



LIU INSTITUTE FOR
GLOBAL ISSUES

ANNEX 1

Workshop

America in Question: Indonesian Democracy and the Challenge of Counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia

Jakarta, January 28-29, 2006

Concept Paper and Focus Questions

Co-organized by
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
The Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver

**Workshop on
“America in Question:
Indonesian Democracy and the Challenge of Counter-Terrorism in Southeast
Asia”**

January 27 – 29, 2006

Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

Organizers: Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia and
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

I. Participants

a. International

Acharya, Amitav (*IDSS, Singapore*)
Desjardins, Mark (*US Embassy – TBC*)
Emmerson, Don (*Stanford University*)
Evans, Paul (*Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*)
Flake, Gordon (*Mansfield Foundation*)
Job, Brian (*University of British Columbia*)
Jones, Sidney (*International Crisis Group*)
Kohno, Takeshi (*Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo*)
Liddle, Bill (*TBC*)
Rabasa, Angel (*RAND Corporation*)
Snyder, Scott (*Pacific Forum/CSIS*)

b. Indonesian

Anwar, Dewi Fortuna (*The Habibie Center*)
Azra, Azrumardi (*Rector, Jakarta Islamic University*)
Baswiden, Anies (*The Indonesian Institute*)
Bayuni, Endy M. (*Chief Editor, the Jakarta Post*)
Buchori, Bini
Djalal, Dino
Djalal, Hasjim
Effendy, Bahtiar
Hikam, AS (*Member of Parliament, former Minister for Technology*)
Joewono, Clara (*CSIS*)
Krisnandi, Yudhi (*Member of Indonesian Parliament*)
Kuncahyono, Trias (*Kompas Daily*)
Manzah, Zulkifli (*Welfare Justice Party (PKS)*)
Markus, Sudibyo (*Muhammadiyah – TBC*)
Masdar, Masduki, (*Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)*)
Mitayani, Trisanti (*Member of Indonesian Parliament*)
Mujani, Saiful (*Freedom Institute, Jakarta*)
Notosusanto, Smitha
Prasetyono, Edy (*CSIS*)

Sambuaga, Theo (*Chairman of the Commission I, Indonesian Parliament*)
Sastrohandoyo, Wirjono (*CSIS*)
Soesastro, Hadi (*CSIS*)
Sukma, Rizal (*CSIS*)
Suryodiningrat, Meidyatama (*Managing Editor, the Jakarta Post*)
Susilo, Joko (*Member of Indonesian Parliament*)
Syamsuddin, Din -*TBC*
Toha, Abdillah, (*Member of Indonesian Parliament*)
Wanandi, Jusuf (*CSIS*)
Widjojo, Agus (*Lt. Gen. Ret*)

II. Agenda (as of 18 January 2006)

All sessions at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jalan Tanah Abang III/27, Jakarta 10160, unless otherwise stated.

Friday, January 27th

19:00 Informal welcoming dinner for international and CSIS participants.
Location: Huating Restaurant, Millennium Hotel Sirih Jakarta
Address: Jalan Fachrudin 3, Jakarta, Indonesia 10250

Saturday, January 28th

09:00 **Opening comments and overview**

09:30 – 12:30 **Session I**

“Patterns and trends in Indonesian views of the US and US security policy”

- Two Indonesian presenters based on their papers (10 minutes each for highlights)
- Two Indonesian discussants (10 minutes each)
Discussion

12:30 – 2:00 **Lunch**

Remarks on how convergent are US and Indonesians views on combating terrorism

- Presented by: Sidney JONES, International Crisis Group

14:00 – 17:00 **Session II**

“Indonesian views of the American approach to counter-terrorism”

- Indonesian paper presenter; remarks by Angel RABASA, Rand Corporation

- Discussion

18:00 – 20:00 **Dinner**

Location: TBC

Sunday, January 29th (at CSIS)

09:00 – 12:00 **Session III**

“Current issues and future directions in US-Indonesian relations”

- Leads by Indonesian and Don EMMERSON
- Discussion

12:00 – 12:20 **Final comments** (Paul EVANS and Rizal SUKMA)

12:30 – 2:00 **Concluding lunch**

III. Concept Paper and Focus Questions

Despite unprecedented power and preponderance, the United States feels more threatened by forces outside its borders than at any point since the Second World War.

