

Workshop Report*

America in Question: Indonesian Democracy and the Challenge of Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Jakarta, 28-29 January 2006

Co-organized by:

Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
The Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver

The workshop was the third and final in a series of meetings on “Rebuilding American Security” funded by the Ford Foundation and organized by the Liu Institute for Global Issues in cooperation with partner institutions in Asia. The basic question informing the series was how democratization in Asia affects national security priorities, views of US security policy, and relations with the US. It followed earlier meetings in Santa Monica and Seoul. The full report on the Seoul workshop is available at: <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/collateral/common/index.cfm?fuseaction=view&pageName=announcements&contentID=533§ion=Information&subSection=Announcements>.

As outlined in the concept paper circulated in advance of the meeting (*see Annex 1*), the Jakarta workshop aimed to assess Indonesian reactions to the Bush administration’s security strategy, especially its approach to countering terrorism in Southeast Asia. Indonesia was selected because of its size, the fact that it contains the largest Muslim population in the world, its renewed importance within Southeast Asia, its activities in combating terrorism and religious extremism, and its march to democracy in the post-Suharto era.

The fifty-five participants included twelve from the United States, Singapore, Canada and Japan and the remainder from research institutes, NGO’s, religious organizations, political parties, parliament, government agencies, the media and universities in Jakarta, chosen to represent a variety of political, ideological and generational perspectives. The discussion was conducted in English and, save for the views expressed in the background papers, on a non-attribution basis. Almost all of the Indonesian participants had extensive first-hand experience with the United States, including time spent in the US as students, teachers or diplomatic representatives, or having had regular interactions with American officials, academics or professionals.

Highlights and Key Themes

While national governments in Asia, including Indonesia’s, are generally able to work with the Bush administration on foreign policy issues, and must do so, there are significant gaps in approach and policy. There is an even larger gap at the level of public opinion, with large majorities highly critical of the United States. More precisely, the criticism focuses on the Bush administration and its policies even as most Indonesians remain very receptive to what are perceived as American values.

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These gaps are in part explained by the dynamics of democratization. In Indonesia, there is increasing urgency in combating terrorism while at the same time protecting rights and freedoms in a fledgling and fragile democratic transition. More sectors of the Indonesian public are able to voice their concerns about the

* Thanks to Patricia Chu for editorial work and Gordon Flake, Brian Job, Scott Snyder and Christine Tian for preparing notes on individual sessions and to Don Emmerson for editorial and substantive comments.

Indonesian government's policies as well as those of the United States. Public opinion can no longer be kept "under wraps". The Yudhoyono government's approach was described as "pragmatic" and "measured" in responding both to terrorism and extremism at home as well as to pressures and opinions emanating from the United States. The discrepancy between "US values" and "US behavior" in Iraq and the Middle East makes it harder for Indonesians to articulate moderate views that could lead public discussion.

Some of the participants used the term "anti-Americanism." Others felt the term was misleading, arguing that Indonesian reactions were a more complex blend of ideas, images and narratives. There is strong criticism in some circles in Indonesia about basic American values including support for individual freedom, human rights, civil liberties, democracy and open markets. But most Indonesians continue to admire many aspects of American values and institutions. The dissatisfaction, anger and resentment focuses on specific US policies (especially in the Middle East) and what was portrayed, using the words of some of the Indonesian participants, as the Bush administration's "inconsistent," "arrogant," and "hypocritical" application of American values in international affairs.

International terrorism is a real problem but should not be the primary prism through which Indonesia is viewed

Indonesian participants emphasized that international terrorism is a real problem but should not be the primary prism through which Indonesia is viewed. Bilateral relations and domestic political reform are undermined when US officials fixate on the single issue of terrorism and when they fail to see Indonesia as not simply the largest Muslim country but as a democratizing and developing country. These larger economic, political, and social dynamics are of greater, longer-term importance.

Beyond the stresses and opportunities in bilateral relations, and appreciation for the work of the US embassy in Jakarta, several participants expressed concern about the poor state of mutual understanding between the two countries, the absence of expert knowledge about the other in each capital, and the erosion of trust and respect at high levels.

