



CANADA AND THE NUCLEAR WEAPON BAN TREATY

GP2 POLICY REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canada has not signed the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons (Ban Treaty). This is a significant departure from what one might expect based on its history of being proactive on nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. In addition to not signing the Ban Treaty, the current Canadian administration has not taken any concrete initiatives to further nuclear disarmament. This report examines some of the reasons for this disinterest, and specifically the factors contributing to the government not signing the Ban Treaty.

Among the important factors that constrain Canada's decisions are the view among many policymakers that Canada is part of a larger alliance structure which faces a persistent nuclear threat. Volatility in the world's security dynamic also feeds into Canada's support for nuclear deterrence doctrines for its own protection.

This report is the outcome of a three month long Global Policy Project, which is part of the Masters in Public Policy and Global Affairs programme at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia. The client for the report is Reaching Critical Will, a New York based organization that works on disarmament, and affiliated with the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. It is largely based on a series of interviews over the phone, Skype, or in person with knowledgeable experts as well as our analyses of the literature on the subject, and a quantitative analysis of Canada's voting record at the United Nations.



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HISTORY OF THE BAN TREATY

The Ban Treaty, adopted at the United Nations in July 2017 by 122 nations, seeks to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in its totality. It is a legally binding instrument that goes beyond existing commitments, and explicitly prohibits its signatories from stockpiling, stationing, producing, transferring, and using nuclear weapons. The Ban Treaty will enter into force when at least fifty countries have signed and ratified the Treaty. As of April 2018, the treaty had been signed by fifty-seven countries and ratified by seven countries.

The Ban Treaty resulted from a significant effort led by civil society organizations, in particular the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). For its efforts, ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 2017. Reaching Critical Will (RCW) is affiliated with ICAN and Ray Acheson, the Director of Reaching Critical Will, is a member of the International Steering Group of ICAN. ICAN and Reaching Critical Will continue their efforts to convince countries, including Canada, to sign and ratify the Ban Treaty.

In the long and arduous road to the adoption of Ban Treaty at the UN, ICAN fostered a unique approach to nuclear disarmament, by highlighting the potentially devastating humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. It was involved in organizing three major conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2014.

After the last conference, host nation Austria invited countries to sign a Humanitarian Pledge resolution at the United Nations General Assembly. This led to the establishment of an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) in 2016, which turned out to be a key step in moving toward drafting the Ban Treaty and having it adopted at the United Nations.

Five former Canadian Ambassadors for Disarmament at the UN published an open letter to encourage the newly elected government under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to take a proactive role in this humanitarian initiative of countries concerned about the catastrophic effects of the use of nuclear weapons.¹

Immediately after the OEWG ended in October 2016, a document labelled “United States Non-Paper: Defence Impacts of Potential UNGA Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty” was sent by the US mission at NATO to all its partners. The non-paper labeled the outcome of the OEWG report titled “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiation” as unbalanced and unrealistic.



It encouraged NATO members to vote against the resolution mandating Treaty negotiations.² Canada duly obliged by voting against the 2016 UN General Assembly resolution that established the mandate for nations to negotiate a legally binding treaty.

Canada's decision has not gone unopposed. Civil Society and the New Democratic Party have been vocally critical of Canada's position.³ They have asked Canada to take an independent stance based on the humanitarian principles and principles of victim assistance, positive obligation and environmental remediation championed by Canada in the passing the landmines ban treaty. Canada's own track record on nuclear disarmament and arms control is a testament to its ability to adapt an independent position. Civil society and the NDP have urged the government to take that into consideration.

The Canadian government has adopted the same arguments for not signing the ban treaty, as other nuclear weapon states. These include:

1. Ban Treaty negotiations fail to consider the global security climate.
2. A nuclear weapons ban would be ineffective.
3. The process to ban nuclear weapons is divisive and not based on consensus.
4. A legal prohibition of nuclear weapons is no substitute for actual weapons reduction.
5. The pursuit of a nuclear-weapons ban undermines the NPT.
6. A step-by-step pragmatic approach to nuclear disarmament is better than a ban.

Canada's advocacy for a step-by-step approach, which includes signing and ratifying the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT) and taking a forward position on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) still falls short of a true commitment to nuclear disarmament. Since the NPT came into force in 1970 the world has not attained the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. In effect, Canada too is opting for the status quo.

HISTORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA

Canada has a long history of dealing with nuclear weapons, although these dealings have been indirect for most of this time. It is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the mid-1950s, NATO has emphasized the necessity for nuclear weapons “in deterring—and, if necessary, defending against—an attack on the Alliance”.⁴

Some academics see Canada’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1963 by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson as a strategic choice in order to be influential during the Cold War.⁵ Sean Maloney in his book *Learning to Love the Bomb* chronicles Canadian acquisition of nuclear weapons as “Canada’s way to contribute to [Nato’s] defence and identify [with] alliance warfare as the a viable option for its own defence”.⁶

However prior to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, according to Maloney, “preserving Canada’s sovereignty, its military obligations in NATO and defence of North America became heavily politicized issues, while public opinion polls found majority of Canadians in favour of acquiring nuclear weapons”. Therefore policy and election outcomes were largely driven by how the public perceived this issue.

The late 1960s saw the coming into power of another Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Military analyst and historian John Clearwater, in his book *Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold War Arsenal* suggests that “[Pierre] Trudeau, upon coming to power in 1968, was not a fan [of nuclear weapons], but did nothing to change Canada’s nuclear policy. Part of the untold story is that the political decision to keep nuclear weapons on Canadian soil was a reflection of the public sentiment at the time”. Clearwater further states that “Change in Canadian nuclear policy emerged gradually and was closely tied to the conventional arms trade with United States,” the details of which are left out of this report. However the only realistic way for Canada to reduce its nuclear footprint was to “trade-out” the weapon systems, which included missiles, rockets and fighter jets, capable of delivering nuclear warheads. According to Clearwater “this was a slow drawdown”.

The weapon systems and their nuclear warheads were gradually replaced for other more modern conventional weapons. For instance Canada bought the CF-18 jets to replace the Voodoo aircraft which carried the nuclear-armed Genie-rockets.⁷ Canadian historians are reluctant to credit Prime Minister Trudeau for this ‘drawdown’. It is labelled a military decision, and Clearwater suggests likewise: “It’s not so much as a Trudeau policy, as they

finally outlived their life expectancy”. However, there is reason to doubt the above assessment based on the fact that the Canadian Prime Minister sits at the helm of all affairs and enjoys executive authority which is second to none. The assertion is also validated by Pierre Trudeau’s personal efforts towards disarmament diplomacy during the 1970s. The pinnacle of Trudeau’s efforts, arguably, is his address at the UN General Assembly’s First Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) on 26 May 1978. In this speech, Trudeau set out what became known as a “strategy of suffocation” aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race underway between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Trudeau stated:

We are nonetheless a country that has renounced the production of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons under our control. We have withdrawn from any nuclear role by Canada’s armed forces in Europe and are now in the process of replacing with conventional armed aircraft the nuclear-capable planes still assigned to our forces in North America. We are thus not only the first country in the world with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so; we are also the first nuclear-armed country to have chosen to divest itself of nuclear arms.⁸

Trudeau’s speech heralded an enhancement of Canada’s bureaucratic capacity as part of an effort to have Canada play a more active role in shaping the multilateral agenda for arms control and disarmament. Furthermore, the speech represented a major conceptual and practical contribution by the Government of Canada to moderating the supercharged competition between nuclear forces.⁹ Canada’s right to address the nuclear problem came from it being geographically placed between two heavily armed superpowers, with an obvious stake in the prevention of war in a nuclear age.

Having already been a signatory to the 1970 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Canada stayed at the forefront of disarmament issues throughout the 1990s by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and initiating negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). In the late 1990s, under the leadership of then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, Canada also championed a ban on anti-personnel landmines, the so-called Ottawa Treaty. The treaty was a hallmark of Canadian policy entrepreneurship and bureaucratic capacity at the international arena.

The above summary of Canadian history with nuclear weapons represents exemplary leadership, policy entrepreneurship and institutional vision towards nuclear disarmament and arms control. However, it stands in stark contrast to Canada's current ambivalence towards the Ban Treaty. This lack of movement on the nuclear disarmament within Canada, in light of the above historical record, is a focal point of our analysis in the next sections.





LITERATURE REVIEW

Canadian officials and politicians have been commenting on the idea of a treaty pushing for global nuclear disarmament for several years now. Even before the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Ban Treaty) became the subject of negotiations, the New Democratic Party (NDP), during the 2015 elections, stated that “it [was] time to pursue a global ban on the use of nuclear weapons by engaging Canadians on this issue and taking a strong stand on eliminating these obsolete, counterproductive and wasteful weapons”¹⁰ But the government did not agree.