American security policy under President Bush has responded to these threats in a way that reflects heightened American power and heightened American fear. It is not just a series of responses to specific situations and individual threats but a fundamental shift in security doctrine and the U.S. role in the world. The US has been shedding constraints and using its strength to change the global status quo.

This workshop is part of a larger project examining Asian responses to a more assertive America. It was motivated by a widespread feeling in Asia and many other parts of the world that there is a large gap in perceptions and policies separating the U.S. from its friends, allies, and partners across the Pacific.

What is commonly called “anti-Americanism”—the expression of negative attitudes toward the United States -- may be too loose a term.¹ But whatever its motives and form it makes relations between the United States and other parts of the world more difficult.

The basic proposition we are examining is that while there has been a surge of anti-Americanism in most parts of Asia and substantial criticism of several aspects of American policy and strategic doctrine (a) this has not taken the form of a deep divide that has developed between the U.S. and some of its key partners in from Europe and

¹ Help is on the way in the form a volume on the topic edited by Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane. The authors emphasize the multi-dimensionality and heterogeneity of anti-Americanism and the ambivalence often associated with it. Instead of a single-anti-Americanism they find a variety of anti-Americanisms. Non-Americans look ott he United States as a mirror which reflects their own hopes, fears and faults.

(b) has not coincided with a diminution of state-to-state relations across the Pacific which, in most case have actually improved after 2001.

The International Context

On a global basis, criticisms of US security policy have centred mainly on specific actions such as the invasion of Iraq, the approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict, initiatives such as Ballistic Missile Defence or actions in specific bilateral relationships. Beyond specific policies, concerns have been voiced about the worldview and philosophy guiding U.S. policy in at least four areas.

1. A strategic outlook that appears to be aiming to transform the unipolar moment into the unipolar era by seeking “maximum spectrum supremacy,” and constraining potential peer competitors or coalitions of competitor states.
2. A radical departure on the use of force from existing ideas of containment, deterrence and sovereignty in the direction of preemption, preventive defence, and regime change
3. A diminished interest in international institutions and a preference for “coalitions of the willing” rather than rule-based multilateral institutions whether these be alliance systems like NATO or organizations like the United Nations. U.S. “unilateralism” and “exceptionalism” are seen to underwrite diminished commitment to specific international conventions and treaties (e.g. landmines, the International Criminal Court, Kyoto, CTBT). The U.S. appears to be placing its faith in power and resolve rather than international institutions or treaties.
4. An approach to fighting global terrorism that has emphasized military instruments.

In Asia, journalists, intellectuals and officials have criticized the Bush administration’s security policies and strategy, but compared to their European counterparts have done so with less vitriol and with less notice. In public forums, and regional meetings there are frequent references to unilateralism, arrogance and wrong-headed policies. A summary of views of Asian leaders expressed in security forums in Southeast Asia in June 2004 highlighted “a growing disconnect between the U.S. and its closest friends in Asia”, “a growing gap between the U.S. and its friends in Asia [that] could begin to undermine security alliances,” and “erosion of support of popular support for pro-American Asian governments.”² Critics frequently assert that the U.S. may be effective in attacking terrorists and rogue states but is overlooking the issues of equality and stability in the global order and hence losing its moral authority.

Whatever the public mood, almost all Asian governments have strengthened bilateral ties with Washington since September 11th. South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines have sent troops to Iraq. US efforts to introduce counter terrorism into regional groupings including APEC and the ARF have been generally successful. More

² Murray Hiebert and Barry Wain, “Same Planet, Different World,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 June 2004, pp. 26-27.

significantly, several Asian states and organizations, including ASEAN, have actively taken up the cause of anti-terrorism.

The Case of Korea

We began with a workshop in Seoul in May 2005 titled “*America in Question: Korean Democracy and the Challenge of Non-Proliferation on the Peninsula*” co-hosted with the East Asia Institute.

South Korea is a close US ally, has more than 30,000 US troops based on its soil, is firmly connected in economic and human terms to the US, is a democracy with an increasingly active civil society, and is an active player in regional and global institutions. It shares a peninsula with a dangerous and insular Northern neighbour and is thus a front-line state and player in conventional deterrence against North Korea and efforts to limit the spread of WMD, especially the North’s development of nuclear weapons.