Indonesian democracy makes it inevitable that public disenchantment with American policy and attitudes will be voiced, heard, and sometimes heeded. The management of bilateral relations is thus becoming more complex. In addition to the complexities of creating a positive understanding at the most senior levels of government, the new challenge is to better understand and address public concerns and perceptions.

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Several participants emphasized that the Bush administration's views on how to frame and fight terrorism can erode hard-won democratic reforms within Indonesia. One noted that "we may need to save American democracy to save our own." Democracy may in fact be pushing the two countries further apart at the same time that it has the potential to bring them closer together, bilaterally and in regional and global fora.

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Patterns and Trends in Indonesian Views of the US and US Security Policy

The background paper by Saiful Mujani and William Liddle, "Anti-Americanism Among Contemporary Indonesians" (see Annex 2), focused on data generated in and around Aceh in late 2004 and early 2005 as part of a study conducted by the Lembaga Survei Indonesia. It distinguished anti-American attitudes, which were widely held, volatile, and heavily influenced by religious affiliation, from anti-American behaviour (in its non-violent forms including demonstrations and boycotts) in which less than 2% of Indonesians are involved.

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The study found a generally positive assessment of the idea of "individual freedom" and divided opinion about whether the US attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terror are attacks on Islam. A key predictor is religious affiliation, with the Muslim majority in Aceh having a decidedly less positive view of the US than

Catholic minorities in Nias, even after recognizing US assistance after the Tsunami.

Positive attitudes towards the US as a democratic, anti-colonial leader of the 1960s and early 1970s have been replaced by negative views influenced by US policies in the Palestine-Israeli conflict.

Anies Baswedan's paper, "Interpreting Public Opinion in Indonesia: Does Religion Matter?" (see Annex 3) focused on how public opinion is created, emphasizing the importance of television, which is five times more important than newspapers or radio and is the most trusted news source. The paper identified an "anti-hegemonic" logic in play, especially in the context of Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. In general, the positive attitudes towards the US as a democratic, anti-colonial leader of the 1960s and early 1970s have been replaced by negative views influenced by US policies in the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The troubling outcome is that it is "politically incorrect" and inopportune for Muslim leaders to be perceived as positively disposed towards the US.

A chorus of participants were skeptical of the view that Indonesians are inherently anti-American based on a civilizational clash of an Islamic Indonesia with a Christian America. The real roots of anti-US sentiments are US foreign policy actions abroad, just as they are manifested in Germany, France or Canada. Individual participants noted that Islamist precepts produce little support for Islamist political parties. Television personalities have popularized conspiracy theories and the view that "terrorism is an American creation." This is changing in the aftermath of the second Bali bombings, with a new trend toward criticism of extremist Islamic groups, mobilization of moderate Islamic leaders to condemn such groups, and support for government policies that are anti-terrorist and anti-extremist. Special mention was made of Vice-President Kalla's invitation to leading Islamic figures to watch the videos made by the Bali bombers and witness their use of Islamic symbolism.

Some noted that the Bush administration's "war on terrorism" had stemmed the tide of American isolationism and was in fact a response to public opinion at home. They lamented that Indonesians, even at the elite level, have a poor understanding of the US. Indonesian scholars and students who go to the US tend to study their own country, not the US.

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US and Indonesian Views on Combating Terrorism

Sydney Jones led a discussion at lunch based on her paper "How Convergent Are U.S. and Indonesian Views on Combating Terrorism?" (see Annex 4). The key parts of the presentation and response were that:

- Indonesian and American analysts remain very far apart in their perceptions of terrorism and how to defeat it.
- Indonesian views have changed little even after Vice-President Kalla aired the terrorist videos. There is still not a nation-wide acceptance of terrorism as a primarily domestic problem. Instead it is often portrayed in schools and student organizations as something engineered by the American intelligence agencies or Malaysian terrorists. A popular view persists that there is "small terrorism" in Indonesia, but "big terrorism" is perpetrated by the US in Israel and Palestine, and Iraq. The small won't be settled until after the big.
- There has been a push for domestic solutions after the second Bali bombing, focusing on poverty and unemployment as important causes and increased police and intelligence operations as the most effective tools.
- American views of terrorism in Indonesia continue to focus on the Al-Qaeda connection. US officials emphasize that Indonesians are not doing enough in failing to sentence Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, shutting down Jama'ah Islamiyah or the more radical peasants, or reducing Saudi aid.
- Indonesians in the post-Suharto era seem to be more concerned about arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention than the Bush administration is. In some respects, Indonesian authorities have a higher respect for the rule of law than do their American counterparts.

