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I. EVANS AND CHEN OVERVIEW

The intersection of three forces—deepening economic integration and cooperation, deeper and wider cultural interactions, and geo-political transition and tension—make this a formative and complicated period in Asia Pacific.

In an earlier period of transition at the end of the Cold War, Asia Pacific states, supported and prodded by track-two processes, developed ideas and institutions that laid the foundation for a creative set of initiatives. Supplementing traditional international relations and bilateral arrangements, the twin ideas of comprehensive and cooperative security had three main pillars. The first was a security philosophy that focused on building security with other countries not against them. The second was an emphasis on creating multilateral processes for building dialogue, confidence and trust. And the third was inclusion of a range of non-traditional security issues (e.g. environmental degradations, illegal migration, natural disasters, infectious disease) into the regional security agenda as important in their own right, of equal significance to traditional matters of national defence, and potential bridges to wider cooperation.

Some of these ideas were firmly rooted in the practice and outlook of ASEAN, an association that in recent years has within its own region made moves in the direction of building a security community and that at the wider regional level has been central in building the institutional architecture that now includes the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit process, the ADMM+ meetings and a host of other meetings. These processes have been reinforced by a huge network of overlapping bilateral, trilateral and regional track-2 and track 1.5 processes for expert discussion and exchange.

This first phase of cooperative security in Asia Pacific was successful in several respects but is inadequate in addressing the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. In part this was because what might be called Cooperative Security 1.0 was really just a starting point in defining and instilling the habits of dialogue and cooperation. It was also because some of the main ideas hard-wired in at the beginning—the ideas of confidence building and trust building -- have never been achieved. It did not define the relationship between cooperative security approaches and the role of bilateral alliances in favour of accepting a “multiplex”, to borrow Yukio Satoh’s term, of security arrangements. And while it promoted measures for building confidence and trust through practical measures including dialogue, transparency, and information sharing, it never defined what they were or the deeper issues of how they operated. Finally, it is because of shifting tides in the distribution of power and capacity generated by the growing importance of several Asian countries, China and India chief among them. What new norms, rules and practices are needed to take account of their bigger roles?

We are meeting at an important time after leadership changes in China, Japan and Korea, the American pivot or rebalance to Asia, continuing tension on maritime boundary issues, rising nationalism, and amidst volatile bilateral relations among key states in Northeast Asia and unresolved problems on the Korean Peninsula, (as well as a broad agreement on priority of promoting growth and development as overarching and ever entrenched national objective.) Efforts in October by China’s top leaders to build a “2 + 7 Cooperative Framework” with
Southeast Asia, looking past a golden decade to diamond decade ahead, and featuring important initiatives related to economic cooperation, are encouraging but not yet comprehensive. While the aim is to build strategic trust, good neighborliness, and a “Community of Common Destiny,” the program is unlikely to be successful without constructive efforts in dealing with maritime disputes and strategic anxieties about a more powerful China that deeply influence ASEAN and regional attitudes.

In the past year there has been an outpouring of academic writings and policy thinking focused on the idea of “trust” including President Park’s “trust politik” proposals and reports and speeches from around the region using the related concepts of “strategic trust,” and “mutual trust.” Even while it is repeatedly mentioned as an objective, the material reality on the ground is something much closer to what the Indonesian foreign minister refers to as an increasing “trust deficit.” “Trust-reducing measures” often seem more robust than their opposite. Questions abound about what trust means, whether it is possible, and how it can be achieved. Is it based on establishing commonalities of value and interest or acceptance and management of differences? Can we ever “trust” those who are not “like-minded”? Is it based on rational self-interest, social capital or a function of identity? Must trust be based on good intentions and good words or a persistent pattern of actions? Is trust ever possible in international affairs and especially across deep ideological and political divides? Is it a bi-product of practical cooperation or its precondition? For example, is cooperation on managing the South China Sea and its resources possible even as political disagreements and sovereignty disputes are unresolved? Can the trust demanded in economic interactions spillover into the political and security realms?

Canada and China worked well together in assisting a first phase of cooperative security in the region through collaborative efforts in the successful integration of China into regional multilateral processes including the ARF and CSCAP. They also worked together in intensive dialogues on environmental issues and in projects like the Canada-China Seminar on Regional Multilateralism and Cooperative Security that operated on a track-two basis between 1996 and 2001 and produced materials The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon that helped clarify and shape regional discussions for a decade.

The agenda of the current project on emerging issues in the Canada-China relationship organized by the University of British Columbia and the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies started with meetings in November 2010 and September 2012 that offered a broad survey of bilateral economic, commercial, political and security issues. While bilateral relations were improving during this period and there are no direct security tensions between the two countries, it was clear to all of the participants that there were troubling aspects of security relations in the region that had the potential to derail economic growth and spiral downward into escalating military competition and potential conflict.

We organized the third meeting in April 2013 with a special focus on security issues and looked at the regional setting, how multilateral institutions could help manage the strategic transition underway, prospective norms and principles for the 21st century, defence modernization and the need of accompanying confidence building measures, and the potential for solving maritime disputes. Out of the discussion came a decision to dig deeper into several key conceptual issues and to link them directly to policy-relevant recommendations.
The main idea of what we are now calling “Cooperative Security 2.0” is that we need to revisit the first principles of security cooperation in the region and the principles, norms and public goods needed in a new set of circumstances. Cooperative Security 2.0, we all agreed, is vastly preferable to Cold War II. Rather than focus on the design and improvement of existing institutions, as important and potentially valuable as they might be, our aim is a broader look at the nature of the security order appropriate to the region, specific measures to advance confidence and trust, and consideration of specific measures in the context of maritime disputes that are examples of constructive steps forward.

More specifically, the November 2013 workshop has four main objectives:

First, clarify and examine the meaning and utility of several key concepts that might be embedded in Cooperative Security 2.0, among them: consociational security order; self-restraint; reassurance measures; trust and trust building measures; empathy and empathy building measures; Community of Common Destiny; core interests; opportunity engineering; New Model of Great Power Relations. To sharpen the discussion, short entries on the meaning, usage and evolution of these concepts are included below.

Second, a specific look at gaps of threat and threat perception in the Asia-Pacific, with the stress on China and Japan, China and the USA, and China and South East Asia Countries and how to bridge them? What are the nature of confidence and trust? Is “empathy” a necessary, and so far missing, catalyst in building real or deep trust?

Third, consider a potential roadmap for addressing maritime conflicts as an example of the application of CS2 thinking to an immediate and pressing issue.

Fourth, analyze the building blocks for a desirable regional security order and a more powerful version of cooperative, including how to apply some of the key concepts contributed by both teams to this process, priorities, difficulties and possible roadmap, etc.

If we are successful in our discussions, we can proceed toward a bigger regional meeting with additional participants from several countries to discuss the foundations and dimensions of a next-generation security order for the region and specific steps that can be taken to achieve it.

II. CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Self-Restraint (prepared by Zhang Linting)

It’s literal meaning is restraint imposed by oneself on one’s own feelings, desires. Also known as self-control¹. Norbert Elias referred to self-restraint as the key genetic material of what he

calls “civilizing process”. Wendt states that self-restraint indicates a kind of violence between rivals that is self-limiting, constrained by recognition of each other’s right to exist.

Broadly speaking, the term of self-restraint might involve three different usages in contemporary international politics.

The first relates to the ends pursued by states defined usually by national interests. Instead of maximizing interests and power, states sometime abstain from doing so even though they have the capacity. Thereby they restrain their own power in achieving their own national goals.

The second and most popular usage relates to state means. States often try to avoid the use of physical force in pursuing their perceived national interests or managing disputes/conflicts among them. They normally choose to deal with conflicts through compromise and by legal and diplomatic means.

The third and newest usage in Asia Pacific refers to the efforts of states to avoid the change of status quo in a unilateral way. In some cases “status quo” refers to territorial claims and sovereignty. In the sovereignty disputes between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea, when the Philippine government began to prospect unilaterally for hydrocarbons in its claimed areas after the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) expired in 2008, China perceived the Philippines’ cooperation with Western companies in the disputed waters as a provocationsignaling a move towards unilateral resource development and thus a violation of the “self-restraint” principle of the ASEAN Declaration of Conduct.

“Status quo” can also refer to balance of power, especially the balance of military capacities between states. For example, one American scholar emphasizes Beijing’s concerns about eroding norms of Japanese “self-restraint”, which may lead to a comprehensive Japanese military buildup in future. Such Japanese self-restraint on military development includes two parts: a constitutional part that involves the so-called “Peace Constitution” of Japan since WWII (Article 9); and a non-constitutional part which involves certain limits of power-projection capacity, tight arms export controls, etc.

Similarly, one Chinese scholar also describes China’s limited nuclear capacity development as “exercising self-restraint.”

In sum, what distinguishes this usage of self-restraint is that it indicates not only the avoidance of using force as means in disputes but also restraining and discouraging the development of military capacities in the first place.

Self-restraint is critical to the creation of trust among states. Wendt describes it as “the ultimate

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basis for collective identity and friendship.”

It is more important than nascent international institutions because if built on internal belief, it helps states overcome the fear of being engulfed by others in a more fundamental and perpetual way.

The challenge to the logic of self-restraint is that it is difficult to read other’s intentions. How to be credible? Wendt suggests three possible answers: through gradual socialization and the principle of reciprocity; through the dynamics of domestic politics, including the proposition that democracies have a much higher possibility to internalize the norm of self-restraint; and through unilateral initiatives including self-binding and self-sacrificing.

2. Reassurance (prepared by Zhang Linting)

Reassurance is usually used to describe statements and actions taken by states to reduce suspicion, strengthen cooperation and build up mutual trust. In the 1960s when the nuclear arms race was at its peak, Charles Osgood posed two questions: “would it be possible for this country to take the initiative in reducing mistrust? Could we transform the spiral of fear into a spiral of hope?” His Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) strategy applied the same logic behind a tense arms race to a tension-decreasing possibility. Contemporary scholars such as Kydd argue that that reassurance can dispel false beliefs as well as exaggerated perceptions of hostility that might drive them towards conflict or war. Stein defines strategies of reassurance as “not only the attempt to reduce miscalculation through verbal assurances but a broad set of strategies that adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of a threat or use of force.” Montgomery points out that reassurance is a type of “conciliatory policy” as contrary to “hard-line policy.” Conciliatory policy includes arms control and unilateral force reductions.

Reassurance usually is embedded in realist ideas including arms racing, balance-of-power, strategic trust, security dilemmas and power transitions. States are insecure in part because they can never be sure about others’ intentions. Therefore, a rational state has to build up its military capacities to strengthen its ability to defend itself. Due to the same uncertainty of intentions, such an action will trigger other states to worry about their own abilities to protect themselves and thus make them feel less secure. As a rational response, they will too start to build up their military capacities. Similarly, in a power transition scenario, a declining hegemonic power cannot be sure about the intentions and goals of a rising power. In order to maintain the status quo, it has to strengthen its military capacity and take preventive manners towards the rising power. On the other hand, the rising power is not sure about the intentions of the incumbent hegemon either, and it may see the hegemon’s actions as containment and thus feel less secure. When it too tries to strengthen its military capacity, the security dilemma between the two will worsen and the likelihood of conflict increase.

7 Wendt 1999, p.360
The concern in realist theory is uncertainty of intention and the consequent lack of trust among states. Rather than seeing this lack of trust as inevitable, some scholars argue that reassurance can be a both rational and viable strategy to ameliorate the security dilemma. If it is rational for one state to respond to another’s defensive build-up with an arms build-up of its own, it is also rational for the first state to prevent this outcome by reassuring others that its capabilities are for purely defensive purposes and not directed against any other state. In this way, a state can attempt to break out of the security dilemma by clarifying its preferences and identity as a status quo, security-seeking actor. Scholars like Walt, Mastanduno and Midford argue that strong states, whether hegemonic or rising powers, all have an incentive to reassure weaker states since doing so can help reduce uncertainty about their intentions. By way of reassurance, a state signals that its goals and intentions are self-limiting. This can help it establish a positive reputation and minimize the likelihood that other states will balance against it.

Reassurance strategies face theoretical challenges. How and to what extent can states guarantee others that their revealed intentions and preferences are true and trustworthy? Reassurance is about what Jervis calls signalling. Cheap talk and pronouncements do not build reassurance. To address this challenge, Kydd argues that a signal of reassurance must be “adequately costly”, which means gestures of reassurance should be attached with so much risk that a state would hesitate to send them if it were untrustworthy. For instance, he mentions that withdrawing a handful of troops from a heavily fortified border will be unpersuasive to the other side if the remaining forces retain the same basic offensive capabilities as before. But even if costly signals can prove the authenticity of a state’s reassurance promises, it is still questionable whether states are actually willing or capable to send out any costly signals. Following Kydd’s theory, Montgomery further argues that states that wish to reduce the severity of security dilemma are often confronted with a difficult trade-off: the same costly/risky actions necessary to reassure their adversaries will also endanger their own security if those adversaries are in reality aggressive. As a result, states may feel rather reluctant to initiate a reassurance strategy.

Reassurance strategies also face practical challenges. According to Janice Stein, there are at least four approaches through which a state can reassure others. One of these is through restraint (see above). A second is through developing shared norms of competition in areas of disputed interest among adversaries. A third is irrevocable commitment, along the lines of Kydd’s “costly signals”. And the fourth is limited security regimes. These are procedures and arrangements agreed by states in order to reduce the likelihood of accidental or miscalculated war.