The government’s preferred alternative to the Ban Treaty to advance disarmament involves what is often called a step-by-step approach. This approach builds on the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and goes on to negotiating various international treaties in the hope that together these will ultimately result in the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the words of Global Affairs Canada (GAC: Canada’s Foreign Ministry Office), “The core of the step-by-step approach involves having all countries join the NPT, bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, and negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty”.¹¹

According to GAC, “Canada’s main nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament goal for many years has been the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Such a treaty would halt the production of the material that gives nuclear weapons their explosive power, and thus eventually halt the production of nuclear weapons”.¹² The problem is that the FMCT has been stuck for two decades and there has been essentially no progress since the 1990s when Canada managed to start, for a brief period, discussions about the treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

On 26 January 2016, Canada’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations made a formal statement on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Mission was convinced that “the start of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remain[ed] the most important element of a Program of Work because it [was] already ripe for negotiation”. The Mission cited how Canada had previously “chaired the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that facilitated the most in-depth discussion on the elements of a legally binding, non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty”. The Mission also felt that “the GGE’s consensus-based report faithfully reflect[ed] the spectrum of views expressed by all its participants and clearly demonstrate[d] that no substantive issues [were] preventing the immediate negotiation of this treaty”.¹³

On 2 March 2016, then Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion addressed the Conference on Disarmament (CoD), iterating that “For the past two decades, the CoD had been coming up empty. The Conference on Disarmament had not made a single concrete contribution to international peace and security”.¹⁴ However, Dion believed that “one major recent success in terms of disarmament [was] the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 [China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States plus Germany]. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [was to] be an essential contribution to global efforts toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, provided it is fully and verifiably implemented”.¹⁵

Stéphane Dion also brought up the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the same meeting, indicating that “the pursuit of such a treaty would not only help put in place a prohibition against the production of dangerous fissile material, but it would also be instrumental in helping to advance important verification mechanisms necessary for broader disarmament efforts. This is a realistic, achievable step, and one that Canada believes must move forward without further delay”.¹⁶ These statements were made in context of his belief that “Without the participation of the countries possessing nuclear weapons, a ban would not bring us any closer to our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Indeed, premature action, risks undermining international stability by creating a false sense of security, without any reliable underpinnings”.¹⁷

On 19 August 2016, Canada voted against a UN report that recommended negotiations begin for a global treaty that would ban nuclear weapons. This was in sharp contrast with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s ambition to make a bid for Canada at the United Nations Security Council in 2021, as well as his desire to promote international peace, which he had proclaimed Canada would champion shortly after getting elected.¹⁸

On 27 October 2016, Canada, along with many other NATO countries, opposed a resolution at the UN General Assembly that would take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. The resolution was introduced as part of a wider effort by a majority of non-nuclear weapon states to push for the negotiation of a nuclear weapon ban treaty by 2017.¹⁹ The Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion defended the decision by referring to the political success of the FMCT at the UN General Assembly, terming it a “concrete progress on nuclear disarmament”.²⁰

On 27 March 2017, negotiations regarding the Ban Treaty began with the intention of creating a “legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading toward their total elimination”.²¹ Alongside other US allies, Canada refused to participate in the negotiations. This was in light of the US government’s non-paper sent to its allies in October of 2016, telling them to vote against or not join the negotiations if they do begin.

On 7 June 2017, the House of Commons session included discussions about Canada’s position on nuclear disarmament. In response to the NDP’s urging Canada to engage in the negotiations of the Ban Treaty, Justin Trudeau in the Prime Minister’s Q&A session in the parliament, dismissed the criticism by saying “It is well-meaning, as the NDP often are, but less “tangible” and “concrete” than what the government is [already] doing in its support for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty”.²²



On 20 September 2017, when the Ban Treaty was formally opened to countries for signature at the UN, Mark Gwozdecky, the Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security and Political Affairs at Global Affairs Canada, stated: “It is Canada’s view that, while well-intentioned, the ban treaty is unfortunately premature. Without the support of any nuclear-armed states, it will not result in the elimination of even a single nuclear weapon. Moreover, by duplicating some provisions of the CTBT and not including measures for monitoring and inspections, it creates confusion and may erode progress for the entry into force of the CTBT. Nuclear disarmament remains a priority for Canada, but efforts to this end must meet the dual test of effectiveness and undiminished security for all”.²³