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- The cliché in the US about the battle for the soul of Islam leads to the false prescription that only when the right notion of Islam prevails will terrorism be solved. Radical Islam spans diverse groups, some supporting violence, most not. Lumping them together causes resentment and produces bad policy. For example, the concept of jihad needs to be approached carefully. It can be separated from physical violence. For most Moslems, the notion of jihad as physical battle is perfectly legitimate in certain circumstances. Effective responses will have to take into account the style and appeal of accessibly written books by people like Imam Samudra that appeal to young readers.
- Radical Islam spans diverse groups, some supporting violence, most not.*
- The US government's contribution of \$157 million to assist Indonesian education was welcomed in some circles. But the announcement was made under the umbrella of the war on terror which immediately led many Moslems to believe that the main agenda of the US was to change the curriculum of Moslem schools, to supervise mosques and schools, to introduce the idea of comparative religions and pluralism in to Islamic schools, and to promote a secularist agenda.
 - Treating terrorism in Indonesia as an insurgency, as frequently done in the US and Australia, is wrong. The best vehicle for combating terrorism is the police, not the army. Policing has been an area of common American, Australian and Indonesia concern and the Indonesian police have done excellent work largely within the framework of the rule of law.
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The general discussion centred on whether Indonesia is doing a better job than the US in fighting terrorism; the specifics of the Hambali case; the conceptual and political difficulties in connecting terrorism and religion; specific debates within Salafi and Wahabi circles about the definition and use of violence; the gap between elite and popular opinion about the nature and best response to terrorism; and a debate about whether a convergence of American and Indonesian views would be possible or desirable.

Indonesia Views of the American Approach to Counter-terrorism

Most Indonesian Muslims, both at the elite as well as grassroots levels, are uncertain and disturbed about how to respond to terrorism.

The discussion continued in the following session beginning with Bahtiar Effendy's paper, "Putting All Cards on the Table: Trust as a Factor in the War Against Terror" (see Annex 5). It argued that most Indonesian Muslims, both at the elite as well as grassroots levels, are uncertain and disturbed about how to respond to terrorism. One aspect of this uneasiness has been driven by the American perceptions of Islam seen in the views of American religious leaders such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Franklin Graham. All have delivered negative messages about

Islam that treat it as a religion propagated by "guerrillas, terrorists, theocrats and tyrants." These antagonize public sentiments in Indonesia.

These views reflect deeply ingrained attitudes in the West towards Islam that emerge at times of crisis like 9/11. Many Westerners perceive terrorism in a less complex way than Indonesian Muslims. As a result of differing cultural perceptions, distrust between Indonesian Muslims and Americans is growing. These differences are deepened by US policy in other parts of the Muslim world, especially the Middle East, where Muslim casualties are huge, and the US penchant for unilateralism disliked. The level of public suspicion remains high. This is exacerbated by the fact that some of the Indonesian terrorists detained by the US government have not been made available to Indonesian authorities.

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Several Indonesian participants emphasized that American soft power is more valuable than hard power in the fight against terrorism in Indonesia. US Ambassador Ralph Boyce was praised for the style and substance of his interaction with Indonesians through personal meetings and public appearances.

One American participant explained at length the evolution of US thinking on the war on terrorism, outlining its evolution through several stages. He portrayed the emergence of Indonesian democracy and US counter-terrorism strategy in Southeast Asia as mutually reinforcing. Southeast Asia is no longer the second front against terrorism but probably the 5th or 6th, well behind Europe and the Arabian peninsula.