In Asia Pacific, reassurance is a concept widely used by both scholars and policy makers. One prominent Chinese scholar describes China’s “harmonious world” rhetoric, its commitment to

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12 Ibid, pp. 151-185
15 Kydd. 2000, p. 326
16 Montgomery. 2006, p. 154
17 Stein. 1991, p. 435
multilateralism, as well as its increasing engagement with various regional security regimes as the key components of China’s reassurance policy. Another Chinese scholar, while admitting the efforts of reassurance taken by China, claims that a quasi-anarchical regional order in East Asia has impeded the effectiveness and prospects of China’s reassurance policy. In analyzing Japan’s grand strategy, one scholar concludes that Japan’s apparently pacifist outlier strategy “possesses the hallmarks of a reassurance strategy”, designed to reassure its East Asian neighbors who remain deeply suspicious as a result of experiencing invasion and occupation by Japan. As a matter of fact, Japan’s grand strategy, rather than reflecting an inward-looking pacifist culture, is “a rational response to the anarchical environment it faces.”

Some American scholars have focused on the role of US-led alliance in the region. However, contrary to the conventional usage of the term, which aims to reduce suspicion and ease security dilemma, reassurance in this scenario refers to a type of external security commitment. Facing the rise of China and the uncertainty it brings, South East Asian countries are looking for greater reassurance from the US in maintaining regional peace and stability. In this case, security reassurance means that a third state will provide or guarantee security to one state when it perceives facing threat from another. This returns us to the essence of balance of power thinking.

3. Trust (prepared by JagaaMenduul)

Trust is an important concept for explaining patterns of cooperation and conflict. Liberal theories of international relations consider trust to be a critical factor in maintaining peace among democracies and solving disputes inside security communities. Although trust is a key concept used to explain anarchy, security dilemmas, and game-theoretic approaches (e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt), it is under-examined by realist scholars. As John Mearsheimer frames it, “[t]here is a little room for trust among states”. Other theorists such as Alexander Wendt argue “that creating trust constitutes the fundamental problem of collective identity formation leading to the emergence of pro-social behavior in international relations”.

One recurring approach defines “trust as a belief the other side is trustworthy, that is willing to reciprocate cooperation and mistrust as a belief that the other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit one’s cooperation.” A second defines trust “an actor’s perception that it may safely

24 Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005), p. 3.
delegate control over its interests to others under certain circumstances.” As Hoffman notes, scholars generally agree on five key features of trust: the actor’s willingness to place one’s interest under another’s control; behavioral manifestations of trust; the degree of trustworthiness of others; prediction of future actions; and assessment of the risk of entrusting one’s interest to others. Trust is an important factor for states to cooperate and prevent misperception, miscalculation, and misunderstanding that could lead to conflict. Cooperation exists only when two states sufficiently trust each other to achieve short or long-term goals.

The term trust is used widely and innovatively in Asia Pacific, especially in official documents including treaties, charters, communiques, statements, concept papers, and reports. Often it is presented as “mutual trust” or “mutual understanding and trust” and used interchangeably with “confidence” in efforts to overcome historical hostilities. For example, the PRC uses the concepts of “mutual understanding” and “mutual trust” more actively than other states in the region. As explained by Finkelstein and McDevitt, “in the Marxist dialectical tradition of the Chinese Communist Party. The antithesis of ‘understanding’ is ‘disagreement,’ and the antithesis of ‘trust’ is ‘hostility’. The objective is to move relationships from hostility to trust while preserving vital Chinese national interests.”

In the Chinese perspective, “mutual understanding” is not so much about finding commonalities as it is the result of acknowledging strategic differences. “Mutual trust” is the product of action to resolve strategic differences. Therefore, in Chinese view, mutual understanding is precondition of trust. The term “mutual trust” is frequently used in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Cooperation and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), but rarely found in the documents or discourse of ASEAN itself.

The terms “political trust” and “strategic trust” are increasingly used in official statements between the PRC and the United States. Both refer to understanding and trust of each other’s

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28 A Chinese perspective presented at a seminar on Canada-China relations in 1997 drew a subtle distinction between the terms trust and confidence. It noted “in most security writings by Western scholars, the word ‘trust’ is used interchangeably with ‘confidence’ … In Chinese, xinren and xinlai correspond roughly to ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ respectively and have different shades of meaning. Xinlai implies that someone is not only believable but also dependable. Whereas xinren emphasizes the believability of someone or something.” The participant went on to say, “‘Confidence’ and ‘trust’ also imply different degrees of belief. ‘Confidence’ is the accumulating process towards the final trust. While ‘confidence’ is more procedural and with more psychological assurance, ‘trust’ is more conclusive with more assured action.” The comments were offered by Chinese participants at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II) held in Toronto in January 1988. The extent to which the term has been used in this particular sense by Chinese Government officials is unclear.
29 See “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy”, “ARF Security Policy Conference Concept Paper”, Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and official statements of the Conference on Interaction and Cooperation and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. The term trust used in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South East China Sea, which was signed between the ASEAN and the PRC.
long term intentions. Lieberthal and Wang define “strategic distrust” as the opposite of “strategic trust,” “a perception that the other side will seek to achieve its key long term goals at concerted cost to your own side’s core prospects and interests.”30 After identifying the sources of strategic distrust, they argue that the only way of building strategic trust is to increase mutual understanding on key issues in economics and trade, military strategy, cyber security, multilateral dialogues, and popular sentiment.

In a multilateral context, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung recently advocated building “strategic trust” for peace, cooperation and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific Region. In his words, “[t]rust is the beginning of all friendships and cooperation, the remedy that works to prevent calculations that could risk conflicts. Trust must be treasured and nurtured constantly by concrete, consistent actions in accordance with the common norms and with a sincere attitude.”31 He accorded ASEAN a key role in building trust through multilateral security cooperation. Because strategic trust refers to perceptions of government officials about the long term intentions and behaviors of other governments in an uncertain security environment, the level of trust is contingent on the degree of understanding and acceptance of common principles, norms, and rules. Although uses of the term trust usually relate to political, security, military and economic issues, the PRC, Japan and South Korea recently declared their intentions to enhance ‘people-to-people’ understanding and mutual trust via increased cultural exchanges among the three states.32

Park Geun-hyae, South Korea’s recently elected President, has used the term “trustpolitik” as an alternative to realpolitik in building economic, social, and cultural exchanges with the North Korean government.33 Beyond North Korea, she advocates building a trust-based partnership in a “New Northeast Asia” and with the Chinese new leaders.34 The other expression dubbed by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa in his recent talk is ‘trust deficit’, which feeds “a vicious cycle of increasing tensions and deepening of distrusts” in the Asia-Pacific.35

4. Trust-Building Measures (prepared by Jagaa Menduul)

Closely linked to a cluster of ideas including confidence building measures (CBMs) and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) (see 2007 Asia Pacific Security Lexicon). Initially used in the context of the Camp David Peace process on the Middle East in the 1980s, trust building in Europe is linked directly to regionalism, integration and the building of a

32 Joint Declaration on the Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership of the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan (May 13, 2012)
35 Address by Dr. Marty Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia, at the Conference on Indonesia, Washington, DC, May 16, 2013.
security community. There is a robust literature on institutional arrangements to advance trust-building in international affairs. Aaron Hoffman, for example, talks about the means for giving “effective voice” in collective decisions and “breathing spaces” to protect leaders from domestic opposition to international agreements.

TBMs emerged in a very specific way in Asia Pacific discussions in the early 1990s. Yukio Satoh, a Japanese diplomat instrumental in creating the ASEAN Regional Forum preferred TBMs because they did pre-judge a relationship of enmity. In 1994 Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans identified the need for a concept different than what developed in the context of Cold War Europe. At the first meeting of the inter-sessional seminar of the ARF in Canberra in November 1994, Paul Dibb introduced TBMs as including both military and non-military measures designed to promote that trust, arguing that “multilateral security dialogue is itself the first and perhaps the most important regional trust-building measure.” Dibb suggested that specific TBMs discussed by the ARF and the ARF-Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) fall into two groups: those that involve information-sharing; and those that require specific measures of constraint. Of these two types, he grouped TBMs into three baskets. Measures in Basket 1 includes exchanges of strategic perceptions; military-to-military contacts; observers at military exercises (on a voluntary basis); and participation in the United Nations Conventional Arms Register. These measures include exploration of a regional arms register; the establishment of a regional security studies centre; the publication of Defense White Papers; and the creation of maritime information databases. Dibb labels these as a ‘little less easy’ and says they would need to be implemented in the medium term. Basket 3 measures, the most difficult to implement, include notification of major military exercises and maritime surveillance cooperation.

Like CBMs and CSBMs, trust-building measures have the broad objective of promoting confidence, reducing uncertainty, misperception, and suspicion in the region and lowering changes of armed conflict. According to some proponents, they differ from confidence-building measures in the way TBMs tend to place greater emphasis on a gradual or incremental approach to building political trust between states rather than spectacular breakthroughs. Others claim they a less formal and more flexible than CBMs and are based upon consensus. William Tow and Douglas Stuart add that TBMs are often built on personal political contacts and relationships.

The phrase has had a life of its own as a signifier of an aspiration in the region, most frequently in the ARF context. Government officials and scholars regard ARF activities such as annual

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37 Aaron Hoffman, Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict (State University of New York Press, Albany, 2006).


ministerial meetings, senior officials meetings, inter-sessional activities, and various Track meetings as important forums for building mutual trust in the Asia Pacific Region.

Recent initiatives have introduced some new elements. The Vietnamese Prime Minister has spoken of building strategic trust based on acceptance of international law, upholding responsibilities of nations, and working to improve the efficiency of multilateral security mechanisms.

Trust has entered into recent analysis of US-China relations in important ways. Lieberthal and Wang emphasized reducing mistrust via deep dialogue about their core national security interests, establish agreements on mutual restraints in developing and deploying new capabilities, improve mutual understanding concerning security situation of the Taiwan strait, reducing tensions in the maritime space beyond China’s territorial waters, and taking steps to lessen security dilemmas (esp., in nuclear modernization and space activities).\(^40\) Dennis Roy takes a different angle when he emphasizes that commonalities, not appreciation of differences, are essential to building trust. “If there is something akin to trust in international politics,” he writes, “it occurs when states become convinced that they share important bedrock values and interests.” And, he argues that the US and China should further cooperation in mutually beneficial areas while striving to manage inevitable bilateral strategic tensions “by reaching agreements where both see a benefit and where compliance is measureable.”\(^41\) Curiously, He Yafei reinforces this idea of trust based on commonalities when he stated that

> “a huge deficit of strategic trust lies at the bottom of all problems between China and the United States. Some scholars have hinted that U.S.-China trust is at its lowest since U.S. President Richard Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China. But history is a mirror. And from a historical perspective China and the United States, despite their differences, have many things in common, and there is no reason for them to distrust each other.”\(^42\)

Not everyone believes trust building is possible, necessary or even valuable. Cooperation without trust is a theme in the writing of Yan Xuetong when he argues that “It is important to recognize that preventive cooperation offers a path for the two sides to stabilize their strategic relations in the absence of trust.”\(^43\)

At the bilateral level, especially between those recovering from past hostilities or avoiding escalation of existing tensions, states are creatively searching for ways to build trust. One such example is PRC and Taiwanese initiatives to establish a mechanism of mutual trust in military affairs. Former President Hu Jintao stated “[t]o help stabilize the situation in the Taiwan Strait and alleviate concerns about military security, the two sides can have contacts and exchanges on military issues at an appropriate time and discuss the issue of establishing a military security

\(^40\) Lieberthal and Wang, op. cit.,
\(^42\) He Yafei, “The Trust Deficit: How the U.S. ‘pivot’ to Asia looks from Beijing, Foreign Policy (May 13, 2013).
mechanism based on mutual trust”. Although the Taiwanese government acknowledges the importance of such a mechanism, President Ma Ying-jeou’s position is that the establishment of the military security mechanism and exchanges “must be preceded by the removal of the missiles that the mainland has deployed opposite Taiwan.” As Bonnie Glaser concludes, both sides agree on the need for bilateral trust-building measures, although the PRC is interested primarily as a means to build political trust whereas Taiwan seeks to avoid accidents and create a more predictable environment.44

The latest example of a trust-building initiative is President Park’s “trustpolitik” focused on humanitarian assistance and renewal of economic, social, and cultural exchanges in order to avoid escalation of existing tensions and to build trust in the long term for discussions on de-nuclearization and unification.45 In her article in Foreign Affairs (2011), President Park Geun-hye stressed:

“Trustpolitik” does not mean unconditional or one-sided trust without verification. Nor does it mean forgetting North Korea’s numerous transgressions or rewarding the country with new incentives. Instead, it should be comprised of two coexisting strands: first, North Korea must keep its agreements made with South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second, there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace. To ensure stability, trustpolitik should be applied consistently from issue to issue based on verifiable actions, and steps should not be taken for mere political expediency.46

President Park also pursues trustpolitik beyond North Korea. For example, during her visit to China in the summer of 2013, she urged Northeast Asian countries need to engage in multilateral dialogues on environment, climate change, disaster relief, and nuclear safety in order to expand trust into areas of politics and security sectors.47

Much of the activity in defence diplomacy has been connected to the idea of trust building. Processes for communication and cooperation have proliferated and most regional militaries today engage in bilateral, minilateral and multilateral trust-building networks at the strategic (and policy-making), operational, and tactical levels. In addition to multiple channels for dialogue, chief among them the Shangrila Dialogue, the ADMM+ process, there are multiple exercises in areas including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peace keeping, counter-terrorism, and

maritime security. Their distinguishing features are that they are non-binding, gradual, and voluntary engagements.

5A. Empathy, Part I: Defining Confidence, Trust, Empathy (prepared by David A. Welch)

“Confidence-building” and “trust-building” are terms widely used not only in Asia-Pacific security discourse, but in international security discourse globally. They are not, however, particularly clearly defined or distinguished. Often they are used interchangeably, not only with each other but also with the term “confidence- and security-building.” Despite the imprecision of these terms, their purpose is relatively clear: to reduce tension and the dangers of accidental or inadvertent war arising primarily from misperception.48 Confidence-building measures (CBMs), confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), and trust-building measures (TBMs) include, for example, prior notification of military exercises; invitations to observe military manoeuvres; other forms of military-to-military contacts; cooperation on peripheral security matters of joint concern (e.g., combating drug trafficking or other forms of transnational crime); and other steps to increase transparency so as to enable actual or potential adversaries to see more easily that their intentions are defensive and benign.