The pattern of South Korean responses, thinking and policy may not be identical or even similar to other countries in East Asia. But the deterioration in US-ROK relations in the past four years not only raises serious questions about the future of the alliance but also about the broader trend in regional security affairs. US-ROK relations are at their most difficult and uncertain moment in more than fifty years. The alliance remains intact, South Korean troops support the American-led effort in Iraq. But tensions have emerged at several levels and on several issues. These include:

- How to handle North Korea, including the tactics and objectives of the Six Party Talks, the sequencing of economic assistance to the North, and specific new programs including Theatre Missile Defence and the Proliferation Security Initiative;
- Views of China, especially on the value of a rising China and whether or not it represents a strategic threat to the US and Northeast Asia;
- Views of Japan’s changing military posture;
- General US security policy including a perceived penchant for unilateralism in global affairs;
- Local-level tensions related to bases and the Status of Force Agreement;
- Announced changes in the decrease and redeployment of American forces based in South Korea.

At the level of public opinion, 2004 survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations indicates a complex pattern of similarities and differences between public attitudes in the South Korea and the US.³

- In identifying critical threats to their country, international terrorism is identified by 61% of Koreans and 75% of Americans; American unilateralism by 50% of Koreans; North Korea becoming a nuclear power by 59% of Koreans and 64% of Americans; development of China as a world power by 46% of Koreans and 33% of Americans (p. 11).
- South Koreans and Americans have generally positive views of each other (average of 58 degrees on the thermometer of Korean feelings about the US; 49 degrees by Americans about South Korea) but very different feelings about China (58 degrees by Koreans; 44 degrees by Americans) and North Korea (46 degrees by Koreans; 28 degrees by Americans).⁴
- Both publics reject preventive war (supported by 10% in Korea, 17% in US) but they are sharply divided on whether war is permissible only after an attack (supported by 34% in Korea and 24% in US) or on the basis of preemption in the face of an imminent attack (26% support in Korea; 53% in US). South Koreans oppose the use of nuclear weapons in any situation while Americans support the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack.
- A large majority of South Koreans view the US as beneficial to South Korea's security and want the US forces stationed there to act as a stabilizer for the East Asia as a whole. South Koreans believe the US would defend their country from a North Korean attack while Americans only support doing so when US efforts would be part of a UN-sponsored operation.
- South Koreans believe the number of US troops in South Korea but could accept a reduction and anticipate US troops remaining for a considerable time but not permanently. Americans believe the US has too many troops in South Korea and that a reduction would have no net effect on South Korean security.
- South Koreans are willing to accept US military action against North Korea over its nuclear weapons program if negotiations fail and if the action has UN approval.

Most observers agree that there is a substantial and possibly widening gap between the Korean and US governments on how to manage relations with North Korea and

³ *Global Views 2004: Comparing South Korean and American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004).

⁴ A December 2002 Gallup Korea survey paints a starker picture. It revealed that the percentage of South Korean respondents having a "positive image" of the US is 37.2%; of Japan 30.3%; of China 55% and of North Korea 47.4%. Thus South Koreans today "view their Cold War allies...more negatively than their Cold War enemies". Cited in Choong Nam Kim, "Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.-ROK Alliance," *Asia Pacific Issues*, No. 67 (Honolulu: East-West Center, April 2003), p. 1.

the alliance itself. Both public attitudes and government policies in Korea are moving away from the Bush administration and continue to support the conciliatory Sunshine Policy initiated by Kim Dae-jung. The Roh government made what it felt to be regional and global policy concessions to the US in the expectation that the Bush administration would make concessions in addressing the North's nuclear weapons program. The strategy of issue linkage, accommodating US policy in regional and global security areas in return for the Bush administration's acceptance of the policy of dialogue vis-à-vis North Korea, has sometimes worked and sometimes become a cause of even greater conflict and tension between Seoul and Washington.

South Korean opinion on the alliance is polarized and volatile. The Seoul workshop examined why. Debate centred on six factors: generational differences; resurgent nationalism; vagaries in inter-party political competition; poor policy coordination between Washington and Seoul; politicization of US-ROK relations; and management of specific incidents including the death of two Korean girls in June 2002.⁵

The generational divide is certainly sharp but may be nothing more than a reflection of broader political transformations occurring in South Korea. The politicization of views of the US may be rooted in a more fundamental struggle to create a new national Korean identity. Negative comments about the US reflect the diversity, plurality, individuality of new actors in political life who are attempting to correct the imbalances and biases of the past. Anti-Americanism is thus a reaction to and reexamination of the past as part of an identity building process that is responding to a crisis of legitimacy in both South and North Korea. Instead of denying civil society, political elites in South Korea are now encouraging civil society participation and the evolution of an ethical politics and foreign policy.