Official statements by the US government have emphasized the “struggle against international terrorism broadly defined as the struggle against premeditated, politically- motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.” They have not referred specifically or exclusively to Islam. The administration has taken great pains not to define the war against terror as a war against Islam.

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Some sectors in the US may hold negative images of Islam but these are not dominant opinions and are not the foundations of US policy. The identification of the threat of Islamic terrorism came from the 9/11 Commission. But terrorism is a method that can be used by different groups for different purposes. This says nothing about motivation. Even if the present danger is Islamic terrorism, especially the Al-Qaeda network and its affiliates and ideology, it is not the only such threat.

Washington’s National Security Strategy places the global war on terrorism in the context of the wider and more ambitious goal of promoting liberty and freedom throughout the world. Defeating terrorism is only one objective. The strategy includes defeating terrorist organizations that have global reach including the capacity to strike the US directly, connecting state sponsorship to sanctuary, reducing the underlying conditions that can be exploited by terrorists, and defending US citizens at home and abroad. President Bush introduced two elements into the US counter-terrorism strategy in 2005 intended to deny militants control of any nation which they could use as a base for launching military attacks and to deny militants further recruits by replacing “hatred and resentment with democracy and hope.”

Although extremist groups may interact with each other, different policy responses are necessary for dealing with each specific group.

American officials recognize that although extremist groups may interact with each other, different policy responses are necessary for dealing with each specific group. The four broad categories of extremist groups in Southeast Asia are: terrorist sector of JI and/or cells associated with them; radical groups that promote and engage in violence, but have a local agenda and operate more or less in the open; paramilitary groups and militias; armed separatist organizations

Indonesian stability and democratic consolidation are more central to US geo-strategic interests in Asia and the world than counter-terrorism objectives narrowly defined. The re-emergence of Indonesia as a significant player in the region is a factor for stability. The democratic consolidation in Indonesia is viewed by Asians, Indonesians and Muslims in the US as an example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. And there are shared interests in areas including regional stability, freedom of navigation, economic cooperation and development amongst other things. There is now the opportunity for a strategic partnership because Indonesia is a democracy.

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The government to government relationship is only part of the picture. The US needs to engage Indonesia at the level of civil society, which includes public opinion. Indonesia is distinctive in the Muslim world in having robust civil society institutions, particularly religious ones. At the level of civil society, Indonesian mistrust of the US is severe and probably growing.

The opening remarks generated a lively discussion on three themes.

The first was the concept of “Islamic terrorism.” Many of the participants took issue with the claim that the American response did not conflate Islam and terror. Others argued that there was a connection that could not be denied but that had to be handled carefully. “It’s impossible to be a Muslim one moment and immediately cease to be one when commits a terrorist act” observed one participant. At the same time it is wrong to blame an entire Muslim community of their religion for the action of a very small number of its members. Another asked “Why not label terror as terror, instead of putting religious label on it? Why treat terrorists as alumni of pesantren instead of agents of terror?”

The second was the impact of the war on terror on Indonesian democracy. Several noted that the war on terror has hampered democratic reform, for example strengthening groups within the military to use new methods of surveillance and delaying or distorting security sector reform. Most of the participants seemed supportive of the way in which Indonesian authorities have tried to balance security needs with democratic process and respect for human rights. But there is pressure on the SBY government from the US as well as Singapore and Malaysia to employ authoritarian tools (including restriction on civil and legal rights) to fight terrorism.

The war on terror has hampered democratic reform

It is essential to strengthen the Indonesian state, especially its legal system, police and intelligence functions while simultaneously strengthening civil society organizations and the rule of law.

The third was how to combat terrorism. Some emphasized the important role of international assistance, agreements and cooperation in both intelligence exchange and economic assistance that would erode the social foundation of extremism and xenophobia. Several argued that the return to authoritarian ways and draconian measures world will not prove effective and will in fact contribute to old patterns of thinking in which conspiracy theories flourish and individual rights are trampled. Rather, it is essential to strengthen the Indonesian state, especially its legal system, police and

intelligence functions while simultaneously strengthening civil society organizations and the rule of law. A key problem is how to demonstrate why terrorism and extremism are wrong. The explanation needs to emphasize Islamic teachings and be taken to the pesantren and school curriculum. Grassroots, religious and inter-faith dialogues are helpful but insufficient unless they connect to radical elements as well as moderate ones.