CBMs, CSBMs, and TBMs all have their value and their place, and arguably can be credited with significant historical achievements, not least of which is facilitating a peaceful end to the Cold War. By clearing roadblocks to meaningful cooperation in arms control, they provided opportunities for U.S. and Soviet leaders to get to know each other better, to discover shared interests and concerns, to overcome (or at least moderate) their mutual suspicions, and to rethink their conceptions of threat. They gave leaders a chance, in short, to improve empathy. Unfortunately “Empathy” is not a term commonly encountered in Asia-Pacific security discourse. In my view, empathy is a necessary condition for a stable peace. Before attempting to justify this claim, however, I must first clarify the relationships between confidence, trust, and empathy. It is helpful to settle on conventional definitions of these terms that, when translated into the dominant languages of the region, denote— and can reliably be known by others to denote— exactly the same thing. What is needed at the outset, in short, is some linguistic landscaping.

The necessity for linguistic landscaping arises as a result of the unfortunate fact that English has become the dominant language of global communication. This is unfortunate not only because English is unpleasant to the ear, but because it is messy and unsystematic. As a living language, English evolves over time, adding far more than it sheds and embracing usage without much regard to formal constraints (grammatical, syntactical, typographical, and so on). The result is that many commonly used words become overburdened with possible meanings, some of which are synonymous with other words’ possible meanings, and some of which are not. Among the oddities of the English language is the fact that some words can mean both one thing and its opposite: to “sanction” behaviour, for example, can mean either to approve it or to punish it.

Similarly bizarrely, a “spendthrift” is someone who spends a lot of money, but someone who is “thrifty” does not.

Dominant English-language dictionaries define confidence as trust and trust as confidence in at least one of the typically several definitions they offer for each.\(^{49}\) This both reflects and sanctions (in the sense of approves) common usage—so it is no wonder that people readily use CBMs, CSBMs, and TBMs interchangeably.\(^{50}\) But there are slight nuances in the ways dictionaries typically define these terms, and these nuances open up a window for clear, conventional understandings that are more useful both analytically and prescriptively.

### Confidence

If there is a standard reference for the meanings of English words, it is the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), whose first two definitions of “confidence” are as follows:

*The mental attitude of trusting in or relying on a person or thing; firm trust, reliance, faith.*  
*The feeling sure or certain of a fact or issue; assurance, certitude; assured expectation.*

For the moment, let us ignore the references to “trust” and “trusting” in the first definition, as I wish to distinguish these words from “confidence” as far as possible. The first point to note is that both definitions refer to a subjective mindset: confidence is an attitude or a feeling. There is debate in the scientific and philosophical literature as to whether confidence is a uniquely human characteristic—our closest animal relatives, at least, may also be capable of it—but confidence is, in any case, a conscious judgment.

Both definitions suggest that the judgment that confidence represents is a judgment of propositional truth-value. Having confidence in “a person or thing” or “a fact or issue” does not much constrain that about which one can be confident. Thus the following sentences all make perfectly good sense:

I am confident that my team will win the championship next year.  
I am confident that the sun will rise tomorrow.  
I am confident that 2+2=4.

Note that the probable accuracy of these three propositions varies considerably. Predicting which team will win a championship in a competitive sport a full year in advance is difficult because of the many variables and uncertainties involved. There is much less uncertainty about the sun rising tomorrow, both because of the observed regularity of the event and because of the fact that we have quite a good understanding of why this happens (though eventually, when the sun reaches the end of its lifespan several billion years from now, it will cease rising in the morning). There is no doubt whatsoever that 2+2=4, because this proposition is true by definition. Generally, we would not be surprised to find the confidence expressed in the first

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\(^{49}\) This is true, for example, of the Oxford English Dictionary, Meriam-Webster’s, and Collins.  
\(^{50}\) In view of the fact that these terms are not clearly distinguished, for the sake of simplicity I will henceforth refer only to CBMs.
sentence misplaced; the world is full of disappointed sports fans. In contrast, it would be odd to question someone’s confidence that the sun will rise tomorrow or that 2+2=4.

 Appropriately, confidence admits of degree. “I am somewhat confident that my team will win the championship next year” is less likely to provoke debate than “I am very confident that my team will win the championship next year.” In contrast, anything less emphatic than “I am very confident that the sun will rise tomorrow” is likely to raise eyebrows. In the third example, we might well wonder why someone would use the word “confident” instead of the word “know”—which helpfully points toward the conclusion that “confidence” is a word best reserved for cases where there is at least room in principle for doubt.51

The earliest understandings of CBMs referred explicitly to confidence in a particular set of propositions. Prior notification of military exercises, exchanges of observers, increased military transparency and the like all served to alleviate anxieties that military exercises were a cover for surprise attack and to reassure that they were intended to hone defensive rather than offensive skills. This sort of confidence could be expressed thus: “I am confident that my adversary does not pose an immediate threat to my security.” He does not, because he cannot—at least, not yet.

**Trust**

The OED defines trust as “confidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a person or thing, or the truth of a statement.” At first glance this would not appear to be an especially helpful definition, because it does not differ dramatically from either of the two definitions of confidence that we discussed earlier. In fact, taken together these definitions are not merely unsatisfactory; they are circular. If confidence means trust and trust means confidence, then confidence means confidence and trust means trust. With dictionaries like that, who needs enemies?

Note, however, the reference to “some quality or attribute of a person” (for the moment let us ignore the phrase “or thing”). In interpersonal relationships, the word “trust” usually arises with reference to promise-keeping, truth-telling, or acting out of concern for one another’s well-being. I am unlikely to say, “I trusted you!” unless (a) I expected you to do something of which I approve and you did not; (b) I expected you not to do something of which I disapprove and you did; or (c) my trust proved to be warranted and I wish to acknowledge your trustworthiness. Figure 1 illustrates a classic trust-building exercise widely used in organizational settings; people who are willing to fall backward blindly clearly trust that the others will catch them, preventing certain pain and possible injury or death. An unwillingness to fall backward is a clear behavioural indicator of a lack of trust.

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51 Or, as Immanuel Kant would put it, we should reserve the word “confident” for a posteriori judgments; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Relationships with very high levels of trust are devoid of suspicion and are typically characterized by generalized reciprocity. Trust is an important and underappreciated concept in International Relations.\textsuperscript{52} While states are only persons in an abstract sense, decision makers can and do routinely distinguish states they trust from states they do not trust. In security matters, trust is highest in so-called security communities, in which the threat or use of force plays no role in the management of disputes.\textsuperscript{53} The United States and Canada, for example, are members of a security community. Neither country bothers to defend their border.\textsuperscript{54} It has been more than 80 years since the two countries updated plans for war with one another.\textsuperscript{55} The prospect of a U.S.-Canadian war at present seems downright laughable. Indeed, the box-office success of comedies such as \textit{Canadian Bacon} depends upon it.\textsuperscript{56}

Note that CBMs add nothing to a relationship characterized by high levels of trust. The absence of anxiety is not a function of \textit{situational considerations} such as a technical incapacity to launch a surprise attack, but of \textit{dispositional considerations}. In point of fact, the United States could, if it wanted, conquer Canada militarily in at most a week or two. But it is not so inclined. The two countries are not adversaries. It is precisely this difference in the nature of a relationship that explains (for example) why the United States is concerned and alarmed by the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, but not at all concerned or alarmed by the fact that the United Kingdom already has them.

Technically, trust so understood is, in fact, a species of confidence. It, too, is a mindstate—an attitude or a feeling—reflecting a judgment of propositional truth-value. It can also be misplaced, though when this happens it triggers a distinctive, intense kind of hurt and disappointment. But though trust is a special kind of confidence, leveraging the potential utility of having two different words available to us requires that we be careful not to use them interchangeably. We should focus on how they differ, not on what they share. The key difference is that trust is an appropriate word to use when the ground of confidence lies in the character and disposition of parties and in the nature of their relationship. When one’s subjective sense of security depends entirely upon situational constraints rather than dispositional considerations, trust is an unsuitable word.

\textsuperscript{54} At nearly 9,000 km, the Canada-U.S. border is the world’s longest. “The Canada-U.S. Border: By the Numbers”, CBC News \url{http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/12/07/f-canada-us-border-by-the-numbers.html}.
\textsuperscript{56} \url{http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0109370/}.
Empathy

The OED definition of empathy is “the power of projecting one’s personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation.” Notice that empathy is a power, or a capacity, not an attitude or a feeling. Right away we can see that empathy differs in kind from both confidence and trust.

While the OED definition is somewhat vague (exactly what does it mean to “project one’s personality into” an object of contemplation?), there is a common metaphor that captures the idea extremely well: namely, putting oneself into another person’s shoes. Empathy is the capacity to see the world from another’s perspective. Importantly, the definition says nothing about sharing that perspective or agreeing with it. For this we have another word: sympathy. Now, like most interesting concepts in English, empathy is defined in various ways by various dictionaries and often used by people very loosely. As a result, it is not always clear which of several possibly meanings of a word one has in mind at any given time. Often people are not even aware that they are sliding back and forth between different meanings. Even smart people can fall prey to this tendency. A prominent psychologist at Yale University, for example, recently penned a widely-read piece in The New Yorker that failed to distinguish empathy not only from sympathy but also from compassion and pity, rendering his argument incoherent.57 The example nicely illustrates the importance of specifying exactly what sense of a word one has in mind when one uses it.

Constraining the definition of empathy to the capacity to put oneself in another’s shoes is useful because it is precise. The importance to conflict management of empathy so conceived cannot be overstated. Without understanding how others see a problem—what they believe, what they fear, what they want, what they need, how they feel—one can neither sensibly identify outcomes they would consider acceptable, nor give sustained attention to exploring possible ways of reaching them. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s primary conclusion from his own soul-searching about his role in world affairs was that empathy is crucially important, a point he made repeatedly in his own writings and in Errol Morris’s Academy Award-winning documentary, The Fog of War.58 Those who knew McNamara well know that he ultimately came to believe that the failure of U.S. leaders to cultivate empathy with Vietnam in the 1960s resulted in the unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of American soldiers and perhaps as many as 3 million Vietnamese. This realization haunted him.

Of course, cultivating empathy is not a sure-fire road to peace. Sometimes knowing one’s adversary’s mind will serve only to dispel hope for a peaceful solution to a dispute. A greater degree of empathy with Hitler would only have convinced European leaders in the 1930s of the inevitability of war, because war is what Hitler wanted.59 But even in this (almost certainly rare) case, more empathy is better than less. World War II would have been shorter and less costly if European leaders had seen it coming sooner and prepared accordingly.

Confidence, Trust, and Empathy: Connections and Pathways

In the hope that I have made a good case for restricting the use of these three terms in Asia-Pacific security discourse to the meanings specified here, what are the logical and empirical connections between them? How might they be leveraged to the cause of peace? It is clear that empathy is a necessary condition for trust—at least, for trust that is not misplaced. Judging someone well-disposed and reliable enough not to pose a threat requires imagining correctly that they see you in a positive light. Empathy is not, however, a sufficient condition for trust, as the Hitler example shows. Does the causal arrow point equally in the opposite direction? Perhaps ironically, the answer is no. If a high level of empathy is required for trust, and if trust represents confidence that someone’s well-meaning disposition will endure, it may blind you to signs of change. Most people are caught by surprise when they discover that their spouses or partners have been unfaithful. Trust tends to perpetuate trust, and an erosion of its foundations can go unnoticed as a result. Small wonder that “trusting someone blindly” is never thought of as a good thing.

Empathy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for confidence. One is likely to be utterly incapable of empathizing with a psychopathic lunatic, but as long as he is locked away in a secure prison, one can have confidence that he is not a threat. Recall that as I am using the term here, confidence is a feeling of relative security that rests entirely on situational factors. On the other hand, confidence is a permissive condition for empathy. Cultivating empathy with someone is almost certainly easier when one is not preoccupied with fear that she will attack you at any moment. A generalized relaxation of tensions opens up spaces for creative interactions that may well lead to improved empathy. I say “may well,” because it is possible that it may not. Sometimes people are simply unfathomable no matter how many opportunities for interaction one has.

Trust is a special kind of confidence, so there is a clear logical connection between these two concepts. Is there also an empirical one? If we look at the history of security communities, we can see clearly that they evolve over time—in almost all cases (Australasia would appear to be the only exception) from previously hostile relationships. There is a natural (but not inevitable) progression from active hostility to confidence to trust. Andrew Kydd has argued convincingly that this progress is facilitated by a “virtuous spiral” for which reciprocity is key.60 But by the same token, breakdowns in reciprocity can interrupt, set back, or destroy the progression.

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60 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations.
altogether. It is interesting but not entirely surprising that some former Soviet bloc countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic integrated into the European security community relatively smoothly once the Berlin wall fell; there were no major missteps or misunderstandings to disrupt the process. Russia, on the other hand, did not. The “realist” explanation for this is quite simply that Russia is a Great Power, and Great Powers tend to be rivals unless they face a common threat. But this explanation is too abstract to be compelling, particularly in view of the fact that some analysts actively predicted Russia’s smooth integration. A more persuasive explanation turns on the lack of empathy that prevented the final step from confidence to trust: at the end of the Cold War, the United States saw Russia as defeated and diminished, whereas Russia saw itself as America’s equal. The many slights and disappointments Moscow felt from Washington undermined early progress toward a more positive relationship.  

