consultation, these authoritative documents suggest his country's coming role in space will be:

"To attack instantaneously when we think it appropriate, at our own initiative, and to deny similar capability to anyone else, primarily using space assets for the observation."

He added, "it doesn't take too much imagination to say that if you were a responsible member of the Chinese government you wouldn't like this a bit."

Vision 20-20 is a far cry from the universe of the 1967 space treaty that extends legal protection to commercial and military support activities in space on the supposition they are peaceful.

Think what would happen to insurance rates for satellites if the possibility of physical interference through space warfare had to be taken into account.

At the Geneva disarmament talks, the Chinese have been trying to update the rules in space but the Americans have hitherto refused to negotiate.

Canada, as an active proponent of non-proliferation, should join in the drive to modernize international space law. As a contributor to the space station program, we have much at stake. In the event of weaponization, our huge investments could be out the window.

Canadians, through our government, our scholars, and our experts, still have much to contribute in dealing with the impact of programs like NMD, in their many facets, on space and the disarmament process.

An arms race in Asia

In deciding whether to deploy N_~M, symposium participants agreed, the Bush Administration must think far beyond questions of mere technical feasibility in setting the criteria for decision making.

This was the thesis of a former senior nuclear disarmament official in the U.S Defence department.

For the sake of argument, let us turn around the usual logic of the opponents of NMD: even if missile defence cannot absolutely protect the American people from a nuclear attack, NMD might still be worthwhile if it could lower the likelihood of such an attack.

Unfortunately for the case of NMD supporters, the decision to deploy would more likely have the opposite result: provoke a series of reactions that could actually increase the threat against North America.

Thus, China might well expand the currently planned modernization of its nuclear deterrent in reaction to the U.S. deployment of NMD. It could build still more of a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles and/or put multiple warheads on its present ICBMs.

The nuclear arms buildup wouldn't stop there. Although the Chinese insist they don't regard India as a strategic rival, the Indian leadership would almost certainly see a significant Chinese missile buildup as a threat, especially if it was coupled with assistance to Pakistan in the provision of missile technology-

If India escalated the weaponization of its nuclear arsenal, so, it can almost be guaranteed, would Pakistan. A stepped-up arms race between India and Pakistan would endanger fragile economies and increase political destabilization in both countries. Attempts to improve relations between the two nuclear armed, long-hostile neighbours would be dangerously set back.

Harder to forecast, but at least as worrying the experts say, is how Japan, Korea and Taiwan would react to any increase in the regional military threat.

Before deploying NMD, policy-makers in Washington must therefore consider the net results for American security Any step that appeared to increase short-term U.S. security, while actually decreasing it the bnger term, must be avoided.

Canada should talk to Iran, North Korea

If the goal is to prevent the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it becomes clear the NMD route is counter-productive.

Yet some Americans, including some planners in the Pentagon, the symposium was told, make the assumption that China is the new adversary, therefore its nuclear deterrent must be invalidated, notwithstanding the danger of causing a nuclear arms race between Washington and Beijing.

Fortunately, the rightwing view that China must be put in its place, by military means if necessary, is not widely shared in the U.S. In Canada, such paranoia does not even enter the NMD debate.

If American proponents of missile defence were forced to admit there is not really a "rogue state" problem, observed a Canadian participant, it would become clear they were really going after China. "I don't think Canadians would buy that as a rationale for NMD at all."

Preventing nuclear proliferation is a country-specific problem that cannot be addressed with a grand, theoretical cure-all like NMD.

The fact is that the West has had considerable success in combating proliferation through diplomacy and the offer of economic incentives. Thus, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus were persuaded to become non-nuclear states. Other states that have agreed to renounce ballistic missiles include Argentina, Brazil and South Africa.

There is no reason why a similar approach to non-proliferation couldn't be successful in states of concern like North Korea and Iran, which are already undergoing positive internal changes.

North Korea, for example, has declared a moratorium on the testing of long-range missiles and is negotiating the possible termination of the program. Why should the U.S. assume that such negotiations must fail? They indeed would be more likely to fail if the U.S. goes ahead unilaterally and deploys NMD against a potential North Korean threat.

In Iran, where the popularly elected president is battling with the ayatollah establishment to bring in far-reaching measures of liberal reform, there would seem to be scope for future negotiations to curtail proliferation.

There could be a special role for Canada in talks with both countries. Unlike the U.S., Canada has restored full diplomatic relations with Iran since the Islamic revolution. Our first ambassador to North Korea has just presented his credentials in Pyongyang.