Current Issues and Future Directions in US-Indonesian Relations

Donald Emmerson’s paper “Garuda and Eagle: Do Birds of a (Democratic) Feather Fly Together?” (see Annex 6) began with the democratic peace thesis that democracies do not fight each other and enlarged it for discussion purposes into what he called the “democratic amity” thesis. This is the view that democracies are likely to work well together and share similar views of regional and global order.

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In practice, Indonesian democratization and political pluralism have simultaneously produced both smoother *and* more turbulent relations with the US. The level of mutual understanding is not increasing. Attitudes and opinions run ahead of deep knowledge. In each country, media coverage of the other side is poor. For example, a survey showed that around 80% of New York Times articles on Indonesia focused on acts of violence and destruction. Nor have increases in US development assistance to Indonesia been covered by the US media.

Hadi Soesastro’s paper “East Asia: Many Clubs, Little Progress” (See Annex 7) argued that the new American attention focused on the Indonesia, even if generated by suspect motives, could be valuable to Indonesia. Indonesia and the US are both targets of terrorism, but the big story in the relationship should be Indonesia’s democratic transition and a geo-political context in which both countries face the major challenge of the rise of China.

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The regional context is important. The US can show support for Indonesia and other partner in Southeast Asia in bilateral ways but also in supporting multilateral processes like APEC and ASEAN community building. East Asia needs to get its institutional DNA right. A US-ASEAN or US-Indonesian FTA may be on the horizon. The emerging regional architecture needs to be inclusive enough that it is acceptable to the US. Indonesia as the opportunity to play a democratically-inspired leadership role in community building that would simultaneously reassure the United States and avoid the mistakes that have thwarted initiatives proposed by other countries in East Asia.

Relations have generally been positive, during the Suharto period and beyond.

On the state of bilateral relations, one participant, who had also attended the Seoul meeting, commented that the US is less important to Indonesian policy thinking and security interests than it is to South Korean. The level of contact between Indonesia and the United States has never been great and relations have generally been positive, during the Suharto period and beyond. Others noted that one of the positive aspects has been cooperation on non-traditional security issues including the very constructive role played by the US after the tsunami and, to a lesser extent, mutual cooperation on avian flu.

One speaker bemoaned the lack of specialist knowledge of Indonesia in Washington and the tendency of high-level American officials merely to “stop-over” in Indonesia on their way to other destinations.

American participants noted that informed people in Washington are aware and appreciative of Indonesia’s democratic transition, including the three elections in 2004. USINDO has been an important instrument for building this appreciation, effectively changing its previous image as Suharto’s lobby group. Nevertheless, one Indonesian participant asked how Indonesia’s democratic process has had any impact on American ideas about democracy or how to encourage democracy.

Looking beyond Southeast Asia, one participant suggested that there is a role for Indonesia to play in teaching democratic practices to Muslim communities abroad. It would have been inconceivable in past for Indonesia to be seen as a model of democracy that can be used to inspire Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and elsewhere. One American participant noted that this is a “value-added” aspect of contemporary Indonesia in the eyes of policy makers in Washington. It was also noted that Islam has never been a major influence on the character of Indonesian foreign policy. Membership in Islamic international institutions like the OIC has not traditionally been terribly significant. Only since 2003 has Indonesia begun sending top-ranked delegations to Islamic meetings with the intention of projecting an image as a democratic and Muslim country playing a moderating role within the Muslim world and beyond.

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The will to export democracy may be as strong as the will to achieve it.

The will to export democracy may be as strong as the will to achieve it. Democracy promotion must be done carefully, whether initiated by the US or Indonesia. The ASEAN Security Community idea annoys some of Indonesia’s neighbours and needs to be packaged and promoted carefully. Indonesia is considering launching an Asia Pacific Forum for Democracy involving ministers and senior officials to discuss practical aspects of democratic institution building, including how to organize elections, anti-corruption campaigns and to share experiences and best practices.