Just as a virtuous spiral can smooth the way for trust, the opposite vicious spiral can in principle undo it. At present there are no empirical examples of genuine security communities unraveling, but there are many historical cases of countries with generally peaceful and sometimes even friendly relations sliding into hostility and war. Sometimes, no doubt, the quality of the relationship in a vicious spiral simply reflects the true feelings of the parties, in which case empathy can shine a bright light on it but will not stop it. But my sense is that in far too many cases conflict arises not because the parties are actively hostile, but because they fail to understand that they are not. In these cases empathy can help reverse a vicious spiral and increase the odds of long-term genuine trust. Put another way: in dangerous situations where conflicts of interest are more apparent than real, confidence-building and empathy-building are both needed to open up space for trust.

Appendix: Candidate translations for specified English-language meanings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Mandarin</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Korean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A degree of subjective certainty resting on situational constraints</td>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td>信心 (XinXin)</td>
<td>自信 (Jishin)</td>
<td>자신 (Jah-shin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incapacity to pose a dire threat)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>確信 (Kakushin)</td>
<td>確信 (Kakushin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>확신 (Hwakshin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A degree of subjective certainty resting on dispositional</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>信任 (XinRen)</td>
<td>信赖 (Shinrai)</td>
<td>신임 (Shin-im)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>신용 (Shin-yong)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations (well-meaning character; relationship based on mutual concern and respect)</th>
<th>Empathy</th>
<th>신뢰 (Shin-roe)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The capacity to understand another’s view of the world (i.e., “To put oneself in another’s shoes”)</td>
<td>神入 (ShenRu) 同理心 (Tong Li Xin)</td>
<td>理解 (Rikai) 共感 (Kyokan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5B. Empathy, Part II: The yawning gap between threat and threat perception in Northeast Asia (and how to bridge it), prepared by David Welch
A few years ago I taught a graduate seminar on regional security at a prestigious university in Japan. The students were smart, well-read, and savvy. I began the course by asking, “What is the number one threat to Japan?” Without exception, the students responded: China. I then asked whether they thought China posed a traditional military threat to Japan of the kind European states used to fear. After not much thought and discussion, they said no; not only did China have no interest in attacking Japan militarily, it had no significant capability to do so short of strategic nuclear strikes, which were implausible under almost any circumstance.

I asked whether they thought China posed a political threat of some kind. Again the answer was no. China was surrounded by hostile or potentially hostile states that were increasingly wary of its intentions; it had no superpower patron; and it punched well below its weight in regional and global fora. No matter how broken Japanese politics might be, Chinese politics looked much worse and hardly offered an attractive model to emulate. China might want to marginalize Japan politically, but it was implausible to imagine that it could undermine or weaken it either internationally or domestically.

I then asked my students whether they thought China posed an economic threat to Japan. No, they said; China had become very dependent upon both Japanese investment and the Japanese market; it was not yet fully integrated into global trade and finance regimes; it had its hands full domestically; and while its gross domestic product had recently surpassed Japan’s in purchasing power parity terms, it lagged woefully in per capita GDP, was struggling to innovate, and was running out of key resources.

I asked whether China posed a cultural threat. Again, the answer was no. My students felt that Japanese culture was distinctive and robust. In fact, at that time Japanese culture was ascendant.

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**Key points**

1. China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States commonly misunderstand each other’s interests, wants, needs, fears, and intentions. In no case are real threats as serious as perceived threats, but the misperceptions themselves pose significant independent dangers.

2. These misunderstandings can be explained with reference to perfectly normal psychological tendencies and processes. Errors can be corrected, though with difficulty. In general, correcting misperceptions of threat requires deliberate efforts to cultivate empathy.

3. Of particular concern to all four countries is North Korea, but in this case it is impossible to determine whether there is a gap between real and perceived threat, placing a premium on joint efforts to reduce uncertainty and plan for various dire contingencies.
Table 1: Sample articulated perceived threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceiver</th>
<th>Perceived threat(s): ☑ Serious, ☐ Moderate, ☒ Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>☑ Resurgent militarism ☐ Springboard for American hegemony ☒ Keeping China poor and weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>☑ Regional hegemony ☐ Demonization ☒ Abandonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>☑ Enabling DPRK ☐ Dokdo ☒ Abandonment ☒ Favouring Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>☑ Revisionism ☐ Strategic competitor ☐ Threat to allies ☐ Inflammatory actions ☐ Political weakness ☐ Obsession with Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

be at the outset, but that it was a threat to Japan in at least one way that they had not previously thought much about. It was a classic demonstration, in other words, of the yawning gap between threat and threat perception.

I have not repeated the experiment in exactly the same way elsewhere, but I have attempted upon every possible occasion to get Chinese, South Koreans, and Americans to articulate their regional security fears, and more often than not I have encountered one of two outcomes: either they realized after some back-and-forth that their fears were largely unfounded, or—more often, sadly—they insisted that their fears were justified, but explained them with reference to anachronisms, irrelevancies, or factual errors. Table 1 provides a sample set of articulated fears I have commonly encountered that seem highly resistant to rebuttal.

What explains these misperceptions? Before we can answer this question, ideally we should establish that they are, in fact, misperceptions. This is easier said than done and would require extended case-by-case examination of the kind space constraints will not allow here. To some extent I will allow my discussion of the sources of misperception to speak for itself; but for the
sake of clarity let me simply assert that the following statements characterize the mainstream positions of political leaders and other foreign policy elites in each of these four countries: China’s overwhelming desire is to continue to develop in a sustainable way that does not jeopardize Communist Party rule—a largely domestic imperative—and its overwhelming foreign policy goal is to prevent external conditions from frustrating this goal. While China would like greater respect, it is not interested in territorial expansion. The one thing China absolutely will not compromise is its sovereign territoriality as it conceives it. This proviso is somewhat worrisome, as path-dependent events are resulting in potentially important changes in how the Chinese people understand what counts as China’s sovereign territoriality, and Chinese leaders feel increasingly vulnerable to mobilized domestic opinion on territorial issues.

Japan’s overwhelming objective is to get its economic house in order, position itself to deal with looming demographic and energy challenges, and play a greater (constructive) role on the world stage. Japan has no interest in returning to a nationalist/militarist past and a strong interest in putting this past behind it, but in a way that is consistent with national pride.

Korea’s overwhelming objective is peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, ideally coupled with a graceful transformation in North Korea of the kind that would ultimately permit unification on South Korea’s terms.

The United States’ overwhelming objectives are (a) to prevent fundamental changes to the rules and norms governing international relations in the Asia-Pacific, and (b) to prevent conflict. For these goals it believes both continued U.S. military supremacy and its current portfolio of bilateral alliances to be vital.

It goes without saying that my interpretations of the actual preferences of key actors will be controversial, but I would claim as evidence in support of them that the overwhelming majority of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Americans with whom I have discussed these questions agree with my characterizations of their own countries’ objectives, even if they frequently disagree with my characterizations of others’. For reasons I will now discuss, this is not surprising.

**Security threats, real and imagined**

A useful place to begin in any analysis of security is with the distinction between the “referent” (i.e., that which is to be secured) and the “threat” (i.e., that which poses a danger to the referent). We owe this helpful distinction to the Copenhagen School of International Relations, which also brought us the equally helpful concept of “securitization,” or the process of elevating something from the status of a run-of-the-mill political problem to a “security” problem warranting extraordinary efforts, measures, and resources to deal with it. Despite the evident utility of these concepts, the Copenhagen School comes dangerously close to insisting that there are no such things as “objective” or “real” security threats, merely subjective or socially-constructed

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ones. This cannot possibly be true. Statistics clearly show, for example, that flying is safer than driving, and yet people fear the former far more frequently and far more intensely than the latter. It is a simple question of fact whether China seeks regional hegemony in East Asia; how the neighbours perceive China’s intentions does not end discussion about them. Dominant security discourses, of course, drive important matters such as policy debates, resource allocations, and diplomatic actions. But we must allow for the possibility that common threat perceptions can be inaccurate.

Misperceptions of threat are common largely because our brains are wired in particular ways as a result of perfectly understandable evolutionary pressures. When the single most likely threat to life and limb was a natural predator or violence at the hands of another, those most likely to survive and pass along their genes were those who were best attuned to immediate, surprising, intentional, viscerally frightening threats (this is why we more easily think of terrorism than global warming as a security threat, even though the latter is by any standard the graver problem). In addition, perfectly normal cognitive shortcuts that we use every day to make sense of an otherwise confusing environment predispose us to certain kinds of misjudgments. These shortcuts include the following:

The availability heuristic. This is the tendency to allow ease of recall to influence our judgments of likelihood. An important reason why many people think aviation disasters are far more likely than statistics show is because they can easily recall vivid, horrific examples. Many Japanese can easily recall video of a drunken Chinese fishing boat captain trying to ram a Japanese coast guard ship in 2010 and accordingly estimate the likelihood of similarly aggressive acts to be quite high—even though the case was unique.

Representativeness. We often make judgments about things by zeroing in on the characteristics they have that we believe are typical of some larger group or class. Through this mechanism stereotypes inform judgments, in turn reinforcing stereotypes. Representativeness can explain, for example, why Koreans tend to interpret Japanese claims to Dokdo/Takeshima as evidence of a lingering imperial mentality rather than as a simple historical claim. It can also explain why Chinese fail to appreciate that the American “re-balancing” (or “pivot”) toward the Asia-Pacific is primarily an artifact of retrenchment elsewhere and not a regional surge.

The egocentric bias. This is the common tendency to overestimate one’s own role in shaping other people’s behaviour. Many knowledgeable Chinese still fail to appreciate that the main target of Japan’s 2012 nationalization of the Senkaku Islands was Shintaro Ishihara, not Beijing.

The fundamental attribution error. This is the common tendency to exaggerate (a) the extent to which people’s behaviour reflects dispositions rather than situational constraints, and (b) the coherence of their actions. Not only do many Chinese believe that Tokyo’s nationalization of the Senkakus was directed specifically at Beijing, they also believe that it was evidence of a

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64 Ibid., 31.
66 For further discussion see, e.g., David A. Welch, Decisions, Decisions: The Art of Effective Decision Making (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2001), Chap. 4.
deliberate attempt by a unitary rational actor to alter the diplomatic status quo rather than a spontaneous reaction to an unforeseen domestic political issue.

Of course, not all erroneous threat perceptions are a function of biases, heuristics, and attribution errors. Sometimes our adversaries are to blame. During the Cold War, for example, the legitimacy of the Soviet Communist Party rested in part upon the supposed inevitable triumph of communism over capitalism, and—not surprisingly—Soviet officials would from time to time speak accordingly. Many well-informed, well-educated Americans took what they said literally. It is now abundantly clear that no Soviet leader since Stalin had expansionist goals, and most likely none believed their own triumphalist rhetoric. Today, Americans listen closely to self-confident-sounding statements about “China’s rise” and “the Chinese dream” and tend to assume that it reflects a coherent strategy for expansion and regional supremacy. In part they do so because the word “rise” in American International Relations discourse evokes Realist notions of power transition (a familiar but frightening trope); but in part they leap to this conclusion because no Chinese leader speaks openly about the divisions, disagreements, factions, and tensions in Beijing, or confesses to feelings of profound insecurity generated by both domestic and international challenges.

It is an open question whether any of the four states in question prefers any plausible alternative to the status quo, both because inertia is the default expectation in international politics and because the available alternatives generally seem substantially worse. As a result, the primary security threats in Northeast Asia arise from miscalculation, misjudgment, and inadvertence, not from the deliberate choices of fully-informed, strategic rational actors. While Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Americans may genuinely fear the kinds of things listed in Table 1, what they should actually fear is fearing them—for this is what is most likely to generate genuine insecurity.

How to bridge the gap

Whatever the cause, a gap between threat and threat perception indicates a lack of empathy. As I am using the term here, empathy refers merely to the capacity to understand how another sees the world. Empathy is a concept that, quite surprisingly, has only recently begun to feature prominently in foreign policy analysis and the study of international relations more broadly. The importance of empathy has only become apparent as a result of various “Critical Oral History” projects on the Cuban missile crisis, the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Brezhnev era, all of which demonstrated the importance of empathy in avoiding and managing international crisis.

70 Critical Oral History involves extended discussions of historical events between former protagonists in the presence of both scholarly experts and declassified documents. Each of these three elements has comparative
Cultivating empathy is not a cure-all for international conflict. In some cases, an increase in empathy will actually throw conflicts of interest into sharp relief and disillusion those who might have harbored hopes of amicable settlements of disputes. Winston Churchill understood Hitler better than did Neville Chamberlain. But even in such cases, more empathy is certainly no worse than less. In other cases, improved empathy can only make it easier to find potentially productive avenues to improved relations.

Improving empathy has both a demand side and a supply side. On the demand side, those who seek it must be willing to admit that they lack it. This is a challenge for self-confident high-achievers with a strong sense of efficacy—characteristics commonly found in those who reach the upper echelons of politics. Leaders can develop habits of circumspection and can be brought to appreciate the limits of their own understanding, but research suggests this is likely to happen only under one of two circumstances: (a) after a long string of events (possibly minor in and of themselves) that cannot be explained in terms of decision makers’ prior beliefs; or (b) after a major shock. In other cases, normal psychological mechanisms—such as finding excuses to discount discrepant information, attempting to rebut it, or simply avoiding it—kick in to immunize beliefs against change. In an ideal world, decision makers would be schooled in advance to appreciate the importance of admitting fallibility and primed to notice evidence challenging their prior beliefs; but these dispositions and skills are rarely cultivated at any level of education or training.

On the supply side, decision makers who seek empathy must have access to the information that they need to attain it. Good-quality intelligence and access to experts are, of course, very helpful. But often the best way of acquiring the information that one needs is through direct contact, which provides valuable non-verbal clues.