Yet, in the final analysis, any success in preventing proliferation in a particular country depends on the cooperation of the other nuclear powers, especially Russia and China.

Such cooperation will only be jeopardized if the U.S. deploys a missile defence system that the Russians and Chinese believe, however wrongly, threatens their own deterrents. A negative Russian reaction could include the termination of current joint efforts with the U.S. to curtail missile proliferation.

In Canada the military-industrial complex is already an NMD player

No participants agreed that the U.S. drive to deploy NMD is simply a response to American fears concerning the possible launch of hostile missiles by so-called states of concern.

A questioner at the public forum suggested the minimum $60 billion plan might really be the inspiration of the U.S. military industrial complex.

Experts agreed that NMD looked like another classic case of generals and corporate chiefs wanting to create together new, ever-more-expensive technology for the sake of the economic benefits the big companies would reap.

The danger of attack from a North Korea or an Iran, remarked an American expert in the field, has been "grossly exaggerated by those engaged in threat marketing."

At the Liu Centre discussion, it was suggested that the NMD work of the military-industrial complex was not confined to the Pentagon but extended north into the Canadian Department of Defence in Ottawa.

Our defence planners are already involved in researching, and developing, a variety of technologies that are of direct relevance to NMD, said a Canadian arms control expert.

From that stunning revelation, a number of questions arose. Was this Canadian military co-operation with the U.S. on missile defence sanctioned by the Canadian department of foreign affairs? Did it then constitute the policy of the government of Canada?

Or was the NMD cooperation with the U.S. driven primarily through military-to-military contacts, or through their departments, or between Canadian defence industry sectors and their U.S. counterparts?

To the extent that Canada is already committing millions of dollars for purposes of developing NMD, what is the real motivation of those who press for official Canadian participation in the program?

A pro-active agenda for Canada

Canadian participants in the Consultation were keen to point out that since the beginning of the nuclear age this country has consistently followed an independent path in matters of national security.

Canada was the first nuclear-capable country - it was a member of the tri-partite Manhattan Project during the Second World War that led to the invention of the atomic bomb - to deliberately eschew atomic weapons.

We have always preferred multilateralism to U.S.-style unilateralism.

In the 1980s, the overtly pro-U.S. government of Brian Mulroney resisted the sustained pressure of the Reagan Administration to participate in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), an ambitious missile defence program known as Star Wars, now considered the father of the scaled-down NMD.

A veteran, independent Canadian arms control expert reminded the group that Mulroney's Conservative government was alone in the West when it in effect said "no" to Star Wars. This time, he suggested, the Chretien government would likely have the NATO European allies on side should it oppose NMD.

The public forum was told that Canada has pushed hard for a review of NATO's nuclear role in the post-Cold War era.

Canada has also strenuously promoted the ratification and entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999.

And in the last Geneva Conference on Disarmament meetings last spring, Canada took the lead in urging that there should be a treaty to limit the spread of missile technology.

Opposition to the U.S. deployment of NMD, if the Canadian government so decides, should therefore not be seen as a departure from Ottawa's traditional stance on arms control. On the contrary, it would be entirely consistent with Canada's longstanding anti-proliferation campaign.

As a country that has long been a leader in the field, we have much at stake in the NMD consultations now unfolding. We should not be standing back on our heels.

Canada must be pro-active, assessing the proposals of others as to viability, offering improved variations, and asking questions such as, do the proposed alternatives offer better security than NMD?

We must also be more active on the diplomatic front, and not just with the Americans or the states of concern. The Russians, and the Chinese, should be urged to be more careful about the countries to which they're selling, or transferring the technology of, nuclear arms or missiles.

Quiet Canadian persuasion

A former top official of the Canadian department of foreign affairs offered the diplomatic advice that any anti-NMD campaign should be conducted not as an attack on U.S. policy but as constructive persuasion to help the alliance leader to choose among the best alternatives.

Canadians should work quietly, through multilateral forums like NATO, to discuss how to deal with the common problem facing the alliance, not just what one member proposed to do about it.

NMD might also be brought up by Canada at the next G-8 Summit, which the prime minister will chair. With the participation of the Russians, the final communiqu6 could emphasize the importance of implementing existing strategic cooperation initiatives and further reducing nuclear arms stocks.

The Global Monitoring System (GMS) proposed by Russia as an alternative to NMD includes the breakthrough agreement with the U.S. last June to establish in Moscow a Joint Data Exchange Centre (JDEC).