Indonesian democracy still needs external support.

Indonesian democracy still needs external support, in part because it rests on weak economic and social foundations. American assistance can be a double-edged sword. An Indonesian participant stated that while Indonesian democracy activism was modeled on and assisted by the United States, this perception has put the United States on a pedestal. Current US policies have knocked the US off that pedestal and catalyzed

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cynicism about the U.S. failure to uphold its own values. The US is not just acting wrongly in Iraq and the Middle East; it is betraying its own values at Guantanamo, Abu Grahib, and through domestic spying. Such policies tarnish the American image as Indonesians continue to seek models for democratic consolidation and promotion. It is now a major challenge to convince the advocates of democracy that democratization is for Indonesia and not for the US.

On the issue of how much American officials genuinely value Indonesian democracy, one Indonesian called for more tangible expression of U.S. support in the form of greater monetary assistance for democratic consolidation. Another noted that the United States was the only country without legislative representation at a recent meeting of the Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum. An American noted that Indonesian democracy is valuable to the United States and that this has been demonstrated in increased Congressional support for developmental and military assistance. The US is now willing "to give Indonesia the benefit of the doubt." Other participants were skeptical that the amount of these increases was significant or that Congressional motives were about supporting democracy as compared to halting terrorism. In the words of one, "the US long had positive political relations with the authoritarian government in Indonesia and elsewhere. The democracy factor may be less important than we think in explaining new American interest in our country."

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The proposal in December 2005 by Eric John, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, that the US and Indonesia work toward a "strategic partnership" produced considerable debate. It was noted that Indonesia currently has strategic partnerships with China, India, Russia and Japan. One Indonesian participant underlined the efforts of the Yudhoyono government to rejuvenate military-to-military cooperation with the US as a step toward a strategic partnership and spoke of prospects for greater cooperation on a range of transnational and economic issues. Another argued that the internal problems of democratic consolidation in Indonesia are still so overwhelming that it is premature to consider expanded U.S.-Indonesian relations. One American participant suggested that from Washington's perspective a strategic partnership could be expected to "keep China honest" and activate and inspire moderate Muslims in Indonesia and around the world.

Several participants underlined the risks for Indonesia and its current government in creating a strategic partnership with the US, even if the term is more grandiose than its actual content and even if it was introduced with little fanfare. It would entail a major shift in Indonesia's long-term policy of non-alignment. It would likely produce a nationalist backlash that, unlike in the Suharto period, could not be ignored. One Indonesian participant remembered the experience in 1951 when an elected Indonesian government collapsed in response to public protests about a proposed alliance with the US.

Others questioned whether there was a sufficient level of mutual understanding and commonality of interests to sustain such a partnership. The common interest in democratization and anti-terrorism were offset by a very low level of mutual understanding and abiding policy differences about Iraq, Palestine, Iran, Myanmar and North Korea.

"Get close; but not too close."

One Indonesian participant used the metaphor that in its relations with the US, Indonesia behaves like a flirtatious young girl, encouraging suitors to "get close; but not too close." This applies to relations with the US but also China and other Muslim countries. An American responded, extending the metaphor, that in any event the US is like a handsome young man who will not settle down exclusively with only one "strategic partner."

In looking to the future, despite a host of differences, misperceptions, and a basic lack of mutual understanding, there are many areas where cooperation is possible. One Indonesian participant suggested that the focus should be on what the two countries could do together rather than what they couldn't. A host of transnational issues require functional cooperation with a range of partners. Even with Australia, which is not a strategic partner, there is an expanding array of joint projects on money-laundering, drug-smuggling, and inter-faith

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dialogue. One participant called for Indonesia to avoid the risks of a strategic partnership and instead use “calibrated diplomacy” on an issue-by-issue basis.