What became clear in the discussion at the Seoul workshop was that views of the US and North Korea were being deeply influenced by the dynamics of South Korea's democratization. Anti-American sentiment could in fact be a sign of political health. The papers and discussion raised four ideas about how democratization in South Korea is influencing Korean national security policies and relations with the US.

First, there is a widely-held view in South Korea, and in other parts of Asia, that the United States is better at promoting democracy than accommodating it. Senior leaders in Washington have considerable experience in managing diverse points of view on foreign policy within the US, but they seem to be having difficulty absorbing the increasing diversity of opinion within Asian societies that are becoming more open and democratic. Democratizing governments in Asia face a similar challenge. They have long had to adjust to public opinion as an influence on US foreign policy, but not at home. These tendencies are made more complex by the tendency of the media to emphasize differences and amplify shifts in public attitudes.

Second, democratization in Korea has brought new voices into the discussion of security policy and a new regime to power. This has been accompanied by the rise of domestic civil society and more pluralism in recruitment of officials.

⁵ A full report, including copies of the commission papers, is available at <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/collateral/common/index.cfm?fuseaction=view&pageName=announcements&contentID=533§ion=Information&subSection=Announcements>

Third, democratization appears to erode support for traditional balance of power concepts and Cold War mindsets. Most Koreans appear to want significant adjustments in the US-ROK alliance and more emphasis on multilateral and cooperative security arrangements in Northeast Asia and on an East Asian basis (e.g. ASEAN Plus Three). A similar pattern seems to be emerging in other newly-emerging democracies in Asia including Indonesia, which is promoting the idea of an ASEAN Security Community, Thailand and the Philippines.

Fourth, the presence of the common value of democracy and the institutions of democracy do not necessarily outweigh differences in identities and interests. The gap of perceptions and policies that separates South Korea and the US on how to respond to North Korea and how to restructure the alliance are deeply affected by a new openness in South Korea on issues including views of the past, sovereignty, ethnic homogeneity, and nationalism. Volatility, diversity and complexity in public opinion and public policy are to be expected for many years to come.

Regarding policy implications for US-ROK relations, Views of the US and the level of anti-Americanism depend in part on American behaviour and world events well beyond the peninsula. The failure of the US to live up to its own ideals and the specific policies of the Bush administration are contributing to global, not just Korean, disenchantment with the US. American policy makers continue to view issues from the perspective of domestic priorities and tend to see them in bilateral contexts rather than appreciating the extent to which US policies in one part of the world, like Iraq or the Middle East, affect perceptions of the US around the world. Policies as much as values are leading to new stresses in the bilateral relationship.

There is a high level of mistrust and mutual suspicion. It has been joined by a new form of “anti-Koreanism” in the US. American sensitivity post 9/11 has been increased by a sense of bewilderment and betrayal at the Roh administration’s response to the North Korean nuclear weapons program and the popular view in South Korea that the US poses a greater danger to peace and stability on the peninsula than North Korea. Some in Washington believe that South Korea underestimates and misreads the North Korean threat, fears Washington more than Pyongyang, acts as an apologist for North Korea, refuses to use any sticks and instead prefers only carrots, increases the risk of miscalculation by North Korea, and is in denial about the reality and implications of North Korea’s weapons programs. The American public expects gratitude rather than resentment from South Koreans.

One worry is that mistrust and suspicion may lead the US to lose patience in accommodating the views of the Roh administration and absorbing the criticism from various quarters in South Korea. Some fear that *Washington* may decide to terminate the alliance.

The Jakarta Workshop

We chose Indonesia as the focus of the second workshop for several reasons. First, it is an important country in its own right and is in a process of robust democratization. Second, it is of increasing significance to the US economically and politically, especially in the context of the fight against terrorism and religious extremism. Third,

there have been virulent public reactions to US foreign policy since September 11th that have had a complex impact on action by the Indonesian government. Fourth, it makes for an interesting comparison with South Korea and allows us to draw some broader conclusions about Asian, or at least Eastern Asian, responses to Bush-era security policies.