Empathy levels appear to be higher initially and easier to cultivate at the Track 2 than Track 1 level. Academics and officials who participate in Track 2 dialogues in an unofficial capacity self-select into these processes precisely because they have an inquisitive disposition, greater familiarity with other cultures, and in most cases relative openness to new information. Direct contact between leaders can, however, result in surprisingly rapid empathy gains. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher on the one hand, and Mikhail Gorbachev on the other, provide valuable examples. Reagan and Thatcher came to understand (and, it seems, to like) their Soviet counterpart quite quickly through a very limited number of interactions, and vice versa. At the end of the day there were no conversions, but they all came to understand very readily that each

was focused overwhelmingly on reducing the dangers of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war rather than on destroying their enemies or winning an epic ideological struggle.

Also useful for cultivating empathy are confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and military-to-military contacts. Again, the Cold War demonstrated that regular interaction at a variety of rank levels increases empathy, in part by reversing perfectly normal tendencies to dehumanize one’s enemy. Arguably, direct mil-mil contacts of this kind also played a crucial role in overcoming historical animosities in Europe after the Second World War. Through NATO, French and Germans (among others) had ample opportunity to cultivate empathy and develop personal relationships that in many cases resulted ultimately in family ties. We think of NATO merely as a functional collective security organization, but in fact it very quickly became a thickly social club with a strong identity of its own. It is an open question whether a European security community could have evolved without it.

In Northeast Asia, interactions at the Track 1, Track 2, and mil-mil levels are uneven. Dyads with denser and longer-standing interactions are (not surprisingly) those that enjoy the highest levels of empathy and in which mutual wariness is least problematic (in Table 1, the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japanese dyads). But even in dyads with comparatively low levels of empathy, contacts appear to play an important role in ameliorating the dangers of misperception and misjudgment. Recent events in the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute provide a useful illustration. When Japan first publicly revealed that a Chinese frigate had locked weapons-control radar on a Japanese ship in January 2013, the working assumption in Tokyo (and also in Washington, once the United States confirmed the Japanese evidence) was that this had been a deliberate escalatory act on the part of the Chinese. Mil-mil contacts quickly established, however, that it was nothing more than an artifact of unclear rules of engagement on the part of a Chinese military experiencing growing pains.

Given the potentially explosive nature of unforeseen or misunderstood events in hot-button conflicts, deliberate efforts to cultivate empathy and build or reinforce CSBMs in the region are desperately needed. Canada can play a role here precisely because it is not directly engaged in any of these conflicts, because it enjoys good relations with all four countries, because it has a reputation for constructive contributions to peace and security, and because it is home to relevant expertise.

What about North Korea? Readers will notice that North Korea has not featured prominently in my analysis thus far. This is not because North Korea is unimportant—surely one must be wary of an isolated, totalitarian, nuclear-armed country perennially teetering on the verge of collapse that does not play by the rules and that has a history of bizarre, aggressive statements and actions—but because it provides a useful illustration of the fact that it is sometimes impossible to determine whether there is a gap between threat and threat perception. North Korea is a mystery.


72 I am grateful to Noboru Yamaguchi for this information. See also “Chinese Officials Admit to MSDF Radar Lock Allegations,” The Japan Times, 18 March 2013.
Pundits are never at a loss conjuring up superficially plausible accounts for why North Korea does what it does, but at the end of the day we simply do not know because we have inadequate windows on North Korean decision making and unusually low levels of empathy with North Korean leaders. It would not be surprising if the same could be said in reverse; North Koreans probably understand others just as poorly.

What does seem clear, however, is that China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States all share an interest in containing North Korea, thwarting North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions, preparing for a possible humanitarian catastrophe if the regime collapses, and paving the way for gradual, peaceful changes of the kind that would enable serious engagement with an eye toward eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula on terms acceptable to all. Whether any or all of this is possible will almost certainly require dramatic empathy gains and a great deal of coordination.

It is at least ironic, and may well prove profoundly tragic, that China, Japan, South Korea and the United States are spending so much time and energy tilting at one another’s windmills that they are largely failing to address what is surely a shared threat, and that may well be Northeast Asia’s most important. If there is a genuinely serious and pressing traditional Northeast Asian security problem, surely this is it.

6. Consociational Security Order (prepared by Amitav Acharya and excerpted from a longer policy memo)

A consociational security order is the political-security order of a culturally diverse region that rests on economic interconnectedness, balances of power, cooperative action by elites and leaders to avoid and manage conflicts for the sake of their common survival and well-being. In this order, highly interdependent states ensure systemic stability with the help of both balance of power mechanisms and cooperative institutions. I borrow this concept primarily from the literature on consociationalism in comparative politics. While widely debated among comparative politics scholars, consociational theory has been generally ignored by students of international relations. Yet certain core elements of the theory, such as group-balancing, interdependence, shared leadership, and controlled competition, have significant

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relevance for international relations scholars. Indeed, key aspects resonate with IR theories, especially defensive realism and institutionalist theory.

Three key mechanisms of a CSO generate stability. The first element in a multipolar structure is equilibrium in the balance of power. Unlike in a security community, security competition among actors does not disappear in a consociation. Moreover, because consociations are comprised of strong and weak actors, to be stable a consociation must create a “balanced disparity” in which different groups engage in coalitional politics that denies hegemony or dominance to any particular group. 75

The second mechanism is institutions that facilitate problem solving and engender cooperation. Under a consociational framework, actors cooperate not because they share a collective identity, but because they consider the price of non-cooperation to be too high under prevailing conditions of high security and economic interdependence. Consociational orders feature institutions that are neither supranational nor concert-like. Actor sovereignty and autonomy remain important. Consociationalism in international relations is “a management coalition of sovereign states”.

Consociational security orders are quite different from security communities. A community requires a deep social bond, convergence of basic values and a collective identity. They are underpinned by substantial economic integration and strong institutions. Hence, “security communities” require a long-term habit of war-avoidance, deep levels of trust, and mutual identification leading to the development of a “we feeling.” A consociation does not require such a sense of collective identity or “we feeling”. Group identity may exist, but it’s weak or moderate. It does not make war “unthinkable”. Positive identification may emerge out of interdependence and habits of interaction. But consociations will always manifest cultural and political balancing as much as interdependence and identification. State sovereignty remains important. Cultural values and norms may matter, but they are redefined and made and remade through politics of balancing and accommodation.

A key argument is that states cooperate not because they are altruistic, but because they find cooperation to be in their interest, and because the costs of non-cooperation will be too high. In a consociational security order, conflict is avoided initially not because group members are bound by deeply shared values and a collective identity, but because actors see conflict avoidance as a necessary precondition for material growth and development. Institutions play a critical role in engaging all actors and inducing restraint as arenas of conflict resolution. But these institutions operate through mutual restraint and accommodation. This is soft institutionalism, rather than integration through formal supranational bureaucracies. A consociational security order is more likely to feature institutions for “cooperative security” (i.e. security with a potential adversary through dialogues and confidence-building mechanisms), rather than collective security or collective defence (NATO). 76 It also contrasts with EU-like supranational bodies, where the sovereignty is member states is compromised or eroded. The independence of different groups within a consociation is preserved.


76 See the entries on each in The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon (2007).
The third mechanism that helps consociations manage order is elite restraint. Members of a consociation develop habits of “individual and collective elite restraint”. While the distribution of power in a consociation is asymmetrical, and hierarchy exists as an objective fact, the more powerful actors do not marginalise the less powerful ones, but respect the rights and interests of the weaker segments. Decisions are not made unilaterally nor are imposed by the powerful actors on the weak, but are made and implemented through consultations and consensus. A system of mutual or minority veto, or “negative minority rule”, prevails, meaning the less powerful actors retain a say over collective decisions. This allows different units of the consociation to “function without the anxiety of having its vital interests ‘subsumed’” by any other member or combined strength of the other members.77

In this respect, CSOs are different from hegemonic security orders. In a hegemonic order, only one power calls the shots, and balancing disappears or is rendered inconsequential. Security management mechanisms, such as multilateral institutions may exist, but they are created, maintained and thoroughly dominated by the hegemon. Moreover, hegemonic orders seek to exclude other great powers by establishing and enforcing a sphere of influence, as was the case with the US Monroe Doctrine in the Western hemisphere. By contrast, a key purpose of consociations is to avoid hegemony.

In a consociational security order, weaker actors are not left to the whims of the great powers, whether singly or collectively. A consociation is therefore different from a concert, where the most powerful actors monopolize the management of order and marginalize weaker ones. The most well-known example of a concert, the 19th century European Concert of Powers, assigned the primary responsibility for managing Europe’s security problems to a selected club of powers. No territorial change was to be permitted without their approval; no great power was to be humiliated and the defeated great powers restored to their status. The European Concert did succeed in ensuring a degree of self-restraint among the great powers towards each other. But the price was the exclusion of the weaker states of Europe, which were exploited and marginalised.

Prospects for a CSO in Asia

Asia’s cultural and political diversity lends itself to a concept that explains how stability is achieved in “divided societies”.

Regarding equilibrium, multiple balancing assumes a multipolar power structure. Some Asian security specialists argue that the future Asian security order would retain continued US strategic primacy. But while there is no end in sight to America’s role as the preeminent military power in Asia Pacific, there is a growing disjuncture between the military and economic sources of the region’s power structure. While the US maintains its military primacy, China is rapidly emerging as the main regional market and a country with significant financial clout. Japan retains considerable economic influence and India is rapidly emerging as a regional and global player. Against this backdrop, it is doubtful if the US with its military power alone can guarantee regional order strictly on its own terms, a key requirement for strategic primacy. At the same time, it becomes more plausible to argue that the US military power will act as a stabilizing force in conjunction with other drivers, such as interdependence and institutions.

China poses the most powerful challenge to Asia’s balance of power. But despite its growing economy and military spending, the US remains and is likely to remain for a long time, the preeminent military player in Asia. While China’s naval build-up gives it an increasing capacity for denying areas close to its shore to the US and its allies, any effort by it to dominate the sea
lanes of Asia and the Indian Ocean can be countered by the navies of the US, in cooperation with Japan and India. The balancing between China and the US is consistent with defensive realism, rather than an offensive realism that implies aggressive expansionism and power maximization by China and pre-emptive containment by the US. The US strategic concepts of “hedging” and “pivot” (renamed as “rebalancing”) support this. In 2006, the US outlined a policy of "encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region" while creating "prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail to preclude future conflict." This strategy involved deploying six carrier battle groups in the Pacific and 60 percent of its attack submarine fleet. Under “rebalancing”, the US navy would by 2020 shift from a 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to a 60/40 split, including six aircraft carriers. The aim of rebalancing is to “maintain a nuanced balance” against China while averting “the potential for a…slippery slope toward growing confrontation with China”. While the new US strategy faces budgetary challenges it also has significant bipartisan support.  

Regarding shared leadership, Asia’s regional institutions provide the main avenue for shared, rather than hegemonic, leadership. They lack collective security/defense functions, which would require hegemonic leadership - single or collective (concert). Instead, they promote cooperative security. This has allowed ASEAN to stay in the driver’s seat of Asian institutions, and helped the engagement of China, Vietnam and India into the region. In the 1990s, they helped to overcome Beijing’s initial suspicion of multilateralism as well as America’s initial leaning towards a containment strategy. Arguably, Asia’s regional institutions did a better job of dealing with China than Europe’s did in dealing with Russia. NATO expansion excluding Russia undermined Europe’s cooperative security doctrine promoted by the OSCE. Asia’s institutions followed the norm of “security with” in spirit, if not in its legalistic form, by offering full membership to China. ASEAN’s strategy continues to engage all the great powers so that no single power can dominate them. This was what led it to invite Australia, India, Russia and the United States into the EAS, despite the latter being East Asian in geographic scope. Some wonder if ASEAN might lose its unity and ability to lead, not the least due to a Chinese assertiveness and “divide and rule” strategy. If this happens, and if ASEAN and related institutions are marginalized or replaced by an Asian concert of powers or a Sino-US G-2, or an Asian NATO, the prospects for an Asian CSO would be seriously damaged. So far, these ideas have found little support in the region. ASEAN has value to China’s effort to legitimize its “peaceful rise” concept. And ASEAN’s continued leadership survives by default because no great power – US, China, Japan or India, is in a position to develop a multilateral security institution under its own imprint either due to historical baggage or the level of mistrust among them.

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http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2012/0131_us_asia/20120131_pivot_asia.pdf

79 This is supported by Johnston’s finding that multilateral institutions have made China’s decision-makers (including technocrats) more attuned to international and regional cooperative norms. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
Asian institutions fit into the consociational, rather than security community, hegemonic, or concert model. Institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum are based on the cooperative security model, rather than collective security or collective defense. No single power has ever succeeded in creating a viable regional institution in Asia. Attempts by different great or medium powers to create regional institutions under their own wings and for projecting their own influence have consistently failed in Asia. Instead of collective security or collective defense that liberals speak of, Asian security regionalism has been based on the cooperative security model that incorporates regional norms and socialization processes such as those developed by ASEAN. The India-inspired Asian Relations Organization in 1947, the US-led South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Australia and Japanese-centered Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC), and the Brezhnev Plan for an Asian Collective Security System, all faltered.  

Some analysts question whether ASEAN’s leadership will continue and suggest an alternative of an Asian concert of powers. But this is unlikely. Historically, concerts emerge in the aftermath of a major power war in which a prospective hegemonic power had been defeated by a rival coalition of great powers. There has been no such great power war in Asia. Moreover, Asian major powers are unlikely to reach the level of ideological agreement that is a prerequisite of a concert. If anything, Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian relations would retain sufficient mistrust to prevent any collective great power hegemony in Asia, thereby allowing ASEAN to retain space for itself by default. And despite weak material power, ASEAN would normatively oppose an Asian concert. As Singapore’s Foreign Minister stated in July 1993, what ASEAN hopes to develop through multilateralism is a "relationship among equals - a true partnership." Regional political opposition to the concert idea was demonstrated in the rejection of former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s proposed for an Asia-Pacific Community that would have been managed by a concert-like system. There has been speculation as to whether and when China might create and lead its own Asian regional institutions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a candidate for such a Chinese effort, another could be the proposed East Asian Community. But Chinese dominance of SCO or EAC is highly unlikely. The broadening of East Asian Summit, the putative vehicle for an eventual EAC, to include Australia, New Zealand, India, and now US and Russia, demonstrates that Asia will have a pluralistic or shared leadership of its regional architecture.