Staffed by American and Russian military personnel, the JDEC will share military intelligence and joint satellite observation regarding the two countries' missile launches.

More than an exchange of early warning information, GMS will include controls on missile and missile technology transfers to third countries. There will be security guarantees as well as assistance for national space programs for states that reject the possession of missile systems.

Canada should accept a Russian invitation to join the JDEC, as should other countries, turning the whole GMS program into the multilateral operation the Russians intended.

A blow to global security

As long as Canada remains undecided about what it should do with respect to the U.S. plans for NMD, said a Canadian nonproliferation expert who works in the U.S., Ottawa might have to react to one or more of three nightmare scenarios.

First, the U.S. could deploy NMD, without heed to the ABM Treaty. Russia would certainly charge the U.S. with a breach of international law.

Canada would then have to deal with, or defend its closest defence partner in the role of a "rogue" state in blatant violation of its treaty commitments.

Or, the U.S. might exercise its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, with all the attendant deleterious consequences for nuclear arms control and strategic stability.

One Canadian option would then be, said the expert in a position paper, to repudiate this country's longstanding support of the ABM Treaty, non proliferation and disarmament in favour of the strategic relationship with the U.S. Or, Canada could conceivably swallow a bitter pill and re-assess its partnership within NORAD to go it alone on the North American continent.

The expert's third scenario projected increased Russian and Chinese strategic offensive forces whatever the nature of the U.S. NMD system. In this case, not just Canadian but global security would be further jeopardized.

In all three instances, he concluded, Canada would face an increasingly insecure world with more rather than fewer nuclear weapons and ballistic/cruise missiles, and with more unsafe nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert status.

NORAD and NMD are not Siamese twins

When renewing the NORAD agreement in the year 2000 for another five years, Canada noted that the defence alliance had no NMD mission. Should the U.S wish to use NORAD as the command-and-control agency for defence missile deployment, it would need to seek Canada's agreement to change the NORAD mandate.

Canada, in other words, could remain in NORAD without being legally required to participate in NMD. Until the U.S. makes its final decision to deploy missile defence, Canada should continue to insist that NORAD remain separate from NMD pending a formal negotiation, it was urged.

Canada should also now publicly identify its criteria for accepting any NMD program. These might include the need to identify a clear ballistic missile threat to North America, as well as make any new system as ABM Treaty compliant as possible.

Some recommendations

As a general observation, the conference concluded that the first line of defence against proliferation is not missile defence it is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles.

In the 21st century, it was emphasized, national security can only be meaningful as part of global security, and that in turn can only be achieved through multilateral cooperative, rather than wholly unilateral, efforts.

Before the outbreak of international controversy over the U.S. plans for NMD, a good deal of progress was made in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. A number of nations were persuaded to become non-nuclear states. New and increased measures of arms control were agreed upon.

The advent of U.S. missile defence, however, even though NMD is not yet deployed, has already had a negative impact at the disarmament talks in Geneva and elsewhere. Arms control measures have been frozen or put in abeyance.

Just as NMD provides no single answer to threats to global security - it magnifies the problem - so there are no single alternative solutions to NMD.

What is required is a whole raft of measures on which to build. Policy alternatives Canada, and Canadian activists, should pursue, include:

- A major effort to modernize international space law to deal with the weaponization dangers inherent in current U.S. plans for NMD, and even more so, the space warfare implications of the U.S. Vision 20-20 statement.
- Assist the Russians and Americans to implement and expand the Moscow-based Joint Data Exchange Centre on missile launches. Explore positively with the Russians their new plan for the missile defence of Europe.
- Directly engage countries of concern like North Korea and Iran, and also countries with nuclear weapons like India and Pakistan, to halt nuclear and missile proliferation.

- Also address Russia and China to halt the transfer to third countries of ballistic missiles and missile technology.
- Vigorously pursue Canadian initiatives at the Geneva disan-nament talks to institute for the first time an international code of conduct for dealing with ballistic missile proliferation, A moratorium on the flight testing of ballistic missiles might be a first step to a universal missile test ban.
- As chair of the G-8 summit in 2002, to push the case for the code of conduct and for greater transparency and accountability in missile activities.
- Press the U.S. to recommit to the principle of preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as the crucial pillar for the current nonproliferation regime.
- Persuade NATO to treat the potential danger from enemy missiles as a common problem facing the alliance, to be dealt with by NATO as a whole. A response from one member acting on its own could be counter-productive.

List of participants in Feb. 16, 2001, Liu Centre Consultation:

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