In anticipation of the findings of the papers commissioned for the workshop, here are some general observations on the results of recent polling and focus groups.

Patterns in Public Opinion in Indonesia

Though the number of polls has been smaller than in the case of Korea, the publicly available ones reveal several broad patterns.⁶

- General images of the US role in the world since 2001 are not positive, generally below world average
- Images of the US are volatile, perhaps more volatile than in any other country in Asia and more than any other Muslim country. In a Pew GAP Study in 2002, 61% of Indonesians expressed a “favourable” attitude toward the United States. After the invasion of Iraq a year later that number fell to 15%. In February 2005, after the tsunami, negative opinion had dropped from 83% in 2003 to 54%. (The polls also found that the percentage of Indonesians expressing confidence in Osama bin Laden fell from 58% to 23%.)
- On the key issue of US approaches to anti-terrorism, the Terror Free Tomorrow survey in February 2005 found that:
 - a) In the first substantial shift of public opinion in the Muslim world since the beginning of the United States’ global war on terrorism, more people in Indonesia now favors American efforts against terrorism than oppose them.⁷

⁶ See "American Character Gets Mixed Reviews: U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative", Pew Global Attitudes Project (June 2005): <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/247.pdf>; "A New Beginning: Strategies for a More Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World", Council on Foreign Relations Press (May 2005): http://www.cfr.org/publication/8060/new_beginning.html; "A Major Change of Public Opinion In the Muslim World: Results from a New Poll of Indonesians", Terror Free Tomorrow (Feb 2005): <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=56>; "Global Opinion: The Spread of Anti-Americanism", Pew Global Attitudes Project (Jan 2005): <http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=104>; Who Will Lead the World?: Shifting Alignments in World Public Opinion GlobeScan/PIPA <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20050406.htm>; "Four More Years: the Asian Perspective" TIME/CNN (Nov 2004): <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501041122-782166,00.html>;

⁷ This corresponds with the views of one admired Indonesian watcher, Greg Fealey, who is reported as saying "There has been a change in attitude among the Indonesian population regarding terrorism in the past six months. There really has been a sea change...The second Bali bombings had convinced sceptics that the threat from terrorism was real and not some trumped-up Western plot." Quoted in the

- b) 65% of Indonesians now are more favorable to the United States because of the American response to the tsunami, with the highest percentage among people under 30.
 - c) More people favor US-led efforts to fight terrorism than oppose them (40% to 36%).
 - d) Those who oppose US efforts against terrorism have declined by half, from 72% in 2003 to just 36% today.⁸
- Focus groups in January 2005 in four Muslim countries seem to suggest that:
 - a) It is possible to improve the image of the United States in the Muslim world. Although many Muslims are angry at what they perceive America does, the right efforts to communicate can produce significant shifts in attitudes.
 - b) Attitudes toward America in the four countries are marked by ambiguity and ambivalence—but they have become much more negative in recent years. Immediate reactions to the United States reveal resentment of American power and of President Bush. American behavior is perceived as being largely predatory. This hostility is spilling over into negative attitudes toward American people and brands. Yet Muslims still respect, if somewhat grudgingly, America's economic strength, educational and legal systems, and work ethic. They recognize that America possesses what they believe their own societies need most to develop. They are of two minds about American popular culture, drawn to American styles and movies yet appalled by their violent and lewd aspects.
 - c) Muslims are angry at what they perceive America to do. Many of the focus group members once admired America and regret that their feelings have soured. They do not hate America's freedom and wealth; they envy them. They do not project repressed rage at their governments onto ours; their views of America have worsened while their attitudes toward their own rulers have improved and their societies have grown freer. It is more accurate to say they hate America for what the country has done, but it is most accurate to say they are hostile to American policies as they perceive them. They are angered by what they have heard about Iraq, the war on terror, Palestine, and post-September 11 American views of Muslims, filtered by largely hostile television stations and print media. They are ignorant of U.S. aid programs that address national priorities they hold dear, despite massive increases in such aid in recent years. Ironically, when asked what they want from America, they request respect and aid—things America can provide.