The principles of consensus decision-making have been an established and unexceptional feature of Asian regional institutions and key to their tradition of shared leadership. While Southeast Asia has a much more consensus-oriented regionalism than other parts of the region, the politics of accommodation developed by ASEAN has diffused to form new and wider regional institutions in Asia.

Regarding elite restraint, all the great powers involved in Asia-Pacific security recognize the "centrality" of ASEAN in the regional security architecture, a sign of restraint or even respect towards a coalition of weaker actors. But there is uncertainty about Chinese restraint. After a period of “charm offensive” in the 1990s and early 2000s and growing engagement with
ASEAN-led regional bodies to demonstrate its “peaceful rise”, China has become more assertive especially in the South China Sea dispute. China’s role in the East China Sea island dispute with Japan has also raised concern regarding Chinese intentions, although here, nationalist sentiments can be found on both sides.

The South China Sea issue presents a critical test of Chinese restraint because of China’s huge military superiority over the main ASEAN claimants. China has not invaded any island by force since 1974 but only occupied islands that were previously unoccupied.\(^\text{82}\) China also relented in its initial refusal to discuss this dispute multilaterally with ASEAN (which includes non-claimant states) or at the ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes non-regional states including the US. It has not closed the door to negotiations. After renewed tensions with Philippines and ASEAN in 2012, Beijing “backed off” from its hardline stance and diplomatically reassured Vietnam, Philippines and ASEAN.\(^\text{83}\) In Northeast Asia, China has worked to restrain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and moved some distance away from the use of force in dealing with Taiwan.

Moreover, Chinese restraint stems not from altruism, but from strategic calculations and normative pressure that the mechanisms of a CSO- balance of power, interdependence, institutions- provide. Strategically, Chinese leaders realize that assertiveness would push the ASEAN countries closer to the US (a balancing factor). China’s engagement with ASEAN since the mid-1990s has been a source of normative and diplomatic pressure; China has engaged these institutions to sell its peaceful rise policy, and deny other powers, such as Japan and the US, the opportunity to take over the show. Another source of Chinese restraint lies more in its dependence on Middle Eastern and African oil imports via the Indian Ocean, whose sea lanes are controlled by the U.S. and Indian navies. Hence, while uncertainty over Chinese restraint is a significant challenge to an Asian CSO, Chinese calculations in the context of the US “rebalancing” strategy and the political and normative costs of a war with ASEAN members make it more, rather than less likely.

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\(^{\text{82}}\) Many Chinese analysts take this to be a major indicator of Chinese restraint. In the dispute with Japan, (which is also true of the South China Sea case), China has “shown some restraint” by not deploying its heavily armed naval ships, but maritime patrol crafts. *Washington Post*, 17 September 2012, A6. Also China does not bear all the blame for the escalation of this dispute. As a seasoned US expert on China points, out, “A strong case can be made that the starting gun in the new dash for petroleum and natural gas in the South China Sea was fired not by China, but by Vietnam, which authorized drilling in disputed blocks in 2006.Douglas H. Paal, “Asia's Maritime Disputes: How to Lower the Heat,” September 6, 2012. [http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/asia-s-maritime-disputes-how-to-lower-heat/dryv](http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/asia-s-maritime-disputes-how-to-lower-heat/dryv).

This is a preliminary roadmap towards cooperation over disputed maritime space in East Asia. Rather than set out an institutional process, it identifies several issues upon which there is disagreement in East Asia, the resolution of which could vastly improve the tone of interaction at sea in the region. Settling East Asian maritime disputes is a long term project. Furthermore, if tension in the Ambalat Sea between Indonesia and Malaysia in the wake of their International Court of Justice hearing is any indication, settling disputes does not necessarily bring stability. Thus, rather than focusing on the disputes themselves, this paper proposes a series of conversations on the mechanics of behavior in disputes maritime areas. To paraphrase Mark Raymond, East Asian countries should work through their scholarly and policy communities to discuss the rules about the rules. This discussion should begin at the Track II level between qualified experts with connections to the foreign and military policy communities in the region. Other government departments including fisheries, transportation and energy will be called upon as well. Some conversations would benefit from input from the relevant civil society groups that place disputed maritime space at the top of their agenda.

Both the East and South China Sea disputes are afflicted with the same basic problem: the perceived imperative to exercise jurisdiction in claimed waters and the parallel imperative to resist such efforts by rival claimant states. The pathway set out below can be adopted among specific claimant states to a particular dispute, but would be most productive as a region wide initiative because every East Asian state, aside from Laos, is party to an active or settled maritime sovereignty dispute. Before mapping out this strategy, a look at existing conflict prevention mechanisms is worthwhile.

Past Dispute Management Efforts

Past Track II efforts such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the South China Sea Dialogues proposed a number of ways to build confidence through functional cooperation in the areas of scientific exchange, fisheries conservation, hydrocarbon resource exploration, information sharing and safety at sea. This work at the Track Two level was formalized somewhat in the maritime security working group of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which in turn contributed to the 2002 Declaration on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. In the East China Sea, Deng Xiaoping’s suggestion to ignore sovereignty and focus on joint development kept the dispute relatively stable until neither side could ignore the sovereignty dimension any further, beginning in approximately 2003. Despite the erosion of this consensus, East China Sea claimants have concluded bilateral fisheries agreements and two joint development agreements.

Dispute management efforts have ultimately failed to generate momentum for dispute settlement due to a combination of domestic pressures and shifting power dynamics. Problematically, cooperation involves mapping a set of tradeoffs between actors, which may value of different aspects of disputed maritime space to different degrees. This is demonstrated by the ambitious effort by three political geographers to propose alternative ways of dividing the South China Sea,
based on relative length of coastline, occupation of main features and, most ambitiously, through the creation of a Spratly Coordinating Agency that would coordinate twelve joint development companies. This ambitious agenda failed because there is more to maritime disputes than intrinsic, economic value.

In the absence of serious negotiation efforts, states have pursued a broad set of agreements through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). These include indirect CBMs, such as port calls, dialogues, joint exercises or operational cooperation on nontraditional security issues, educational exchanges and track two dialogues and direct CBMs such as hotlines, communication protocols, frequent operational dialogues, shared understandings of conduct in disputed areas, codes of conduct and formal guidelines on behavioural protocols about acceptable conduct at sea. As the region’s naval capabilities grow, it is inevitable that interactions between navies at sea will grow as well. There has been no shortage of proposals for codes of conduct. South China Sea claimants have recently restarted talks towards a Code of Conduct (COC). Similarly, Japan and China have engaged in three separate tracks of talks on improving transparency between their respective militaries and coast guards. The recent unification of four of China’s coast guards into one agency bodes well for improved interaction with those if its neighbours.

The region has already witnessed a number of close calls and dangerous maneuvers in recent years, which can be fatal in some instances. These types of tragedies can be avoided if regional militaries can establish protocols for similar communications channels and professional conduct at sea. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) has been instrumental in this regard through its efforts to develop a Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea. This should be adopted by all WPNS states as soon as possible.

The Challenge of Cooperation

Despite these proposals, claimant states have shown little interest in addressing the underlying sovereignty and related jurisdictional issues that lie at the heart of maritime disputes. As a consequence East Asian countries, motivated by the basic tenets of national sovereignty, are caught in a circle in which confrontation is met with confrontation as each party attempts to defend its disputed sovereignty. The region seems farther from cooperation now than at any point in the post-Cold War era.

This is an initial draft of a roadmap towards fostering state interest in attempting to address these underlying issues. The goal is to generate the most important ingredient to resolving maritime disputes in East Asia: the political will to do so. This is a high bar to meet because political will to act only really emerges when a state’s leaders conclude that they either have something to gain from the act, or they have something to lose from not acting. Short of this set of circumstances, leaders likely prefer to delay any concrete decision. The emergence of political will is further complicated by the fact that the set of circumstances that might provoke a state to act to gain or avoid loss are the same ones that motivate their rival. In a territorial context, often mistaken for a zero-sum game (more on this below), this requires at least one state to be operating under a delusion. When State A acts because it thinks it can gain, necessarily it thinks that State B will
lose and is either unaware of it or is fool hardy. In either case, the set of circumstances that generate the political will from two states to act in a cooperative manner is not common, particularly when delay is a less risky and often cheaper strategy.

Thus, political will is the long-term goal. In the short and medium term, however, there are a number of ways to create cooperative space while states are delaying, which could set the stage for cooperation in the future. In short, the paper envisions a set of micro-agreements that are less ambitious than dispute settlement, but which bind the hands of claimant states over time, rendering their behavior more predictable, improving stability and the overall climate of any negotiation. State support of the initiatives is important, but these discussions should occur as a series of dialogues between relevant scholars in the field. Rather than spell out the precise mechanics of dialogues, the discussion below outlines a series of topics for discussion, which much necessarily precede the political will to negotiate in good faith.

The object of the first phase is to develop consensus on the legal principles at play. The second phase would implement these principles through functional cooperation between protagonists at sea. Collectively, these short and medium term projects support the development of political will, the long-term objective.

The purpose of these dialogues is not to create new formal institutions and mechanisms, nor to renegotiate existing international agreements like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). East Asian states have successfully availed themselves of these institutions. All countries profess to follow international law. ASEAN and its related meetings have provided venues for the airing of grievances and have been mechanisms through which the great powers can contribute to regional peace and stability, even if for instrumental purposes. Claimants have not turned their back on regional institutions by withdrawing from them, nor is there great disagreement on the central ways of making and organizing claims to maritime space. Those that point to the perpetuation of regional disputes as a failure of regional institutions have their hopes set too high.

**Phase 1: Clarify the Legal Principles**

First, is sovereignty as zero-sum as is often claimed? One often hears from East Asian commentators that sovereignty cannot be compromised or shared. This entrenched notion was the departure point for Ma Yingjeou’s “East China Sea Peace Initiative”, which has been celebrated as an innovative way to build trust between claimants to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. However, there is evidence elsewhere that sovereignty can indeed be shared. The very decision to share or surrender sovereignty is itself a sovereign act. For example, Canada routinely shares or compromises its sovereignty in the pursuit of national objectives, including the hosting of American military forces on Canadian soil. Further, Canada once declared a hospital room in Ottawa to be Dutch territory so its monarch could be born in Holland. These examples are perhaps less explosive than disputed island features in East Asia, but they illustrate that sovereignty can be shared and the decision to do is a sovereign act. In a territorial context there are examples of countries around the world choosing to share sovereignty over a disputed area. For example, Peru and Ecuador share sovereignty over a slice of Amazon rainforest that was
disputed between them for over 500 years. Creative diplomacy has ensured the careful management of Aland Islands by Sweden and Finland. As a first step therefore, East Asian scholars could meet with Western counterparts and discuss the very meanings of the term sovereignty and the conditions under which it can be divided. This dialogue may benefit from participation from civil society groups based in Manila, Hong Kong and Tokyo.

A second discussion that would greatly improve the tone of state behavior at sea would revolve around the purpose of exercising jurisdiction in disputed areas. East Asian states may consider that once a dispute crystallizes, defined as the point in time at which it becomes obvious to the claimants and the international community that two or more countries disagree about something, subsequent acts of jurisdiction or **efforts to illustrate effective occupation (effectivités) are moot.** Although some countries deny that disputes exist as a bargaining tactic, this cannot obscure the fact that other countries have registered their diplomatic opposition. Once this occurs, subsequent acts of *effectivités* do not strengthen a claim according international jurisprudence since the 2003 ICJ decision on the sovereignty of Sipidan and Ligitan islands disputed between Malaysia and Indonesia. Thus, despite Japanese assurances that there is no territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, there has been since 1970, when the Republic of China protested Japan’s claim. Subsequent acts by any country to change the matters on the ground have no bearing on any party’s sovereignty claim after that. This dialogue could involve international legal experts from claimant countries, including high profile experts that have served on relevant international bodies like the ICJ or the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

A third discussion would revolve around the utility of exercising maritime jurisdiction to sustain a claim to a land feature. **Maritime claims are made from land based features.** Efforts to exercise jurisdiction over water typically don’t strengthen claims to these waters. Yet, East Asian countries seem more convinced by Geoffrey Till’s observation that “local navies have a basic national duty to exercise maritime sovereignty since it is a fundamental principle of international law that for sovereignty to be recognized, it needs to be exercised.” This sentiment is echoed by MengXiangqing of the National Defense University's Strategic Studies Institute. In international law, there are two conventions regarding disputed sea areas; one is to see whether you have effective management there; and the second is that actual control is superior to historical proof. For example, we say that this sea area has historically been ours, but this alone is no use, it depends on whether we have actual control there. China's maritime monitoring must demonstrate its presence and express effective jurisdiction in the sea areas under its jurisdiction. This sentiment seems to confuse demonstration of unopposed administration of islands (land), through evidence of *effectivités* (noted above) with the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction over a claimed ocean space (water). The former supports a sovereignty claim; the latter cannot support a jurisdictional claim because claims to maritime space are based on possession of land, not the sea. Discussions on this matter and on the previous issue could go a long way to reducing the pretext for the deliberate exercise of jurisdiction in disputed areas. Participants could involve legal experts from the region as well as experts involved in the US-Canada Gulf of Maine case, in which this question was addressed.