Epilogue (June 2007)

Recent trends in public opinion in Indonesia do not indicate a warmer response to the Bush administration. A poll taken in January 2007 and released in April by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in cooperation with PIPA and GlobeScan shows that most countries, including Indonesia, reject the idea of the US as preeminent world leader; still want the U.S. to be active in international efforts to address world problems; and see their own country’s relations with the US improving. In Indonesia, 68% of respondents agreed with the statement that “the US is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be”; 64% feel that the US cannot be trusted to act responsibly in the world”; and 46% believe that relations with the U.S. are improving, 27% that they are staying about the same, and 23% that they are worsening.

See: <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/CCGA+ ViewsUS article.pdf>

In Indonesia positive ratings of US influence in the world have dropped from 40% to 21%

The same poll shows that after the Bush administration’s new “surge” strategy in Iraq indicates that in Indonesia positive ratings of US influence in the world have dropped from 40% to 21%, explained as “perhaps due to the waning of the positive effect of the American aid to Indonesian tsunami victims.” Overwhelming majorities disapprove of the US handling of: the war in Iraq (85%), the war in Lebanon (81%), Iran’s nuclear program (77%), North Korea’s nuclear program (73%) and treatment of detainees at Guantanamo and other prisons (72%); global warming (52%). And 83% see the US military presence as a destabilizing force in the Middle East.

See: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan07/BBC_USRole_Jan07_bgasia.pdf.

The visit of President Bush to Indonesia for an 8-hour stop-over in November 2006 did not do much to improve his image as seen in the poll results above. His effort to consult SBY on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and focus on new American support for the Indonesian education system were overshadowed by large-scale demonstrations before and during his visit. “It’s to Indonesia’s credit that it’s a society where people are able to protest and say what they think,” Bush said.

*“It’s to Indonesia’s credit that it’s a society where people are able to protest and say what they think”
George W. Bush*

Negative publicity about Indonesia, typically related to violence and radical Islamists, continues to erode the dominant image among informed members of the US public of an Indonesia that is moderate and democratic. This negativity has been reinforced by the travel advisory on the website of the US Embassy in Jakarta that advises against non-essential travel.

At the same time, government to government relations continue to be positive. The visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Jakarta, and various Indonesian votes on the UNSC, most recently the abstention on the US resolution to pursue the killers of Hariri in Beirut, have been downplayed in Washington. This may reflect support for SBY against his Islamist opponents, recognition of the democratic forces at play in Indonesia, or a strategic calculation of the importance of Indonesia as a counter-weight against the rise of China. Washington’s reference to Indonesia as the world’s “third largest democracy” has become something of a mantra. Indonesia is one of the few places in the Muslim world where democracy is succeeding. SBY may be emerging as an Indonesian Gorbachev, more popular in the West than in his own country.

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APPENDIX 1: AGENDA

Saturday, January 28, 2006

09:00-09:30 **Opening Comments and Overview**

Jusuf Wanandi, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
Paul Evans, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

09:30-12:30 **Session One: Patterns and Trends in Indonesian Views of the US and US Security Policy**

Chair:
Jusuf Wanandi, CSIS

Initial Presenters:
William Liddle, Ohio State University
Anies Baswedan, Indonesian Institute

12:30-14:00 **Luncheon Discussion: How Convergent are US and Indonesian Views on Combating Terrorism?**

Speaker:
Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group

14:00-17:00 **Session Two: Indonesian Views of the American Approach to Counter-terrorism**

Chairs:
Brian Job, University of British Columbia
Hadi Soesastro, CSIS

Initial Presenter:
Bahtiar Effendy, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah

Discussant:
Angel Rabasa, Rand Corporation

Sunday, January 29, 2006

09:00-12:00 **Session Three: Current Issues and Future Directions in US-Indonesian Relations**

Chair:
Edy Prasetyono, CSIS

Initial Presenters:
Donald Emmerson, Stanford University
Hadi Soesastro, CSIS

12:00-14:00 **Final Comments and Recommendations**

Chairs:
Paul Evans
Hadi Soesastro

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (see Annex 8 for biodata on the role players)