On 9 October 2017, Canada’s Permanent Mission to the UN once again made a formal statement regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, stating that “Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remain pressing concerns”.²⁴ However, the mission reiterated that “We remain unconvinced that the newly negotiated *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* will be effective. For Canada, the NPT remains the cornerstone for making progress towards a nuclear weapon free world. We believe that greater effort is needed to build trust and reduce tensions that fuel the reliance on nuclear weapons for national security. We support the practical and progressive work needed to bring the CTBT into force, to develop negative security assurances, to devise new techniques and global capabilities for credible nuclear disarmament verification and to prepare for the negotiation of a *Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty*”.²⁵

On 27 October 2017, at an event in Quebec where Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was promoting his government’s new spending measures, he was asked by reporters about pleas from Setsuko Thurlow, a survivor of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and a nuclear disarmament activist, to sign the Ban Treaty. In response, Trudeau stated that “This extraordinary individual, her story and her continued fight for a nuclear-free world remains something that this government and Canada is always supportive of. We need to move towards a safer world with far fewer nuclear weapons. We need to create a nuclear-free world for our children and grandchildren”.²⁶ When pressed on the most viable method in achieving that, Trudeau reaffirmed that “We’re focused on significant, concrete measures moving forward that will actually include countries that have nuclear weapons. I think any time you’re going to talk about moving forward on a nuclear-free world, you have

to focus on the countries that already have nuclear weapons and therefore look at reducing that amount”.²⁷

On 27 February 2018, Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland gave a speech in Geneva, Switzerland at the High Level Segment of the Conference on Disarmament, addressing Canada’s policy towards non-proliferation and disarmament. She noted that “[Canada was] chairing a UN expert group on the development of a fissile material cut-off treaty to help halt the production of nuclear weapons. [It] followed a Canada-sponsored UN resolution that brought together 159 states. Crucially, this expert group include[d] all five nuclear weapons states, India and nineteen non-nuclear weapons states. Throughout the FMCT preparatory group process, Canada pursued two objectives: first, to counteract growing international divisions by uniting nuclear and non-nuclear armed states in continuing to work toward [a] shared non-proliferation and disarmament goal; second, to make real progress toward the long overdue negotiation of this treaty”.²⁸

In that same statement, Freeland also directly challenged the Ban Treaty, commenting that “FMCT votes in the UN General Assembly show support for the FMCT is nearly universal. Moreover, both proponents of the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and [its] skeptics are on board”.²⁹ However Freeland acknowledged that “Over the past year, we have seen leaders from the global disarmament community drive the negotiation and signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The popularity of this initiative speaks to the desire of countries, activists and communities to accelerate the work toward disarmament. It also reflects frustration and disappointment at the pace of global efforts so far. We believe that this is a legitimate criticism”.³⁰



METHODOLOGY

Interviews with experts was our primary method of obtaining information. The experts were chosen based on an extensive review of the literature on Canada's nuclear history and recent opinion pieces on the Ban Treaty. In turn, some of the first interviewees recommended further names, most notable amongst whom were former Canadian ambassadors to the UN who participated in the Conferences on Disarmament. We also interviewed members of non-governmental organizations and various activists based in Canada that specialized in following the government's nuclear weapons policies.

The interviews were semi-structured, with multiple questions eliciting descriptive answers. These were used to collect information on who the key decision

makers were in Canada when it came to nuclear weapon policy, the key constraints on their decision making, and what avenues of change the interviewees saw (if any). To achieve our objective, we felt that we had to gain a firmer grasp on the historical context of Canada and nuclear weapons. So, in our initial interviews, we placed a lot of emphasis on asking questions regarding the history of Canada's policy towards nuclear weapons. A special focus was the period under the late Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, when Canada's nuclear weapons policy differed greatly from the US.

Our efforts to better understand the processes through which the Canadian government decided not to sign the Ban Treaty faced a major setback when Global Affairs Canada refused our interview request.

Our initial interview request sent to GAC on 14 February 2018 said:

"We are a group of four graduate students in the Master of Public Policy and Global Affairs degree program at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. For our senior year Global Policy Project, we are trying to better understand Canada's refusal to sign, or participate in the negotiations that led to, the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons that was adopted at the United Nations in July 2017.

We are being mentored by Professor M. V. Ramana in this project and the client for the project is Reaching Critical Will, a non governmental organization that has been involved in the negotiation of the Ban Treaty. We would like to interview you to get your insights on this subject, or related areas. We sincerely hope you can share some time to help us with our project. We will be in Ottawa from the 17th to 21st February and we would appreciate if you could meet with us."