A final series of discussions should **consider the implications of recent arbitration rulings** for East Asian maritime disputes. The recent ICJ decision pertaining to the sovereignty and
entitlement of features in the Caribbean Sea disputed between Colombia and Nicaragua may be instructive for two reasons. First, in its analysis of what qualifies as an island, rock or low-tide elevation, the ICJ clarified the criteria for what qualifies as which. Secondly the ICJ confirmed that it is prepared to ignore small features, regardless of their status, if a stronger case for maritime delimitation can be made based on non-disputed features like coastlines. As pointed out by Peter Drysdale, if read in conjunction with the ITLOS decision to ignore an inhabited island in delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar because it would have blocked the projection of another state’s EEZ derived from its coastline, this suggests that international jurisprudence is less preoccupied with matters of sovereignty over islands. Land not only dominates the sea, but now islands as well. In addition to regional legal experts, representatives of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Colombia and Nicaragua may also be involved in this dialogue.

Phase 2: Building Functional Cooperation at Sea

The discussions on legal principles and the dissemination of their findings, including points of consensus, set the stage for functional cooperation at sea. In the first instance the findings could be transmitted to senior leadership at regional coast guard dialogues like the Asian Coast Guard Agencies meeting. Building on this shared understanding coast guards could develop protocols for interaction in disputed areas. This could include shared protocols for the policing of fisheries jurisdiction in contested areas, the development of a regional shiprider program and the extension of operational protocols to include military and civilian vessels (given the modalities of maritime enforcement at sea). Importantly, China’s new unified coast guard should be its lead agency for international cooperation. The China Maritime Safety Administration does not operate in waters where it might interact with rival coast guards or navies.

Another way to reduce confrontations at sea is to agree on appropriate high seas corridors to be used by warships to transit the narrow straits through the Japanese islands and the Philippine Sea. Regional states generally accept that such transits by warships are permitted and are not controversial. However, confidence could be built if transiting navies agreed to stick to predetermined routes. Deviance from these routes would be interpreted suspiciously, rather than the transit itself.

Conclusion

There are a number of ‘micro-agreements’ on legal principles that could be reached in the short term. These could in turn feed into medium term agreements around functional cooperation on appropriate behavior at sea. Collectively this effort could improve the regional security setting, regardless of the outcome of regional maritime disputes. In time this effort should contribute to the political will to negotiate regional maritime boundaries. It is clear that countries in East Asia see a floor, beneath which they do not want these disputes to deteriorate. China did not interfere with the Philippine resupply of the grounded BRP Sierre Madre which marks its base on Second Thomas Shoal. Instead, Beijing proposed talks towards the long awaited COC. Similarly, both Japan and China prevented nationalist groups from visiting the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands during the political charged period in the middle of August 2013. This pragmatism can be put to good
use in the fashion outlined above.

III. CHINESE CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Community of Human Destiny (prepared by Cai Liang)

The “community of human destiny” is an international value envisioned by China. It’s based on the belief that human beings should meet common challenges together. It incorporates perspectives of interdependence of international powers, common interests, sustainable development and global governance. As human destiny and interests are more closely related to each other, the concept adheres to the principle of bringing Chinese people's interests with the interests of people of different countries together. Specifically, it means considering the legitimate concerns and interests of other countries while pursuing the interest of China; striving for China’s development while promoting common development with other countries and jointly coping with global challenges. The essence of it is to achieve win-win cooperation.

The concept of “community of human destiny” originates from the spirit of harmony in traditional Chinese culture, such as the idea of “co-existence of nations in concord” and “the world of great harmony”. The concept of “community of human destiny” inherits China’s national spirit and cultural tradition. It emphasizes overall harmony, advocates convincing people by virtue in the process of acculturation and integration; and reflects the governing thoughts that a good king should be both a saint and a good governor. In China, political integration starts from the construction of family relations, and stresses harmony rather than binary oppositions. Chinese political thoughts think the overall harmony is the most promising prospect: “World situation is constantly changing. If things are co-existed harmoniously and in the right order, then development of the world will be sustained and constant.” 84 The “community of human destiny” also reflects the pursuit of a harmonious world in traditional Chinese culture: “In a good society, the whole world is a community; people trust each other and live together in harmony. They not only care about their families but others’, not only raise their children but others’; the elder are taken care of, the young are employed, the children are raised up happily; vulnerable groups are taken care of. A world like this is a harmonious one.”85

Therefore, Chinese culture thinks all nations live side by side in a great harmony is the permanent value of human civilization

The concept of “community of human destiny” also derives from the prevalent idea that the international society is a “big family”. Multi-polarization, economic globalization, cultural diversification and social informatization has made the earth a global village. Economies are tied to each more closely and personal exchange among countries is more frequent. As a result, countries are facing many common issues such

84 The Book of Changes·QianDiagram·Tuan Analects

85 The Book of Rites
as food security, resource shortages, climate change, cyber attacks, overpopulation, environmental pollution, epidemics, transnational crime and other global non-traditional security issues. All of this poses serious challenges to international order and human survival, and the international society has reached the consensus that human society is a big family. Based on this consensus of “big family”, the “community of human density” emphasizes on overall interest and a mutually beneficial interest coordinate mechanism. It advocates that the interests of the “big family” are also the nations’ interests; nations acting in the common interest of the world are actually serving the interests of their own. When each member comes to realize the relationship between their interests and the “family” interest, “big family” becomes the “community of human destiny”; and the latter enriches the connotation of “big family” and increases the consensus’s influence in the international society.

The Chinese government has gradually adjusted its relation with the international system, attached more importance to the common interests of humanity and become a stakeholder of the international society. The concept of the “community of human destiny” derives from other concepts about human society which the Chinese government reiterated in recent years. The white paper, *China's Peaceful Development* released in September 2011, says that there’s need exploring new meanings of the common interests and common values of humanity from the perspective of the community of destiny.86

The political report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) formally raised the concept of “community of human destiny.” Hu Jintao said in the report that "History shows us that human co-existence won’t happen in a world of law of the jungle; using all one's armed might to indulge in wars of aggression won’t bring a better world. The world needs peace not war, development not poverty, cooperation not conflict. Building a world of long-lasting peace and common prosperity is the common aspiration of people of all countries. Chinese people are willing to make unremitting efforts to the noble cause of peace and development of mankind". This cause requires us to “promote the community sense of human destiny; pursue China’s own interests while taking into account the legitimate concerns of other countries; to quest for national development while promoting common development; to build a more equal and balanced new global partnership for development; to share responsibilities and promote common interests of mankind.”87

The international society has taken note of this concept of “community of human destiny” after it was put forward. The editorial of “International Daily News”, an Indonesian newspaper, wrote that “The CPC envisions the “community of human destiny” in the 18th National Congress of Communist Party of China, advocating the world to work together for the common development of different nations. Undoubtedly, this new concept will help China to realize its objective of building a beautiful country, and

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86  The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Peaceful Development”

87  Hu Jintao “Adhere to The road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for Building a Well-off Society—Speech at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)”, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012, pp. 46-49
world of peace and great harmony. It reflects China’s global perspective, its responsibility as a great power and its vision of creating a world of great harmony.  

In Xi Jinping’s first meetings with foreign leaders, he said that the international society has become an interdependent community of common density. No country can manage the complicated economy issues and other global issues alone. During his first visit to Africa, Xi also said Central Africa is a community of common destiny. African political leaders and scholars spoke highly of this idea. On June 13, 2013, Xi Jinping met with Wu Poh-hsiung, the honorary chairman of Chinese Kuomintang. During the meeting, Xi proposed to “advocate promoting the community sense of common destiny across the straits, enhancing national pride and strengthening the faith of rejuvenating China,” and Wu responded positively. When meeting with Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun in Shenzhen on June 30, the former DPP chairman Frank Hsieh said that “people of both sides should create common memory, face the world together and build a community of common destiny.”

Most scholars think that the concept of “community of human destiny” is based on China’s vision about its development in the second decade of the 21st century; the concept conforms to the trend of times. Moreover, it brings China’s interests and other nations’ interests together and expands the common interests of different nations strategically. Some have pointed out that the “community of human destiny” is a multi-dimensional concept. It has become increasingly evident that we are in a community of common destiny, although each nation has different national strategy, social system and stage of development. The community sense of human destiny benefits the world and China both. Some scholars argue that: “In current international society, values are still used to serve national interests. Therefore, there is still a long way to go…. If politicians make policy decisions based on long-term interests of mankind rather than short-term domestic political needs, the “community of human destiny” that strives for the common prosperity of mankind may become a reality one day.”

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89 The Speech of Xi at the Conference Center of Julius KambarageNyerere at Tanzania


91“Waiting, but Afraid of Getting Hurt,” The China Times, 07/02,2013


93Zhai Kun, Walk with the Community of Human Destiny, World Knowledge, 1.2013

94Quxin, The Base of the Community of Common Destiny, Qiushi,4.2013
relationship between the “community of common destiny” and China Dream say that China Dream not
only embodies Chinese people’s determination of building a better home and stronger nation, but also
reflects Chinese people’s innermost community sense of the human destiny. 95

2. National Core Interests (prepared by Zhou Yiqi)

National Core Interests (NCI) refers to those non-negotiable national interests that are fundamental to a
country’s survival and development. As one integral part of a wide range of national interests, NCI ranks
the most fundamental interests among national interests. The White Paper on China's Peaceful
Development released by the Information Office of State Council of China on September 6th, 2011,
defined the scope of China’s core interests as “state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity,
national reunification, the stability of China’s political and social system and ensuring sustainable
economic and social development.” 96

China had been either ambiguous in defining her national interests and even reluctant to talk about it for a
quite long time before the open and reform in the 1980’s. This is because Chinese traditional philosophy
values moral integrity over self-interest and since the main focus of PRC diplomacy before open and
reform had been on promoting a worldwide proletarian revolution, any discussion on national self-interest
was regarded as selfish activities which were against the spirit of internationalism. It was not until that
China reformed and opened to the world in the 1980’s that the term of national interests started to enter
the agenda of Chinese diplomacy. In a meeting with President Nixon in 1989, Deng Xiaoping pointed out
that “the major considerations on nations’ relationship should be based on one nation’s own strategic
interests.” 97

Since the 1990’s, some Chinese scholars have started to emphasize the hierarchy of national interests. In
his book “the Analysis of Chinese National Interests”, Yan Xuetong pointed out that the hierarchy of
national interests should be nation’s survival, political recognition, economic interests, dominant position
and global contribution. 98 In the book of “International Relations during Global Era, Prof Yu Zhenliang
wrote that a nation must differentiate the priority and order of her national interests so that she can
conduct an effective foreign policy. A nation should pursue her major interests at first and then her
secondary interests. 99 In sum, a country’s national interests can be categorized into core interests,
important interests, major interests and ordinary interests. In the different hierarchies of national interests,
the core interests is individually put forward due to its most prominent position.

In actual practice, the hierarchy of national interests also reflects itself in many countries’ diplomatic
practice. The Commission on America’s National Interests, established by Harvard’s Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, the Nixon Center, and RAND in 1992, published two reports on
America’s National Interests. In these two reports, American’s National Interests are categorized into

95 Yang Jiemian, China Dream and China Diplomacy, Wen HuiBao, 6.25,2013
97 Material from People.Com: Deng Xiao meets with Nixon on 31ST Oct 1989 ,
vital interests, extremely important interests, important interests, and less important or secondary interests.  

From Chinese scholars’ point of views, one nation’s core interests have those following characteristics. First, it is in the position of top priority. Core interests is in the position of top priority among a nation’s arrangement of her national interests, rendering all other interests secondary positions. A nation should first allocate her strategic resources into the defense of her core interests. Second, it affects the overall situation of national interests. Among different national interests, core interests is in the critical position that a slight move in it may affect the situation as a whole. The achievement of core interests is beneficial to the achievement of non-core interests. Once core interests is in jeopardy, the security of other national interests will also be in danger. Third, it is non-negotiable. Core interests can never be bargained, interfered and infringed. Any responsible government will be determined and unequivocal in defending her core interests.

Before 2009, some scholars had discussed Chinese national core interests in their articles and some Chinese government officials also had mentioned this concept in some special circumstance such as Taiwan straits issues. However, the concept of core interest was for the first time proposed by a government official in the Sino-US S&ED dialogue in the July 2009. During that meeting, Dai Bingguo, then Chinese State Councillor, stated that one important point in guaranteeing the sustainable, sound and stable development of Sino-US relation is the mutual understanding and mutual support of each other’s defense of their core interests. The core interests of China are the national and fundamental institutions’ security, the national and territorial integrity and the sustainable and stable development of economy and society. Dai’s statement was regarded as Chinese government’s first time declaration of the core interest. The main rationale behind Chinese government’s declaration of those core interests in 2009 is to respond to and reassure other nations’ worries and confusions on Chinese future development path after the successful host of Beijing Olympic. In 2010, State Councillor Dai wrote an article on “Adherence to the Road of Peaceful Development”, in which China’s strategic intention was clarified as to “promote development and harmony domestically and pursue cooperation and peace internationally.” Though, in this article Dai Bingguo put forward three categories of China’s core interests, the main theme of the article was to express to the world clearly that China’s development path, strategic intention and use of capability will not threat world’s peaceful development and other nations’ interests. China’s development is not negative but positive.