<p>International Acharya, Amitav (<i>IDSS, Singapore</i>) Emmerson, Don (<i>Stanford University</i>) Evans, Paul (<i>Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada</i>) Flake, Gordon (<i>Mansfield Foundation</i>) Job, Brian (<i>University of British Columbia</i>) Jones, Sidney (<i>International Crisis Group</i>) Kohno, Takeshi (<i>Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo</i>) Liddle, William (<i>Ohio State University</i>) Rabasa, Angel (<i>RAND Corporation</i>) Snyder, Scott (<i>Pacific Forum/CSIS</i>)</p> <p>Indonesian Adi Chandra, Bonggas (<i>Parahyangan University</i>) Anwar, Dewi Fortuna (<i>The Habibie Centre</i>) Anwar, Sjafii (<i>Director, ICIP</i>) Baswedan, Anies (<i>The Indonesian Institute</i>) Bayuni, Endy M. (<i>Chief Editor, The Jakarta Post</i>) Buchori, Binny (<i>Perkumpulan Prakarsa</i>) Djalal, Dino Pati (<i>President's Spokesman</i>) Effendy, Bahtiar (<i>UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta</i>) Hadi, Umar (<i>Department of Foreign Affairs</i>) Hasibuan, Bara (<i>Puri Consulting</i>) Hasjim, Sjafiq (<i>Deputy Director, ICIP</i>) Hikam, MAS (<i>Member of Parliament, former Minister of Technology</i>) Joewono, Clara (<i>CSIS</i>) Keliat, Makmur (<i>CEACOS – University of Indonesia</i>) Kepper, Irawait, B. (<i>PT Irii Ira Inanta</i>) Kuncahyono, Trias (<i>Kompas Daily</i>)</p>	<p>Lubis, Uni Z. (<i>Editor, TV-7</i>) Markus, Sudibyo (<i>Muhammadiyah (tbc)</i>) Masdar, Masduki (<i>Nahdlatul Ulama NU</i>) Mitayani, Trisanti (<i>Member of Indonesian Parliament</i>) Mulia, Musdah (<i>Department of Religious Affairs</i>) Mu'ti, Abdul (<i>Chairman, Pemuda Muhammadiyah</i>) Nashidik, Rachland (<i>Imparsial Indonesia HR Watch</i>) Notosusanto, Smita (<i>University of Indonesia</i>) Nusa Bhakti, Ikrar (<i>Indonesian Institute of Sciences</i>) Percaya, Desra (<i>Department of Foreign Affairs</i>) Prasetyono, Edy (<i>CSIS</i>) Rezasyah, Teuku (<i>Padjajaran University</i>) Robet, Robertus (<i>YLBHI</i>) Said, Salim (<i>PPSN</i>) Sastrohandoyo, Wiryono (<i>CSIS</i>) Siagian, Sabam (<i>The Jakarta Post</i>) Soebagjo, Natalia (<i>University of Indonesia</i>) Soesastro, Hadi (<i>CSIS</i>) Sukma, Rizal (<i>CSIS</i>) Suryodiningrat, Meidyatama (<i>Managing Editor, the Jakarta Post</i>) Susilo, Djoko (<i>Member of Indonesian Parliament</i>) Toha, Abdillah (<i>Member of Indonesian Parliament</i>) Wanandi, Jusuf (<i>CSIS</i>) Widjojo, Agus, (<i>Lt. Gen (Ret)</i>) Wirawan, Hariadi (<i>University of Indonesia</i>) Ismartono, Yuli (<i>Tempo Magazine</i>) Zulkieflimasyah (<i>Welfare Justice Party</i>)</p>
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Annex 2: "Anti-Americanism Among Contemporary Indonesians," by William Liddle and Saiful Mujani

Annex 3: "Interpreting Public Opinion in Indonesia: Does Religion Matter?," by Anies Baswedan

Annex 4: "How Convergent are U.S. and Indonesian Views on Combating Terrorism?," by Sydney Jones

Annex 5: "Putting All Cards on the Table: Trust as a Factor in the War Against Terror," by Bahtiar Effendy

Annex 6: "Garuda and Eagle: Do Birds of a (Democratic) Feather Fly Together?," by Donald Emmerson

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Annex 8: Biodata of Role Players