Sydney Morning Herald, January 11, 2006,
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2006/01/10/1136863239483.html?>

⁸ A Major Change of Public Opinion In the Muslim World: Results from a New Poll of Indonesians Terror Free for Tomorrow <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Full%20Report.pdf>

d) In contrast to local Islamists, Osama bin Laden received rock-star reviews from many young Muslims. Many dismissed his ties to terrorism as American propaganda, describing him as a “victim of false accusation” and “a name invented by the United States to justify its acts.” Some, however, particularly women and older people in Morocco and Indonesia, were more critical, terming him a “terrorist,” a “world criminal,” and a “coward” who “gives Muslims a bad image.” Bin Laden’s appeal was as an outlet for anti-American frustration, much more than for Islamic fundamentalist ideology: he “put America in its place.” In the focus groups, no one said they liked bin Laden because they wanted a Taliban-style state or to impose Islamic law. Instead, they admired his fortitude and skill against the dominant world power.

e) Indonesian focus group members had mixed feelings about the United States. They hated America, but they loved it, too, even if recent years had accentuated their hostility. Anger at U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. government dominated immediate reactions to America. Spontaneous “top-of-mind” reactions were hostile, focused on politics and war. A generalized resentment and hostility toward the power of the United States was palpable in all the focus groups. Spontaneous associations included “power,” “world police,” “sophisticated weapons,” “arrogance,” “domination,” “blood,” “cowboy,” and “greed.” Fear of American domination was a leitmotif throughout the discussions.

f) Views of President Bush were very negative: not one member in any focus group had a good word for him.

g) The rejection of U.S. views on the war in Iraq was total in the focus groups. Muslims in Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia felt the United States invaded on a false premise to further its own regional goals and were unhappy with everything they saw and heard about Iraq.

h) U.S. policies in the war on terror are seen as feeding violence rather than reducing it. Many focus group members argued that the United States used terrorism as a pretext to attack Muslim nations or that it—unwittingly or wittingly—provoked terrorist acts.

i) Many focus group participants held conspiratorial images of U.S. policymaking toward Israel and the Muslim world. The most prominent of these flowed from stereotypes about Jewish influence in America, which were pervasive among the focus group participants in all three countries despite their high levels of education.

j) U.S. relief had not dramatically changed opinions about America, but the balance of views had become more positive. Most Indonesian focus group members were very grateful for American tsunami relief. Unlike before the disaster, many were willing to give America the benefit of the doubt. Yet some still suspected American motives.⁹

⁹ A New Beginning: Strategies for a More Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 7 May 2005 http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Anti-American_CSR.pdf

All of these observations are of course subject to scrutiny for several reasons including methodology, interpretation, and evidence.

Questions for Consideration

Each participant in the workshop is asked to design one or two key questions for each session. The following are merely suggestive.

On patterns and drivers of public opinion

- What explains the rapid rises and falls of public attitudes in Indonesia toward the United States? If American assistance after the tsunami is part of the explanation, can the bounce be sustained? Do other bilateral initiatives such as the resumption of IMET, or US aid to public education in Indonesia play an important role? Has the concern among elites dissipated about the views of the US administration on global issues including UN reform, WMD, non-proliferation, Kyoto and the ICC? Have public criticisms about the US-led invasion of Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict been muted in the face of improved bilateral diplomatic relations?
- Have negative images of US security policy spilled over into commercial or other substantive relations? Is there some kind of firewall that protects government-to-government relations from shifts in public opinion?
- How significant are the roles of Indonesian religious leaders in influencing opinion about the US?
- What are the recurrent narratives that underpin both positive and negative assessments of the US?
- Do public attitudes toward the US track closely with attitudes toward Australia?

On the possibility of a convergence of US and Indonesian views on how to fight terrorism

- Is in fact a convergence occurring? If so, does it go beyond mutual fears of terrorist attacks and religious extremism to also include joint policy initiatives to combat them?
- What areas of disagreement remain?
- Has Washington made any policy adjustments in response to Indonesian concerns or proposals? Does Indonesia have the ears of top officials in Washington on fighting terrorism or other major security issues?

On next steps in US-Indonesian relations

- Is there any prospect of an anti-Indonesian backlash in elite circles or public opinion in the US?

- What kinds of new bilateral initiatives or programs would advance US-Indonesian understanding?
- Will more democracy in Indonesia bring it into closer alignment with US priorities and approaches?