Some controversies are also intrigued by China’s declaration of nation’s core interests, which focus on the content and range of core interest and its relationship with common interest. In the content, some scholars think that Chinese officials gave a vague definition of core interest, which arouse other nation’s suspicions on Chinese foreign policies. For instance, Hiroko Maedo,a research fellow at PHP institute,  

100 See America’s National Interests , The Commission on America’s National Interests, 2000
thinks that despite similarities to other nations’ definition of core interests, China’s core interests is indeed specious, the core interests of Chinese characteristics tend to cause many contradictions in recognition and confusions in explanation. Thus, other scholar thinks that Chinese government officials should make a clear list of national core interests and maintain the stability of the content of core interest. As for the range, whether China will expand the range of core interests at will is another focus of discussion. On April 2010, some international media, based on some unconfirmed sources of information, connected South China Sea issue with China’s core interests, which caused misunderstandings of some ASEAN nations on China’s South China Sea policy. Though the late facts have disproved those international media’s reports on that issue. Even today, there are some arguments that China’s expanding national core interests exacerbate sense of insecurity of other nations. Besides, other scholar also points out that the excessively expanding of range of core interest will ultimately weaken them since it covers so many areas that it loses the focus. Third, in terms of the relationship between core interest and common interest, one scholar argues that the main difference between Chinese and western principle of politics is the difference of emphasis on individual and collective interest. China puts more emphasis on collective interests and Western culture puts more emphasis on individual interests. To some extent, the current emphasis on core interest of China defies her own traditional value and might be entrapped in the western discourse of the trap of core interest. Therefore, one Chinese scholar proposed that when China mentions her core interest, she should think in a global perspective and emphasize the common interest and avoid relying too much on military means to defend national core interests.

3. Opportunity Engineering (prepared by Zheng Yinqin)

Opportunity Engineering (also called Chance Engineering) is a terminology in Management Science. It is both a tactical approach and a mindset. In Management Science, opportunity refers to a favorable yet unstable situation, a significant yet fleeting incident in which a certain social entity can achieve a certain objective. Opportunity Engineering comprises opportunity identification, opportunity value assessment, opportunity exploitation and creation, etc.

104 China Economy Website, ”Japan Think Tank said that China’s core interest make Japanese puzzled” http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20120316/152811608837.shtml (Chinese)


113 Huang Jinfu, Opportunity Management.
The first use of OE by IR (International Relations) scholars can be dated back to February 15th, 2008 when Bonnie Glaser from CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) pointed out in a symposium held at Washington, D.C. that “to respond to the results of the Taiwan presidential election, mainland scholars in China have proposed replacement of the long used ‘crisis management’ by a relatively more open and pragmatic ‘opportunity management’. ” Since then, opportunity engineering has been used frequently to describe the cross-Strait relations as a policy innovation introduced by both sides to make the full use of the historic opportunity brought about by the KMT’s return to power. This term was later used to describe China-US relations (in 2009, it is proposed that the development of China-US relations requires a new thinking which can facilitate the shift from crisis management to opportunity engineering, from shared-interest-based to common-value-based, in order to seek social and cultural commonality) and “Regional Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific” (in 2013, Paul Evans from the University of British Colombia, Canada pointed out that the development of Asia-Pacific regional security cooperation requires new OE thinking).

However literature on OE in IR studies is scarce and there is no clear definition for OE by far. Opportunity is usually regarded as the opposition of crisis or challenge in IR studies. Zhang Tuosheng of China Foundation for International Strategic Studies pointed out that if crisis is the highly risky incident arising from the escalation of interest divergence, then opportunity means a favorable scenario and the possibility for cooperation based on shared interest. David H. Clark and Patrick M. Regan think that “opportunity is the core concept in international politics studies, especially in international conflict studies”, that “opportunity is invisible, only identifiable in state-to-state interactions”, that “as a part of the trust in other states”, “opportunity not only concerns geographical vicinity and power” but also “includes strategic and structural factors and the interaction between the two opens up the window of opportunity for state behaviour”. Existing literature shows that apart from the features such as objective reality, objective correspondence, unusual gains, uncertainties, collateral risks and time effectiveness, IR studies also focus on opportunity’s plasticity and reciprocity. Plasticity means that opportunity arises from interaction; positive interactions cultivate cooperation and create opportunity. Reciprocity means A derives development opportunity from B and in turn, provides B with favorable conditions for development.

Zhang Tuosheng pointed out that the research and discussions surrounding OE as a term in the IR lexicon should be focused on those opportunities that are mutual and reciprocal rather than one-sided, on bilateral or multilateral opportunity engineering rather than unilateral one. He emphasized that “OE requires relevant states and sides to transcend interest divergence, make full use of all opportunities and conditions to cooperate and strive for the best scenario on security issues where disparate interests converge. Therefore, the Cold War mentality must be denounced and the mindset of worst scenario as the starting point must be changed. An occasional or incidental difference or divergence should not lead to the lost opportunity for important cooperation, much less let the suspension of cooperation on major project be the means to resolve differences. This kind of efforts plays an irreplaceable role in expanding shared interests, increasing mutual respects, and limiting and settling disputes.” Zhou Zhihuan also pointed out

that “both sides should make full use of the period of opportunity and respect each other when differences arise over sensitive and major issues to maximize shared interests and achieve win-win results.” Chen Zibo further stressed that “chance management” is not a policy preference towards a specific political object, but a kind of long-term strategic deployment. The pursuit of short-term interests and results is unadvisable. Otherwise, chance management is pointless.” Besides, IR students all emphasize that opportunity engineering and crisis management are inseparable because the more effective crisis management is, the higher the possibility will be for opportunity engineering; and crisis management ought not to be forgotten while conducting opportunity engineering.

From the above analysis, we can see that opportunity in the IR lexicon arises from the interactions among different parties. As bi-party or multiparty behaviour, OE comprises two parts: firstly, there is an objective condition in which parties involved have the consensus that cooperation benefits all; secondly, parties involved engage in positive interactions to make full use of such a favorable condition to expand the benefits.

It is noteworthy that Chinese culture has provided a new perspective on OE studies. First, in Chinese culture, subjective initiative has always been valued and scholars believe that opportunities not only can be created but also hide under crises. Maximizing the value of potential opportunities hidden under crises manifests optimism in a dire situation. That is why Laozi, an ancient philosopher said “Good fortune lies within in bad, bad fortune lurks within good.” Chairman Mao once remarked that “Bad things can be turned into good ones.” Mr Deng Xiaoping said “A changing world is a big opportunity.” American scholars like Gary Schmitt and Tim Sullivan commented that China always regards crises as opportunities to realize policy objectives rather than something that should be avoided. It requires strategists of all countries including China to further study how to turn crises into opportunities, which is an important subject matter in OE studies. Second, Chinese culture emphasizes the feature of mutuality of opportunity in that one party’s opportunity engineering can also bring benefits to other parties. Recently, China has reiterated the importance of making full use of the current period of strategic opportunity to achieve peaceful development. At the same time, China stresses the practice of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, proposing that all nations and their peoples should share the fruit of development. It shows that the essence of the Chinese idea of peaceful development is not only to turn the opportunity for the world into the opportunity for China, but also to make China’s development into opportunities for world development. A changing world and international situation and the establishment of major power relationship require China to practice opportunity engineering in such a way.

4. The New Model of Major Power Relations (prepared by Ji Yixin)

At the Second U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Dai Bingguo (then Chinese State Councilor) proposed that “In this era of globalization, we should foster a new type of relations among major countries characterized by mutual respect, harmonious coexistence and win-win cooperation of countries with different social systems, cultural traditions and development stages.” An uncharted path for a new

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pattern of major power relationship is an inevitable choice for China, the world’s biggest developing country, and the United States, the biggest developed country. 117

On February 15th, 2012, Mr. Xi Jinping (then Chinese vice president) brought up the vision as he said, “We should expand our shared interests and mutually beneficial cooperation, strive for new progress in building our cooperative partnership and make it a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21st century.” For this purpose, the two sides should make joint efforts in the following four aspects: steadily increase mutual understanding and strategic trust; respect each other’s core interests and major concerns; work hard to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation; and steadily enhance coordination and cooperation in international affairs and on global issues.118

Later, Hu Jintao (then Chinese President) further explained this new type of major-power relationship in his opening remarks of the Fourth U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue and during his meetings with U.S. President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the G20 summit meeting. Hu stressed that to foster the U.S.-China Major-Power Relationship, the two sides “need to trust each other; need to act in a spirit of equality and mutual understanding; need to work actively; and need to nourish our friendship”.119

During his state visit to Russia in March 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Win-Win Cooperation and Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation, making it clear that the two country strive for “a long-term, stable, and healthy major-power relationship” to set an classic example of the new model of major-power relations.

On June 7th, 2013, during his meetings with U.S. President Obama at the Annenberg Estate, California, Chinese President Xi Jinping characterized the substance of the U.S.-China Major-Power Relationship as “no conflicts and no confrontation; respect for each other; conduct cooperation for win-win results”, emphasizing steadfastly pushing forward the construction of a new type of major-power relationship through strengthened dialogue, enhanced mutual trust, expanded cooperation, well-managed differences.120

On the Washington side, President Obama stressed that “America welcomes China’s peaceful rise” and that “the two parties should prove to the world that the future of U.S.-China relations will not repeat the past mistakes of other big powers”.121 Hilary Clinton (then U.S. State Secretary) said in her speeches at the United States Institute of Peace and the United States Naval Academy that “Today’s China is not the Soviet Union”, that “We are not on the brink of a new Cold War in Asia”, and that “We are, together, building a model in which we strike a stable and mutually acceptable balance between cooperation and

118 http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2010-05/25/content_1613069.htm
120 http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-06/08/content_2422916.htm
121 奥巴马在第四□中美□略与□□□□开幕式上的□面致辞。 “第四□中美□略与□□□□在京开幕”，《人民日□》， 2012 年5月4 日
competition. This is uncharted territory”. After the power transfer both in China and the United States, Thomas Donilon, then U.S. National Security Advisor remarked on March 11st, 2013 that China and the United States should strengthen cooperation in the military, economic, cyber security fields to “build a new model of relations between an existing power and an emerging one”. After the presidential meetings at the Annenberg Estate, Mr. Donilon commented that the two heads of state reached the consensus that direct conflict is not inevitable between an emerging power and an established power.

Scholars believe that the concept of “A New Model of Major-Power Relations” is a right near- and medium-term direction in which both sides make joint efforts to “translate the political will of the top leadership into a majority consensus, and to turn high-sounding declarations into concrete actions”. The proposal of building a new model of major power relationship at the juncture of Chinese leadership transition represented China’s proactive posture in constructing diplomatic theories, drafting international strategies, and enforcing policies. It is more an accurate summary of what the relationship is like after changes since the late 1970s. In other words, the current relationship between China and the US is one that has never existed in the history of international relations. As such a type of relationship has never existed, it is legitimate to label it “new.”

China believes that the NMGPR initially referred to but now is not limited to China-US relations. It can be used for relations with traditional powers such as the United States, Germany, France, the UK, and Japan as well as emerging powers such as Brazil and India. The cooperation-based and win-win oriented new model of major-power relations is designed to safeguard and facilitate the peaceful transition of the international system, transcend the old pattern of emerging-established conflict, enhance the influence and role of big developing countries such as the BRICS states, foster China’s relations with traditional powers like European countries, and stabilize and revive China-Japan relations which is currently at a historically low.

Western politicians’ responses to the New Model of Major-Power Relations differ. Henry Kissinger thought that it was the common responsibility of China and the U.S. to explore a new path for major-

Forrestal Lecture at the Naval Academy, U.S. Department of State website http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/04/187693.htm
124 Yuan Peng, Strategic Thinking on the Construction of New Type of China-U.S. Relations. Contemporary International Relations.
125 马马勉: “新型大国关系：理□、□略和政策建构” 《国□□□研究》 2013年第3期
127 马马勉: “新型大国关系：理□、□略和政策建构” 《国□□□研究》 2013年第3期
power relations. “The two sides must make joint efforts and keep dialogue whenever possible.” Kevin Rudd found that Washington was apparently puzzled with the “the new type of great-power relationship” and that there was little substantive response from the American side. He thought that Xi's first presents a unique window of opportunity to put the U.S.-Chinese relationship on a better course. Doing that, however, will require sustained leadership from the highest levels of both governments and a common conceptual framework and institutional structure to guide the work of their respective bureaucracies, both civilian and military.

U.S. scholars are interested in the concept. Optimists like Brzezinski think that “guided by the knowledge that ultimately their relationship is critical to both countries and is also of enormous importance to global stability; I have increased confidence that both sides will make a serious effort to find compromise formulations because they are both aware of the importance of the relationship to their own long-term interests.” Joseph Nye thinks that “The belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes. China needs thirty years of peace to meet our development goals and come close to the US. During that period we can focus on building a new type of great power relationship.” David Shambaugh thinks that “too often in the past, and usually at the insistence of the Chinese side, US-China summit meetings have produced hollow slogans that are disconnected from reality and devoid of substance. Thus, suggestion No. 1 for the summit is to stay away from slogans and stick to substance. Suggestion No. 2 is to be honest—with each other, each nation’s publics, and the world.”

Other scholars have suggested that leaders of both countries should bring the two sides closer in terms of trade and economic ties and should rethink the U.S.-China bilateral dialogue mechanism and appoint a very senior official on each side to be clearly in charge of relationship management; institutionalize and broaden military-to-military cooperation and emphasize strategic discussions; improve each side’s management of key third-party actors; avoid gratuitous acts that alienate citizens in the other country.

128 http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2012-02/2472496.html
129 Kevin Rudd, Beyond the Pivot: A New Road Map for U.S.-Chinese Relations, Foreign Affairs, Volume 92, Number 4, March/April 2013
130 http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-06/10/c_116111070.htm
Consociational Security Order (CSO) Chinese translation:

协和安全机制 (xiehe anquan jizhi)
xiehe: harmonious, accommodating, coordinated
anquan: security
jizhi: order, system, mechanism

共同体安全机制 (gongtongti anquan jizhi)
gongtongti: community, commonwealth
anquan: security
jizhi: order, system, mechanism

多元共存安全机制 (duoyuan gongcun anquan jizhi)
duoyuan: multi, multiple, diverse
gongcun: co---existence, co---survival, symbiotic
anquan: security
jizhi: order, system, mechanism

多元共进安全机制 (duoyuan gongcun anquan jizhi)
duoyuan: multi, multiple, diverse
gongjin: common progress, moving forward jointly
anquan: security
jizhi: order, system, mechanism