GAC responded on the same day. To our dismay and surprise, the Director of GAC questioned our motives: “[We] would like to better understand [your] relationship with Reaching Critical Will, an organization that we know very well. When you say ‘the client for the project is RCW’, what exactly do you mean by that? Is RCW going to publish the interview(s) and/or your report on their website? Any further information that you can give us on the exact purpose of the project will allow us to make an informed decision on whether we can accept or not your request.”

Our immediate response on 14 February 2018 to GAC was:

“In the case of our project, the client is Reaching Critical Will who would like to better understand the decision-making process that led to Canada's non-participation in the Ban Treaty negotiations. As you know, RCW, along with other members of ICAN has been involved in lobbying countries to sign the Ban Treaty. Our understanding is that RCW will use the results of our project to better inform their lobbying efforts. We expect that our report will be shared within the ICAN network. If you would like it, we can ask RCW not to publish the report on their website.”

On 18 February 2018, the Deputy Director of GAC refused our interview request:

“Unfortunately, as public servants, we are unable to accept your request to be

interviewed for a project you are undertaking on behalf of ICAN. This is because it is unclear exactly what use ICAN will make of the interviews, and because of the possibility that they may be published - which is usually the sole prerogative of elected officials.”

The refusal was based on their concerns about how ICAN and Reaching Critical Will might use their interviews. GAC remained adamant despite our assurances that our work was academic in nature and that all responses will remain anonymous.

Not wanting to give up on the opportunity of interviewing GAC, we requested an interview for a second time on 4 March 2018:

“Thank you for your response. We are very disappointed at Global Affairs Canada's decision to refuse to talk to us. As students of public policy, it would help us enormously to understand how public servants approach various policy decisions. We would like to clarify that our coordination is with Reaching Critical Will rather than the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, interviews would be on a 'background basis' and that officials would not be quoted or their remarks made be public in anyway. As mentioned in our earlier email, we can share the parts of the report that deal with our discussions with Global Affairs Canada for your approval. If you have any other stipulations we will consider those too.


We hope that you will reconsider your decision based on our response.”

Instead of outright rejecting us, the Deputy Director stonewalled us on 6 March 2018 without following up on our request again:

“I will consult with the Director on his return from leave next week with respect to your request and get back to you thereafter.”

No response has been received since.

After the interviews were conducted, we identified keywords mentioned by the interviewees and compared them with other interviewees. Analyzing these allowed us to verify that we had indeed chosen respondents holding a wide spectrum of opinions. The **plot below** shows, for example, the range of positions on the desirability of the Ban Treaty itself.



In addition, we also analyzed the voting patterns of Canada and its key allies at the United Nations on nuclear related resolutions. The impetus for this was the assertion by many interviewees that Canada followed the US, France, and the United Kingdom closely.

KEY DECISION MAKERS

Canada is a multiparty parliamentary democracy with a “first-past-the-post” electoral system for choosing national governments. From February 2006 to November 2015, Stephen Harper was the Prime Minister of Canada as leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. In the aftermath of the 2015 federal elections, he was succeeded by Justin Trudeau, leader of the Liberal Party of Canada.

The Prime Minister is the first among several key decision makers and has the power to choose a Cabinet, which he chairs, and to make various appointments. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet Ministers are Canada’s principal decision-makers. However, devolution or delegation of power to the Cabinet is Prime Minister’s prerogative, which can result in consolidation of decision making power with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).³¹

The Privy Council Office (PCO) also plays an instrumental role in policy making process. The PCO is the hub of non-partisan, public service support to the Prime Minister and Cabinet and its decision-making structures. Members of the PCO are appointed for life by the governor general as directed by Prime Ministers.³² Through communication with government departments, PCO keeps track of where different ministers stand on an issue and transfers this information to the Prime Minister. The PCO provides essential advice and support to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Accordingly, the PMO exercises significant influence over the executive branch of the government. Various statements made by our interviewees also confirmed that the power to make decisions on matters related to National Security is vested in the PMO. A significant number of respondents also considered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Global Affairs Canada department and the Ministry of National Defence as secondary sources of power and influence in Ottawa.

CONSTRAINTS

on Canada's decision to sign the Ban Treaty

THE BIG PICTURE

Amongst them, our interviewees identified multiple challenges to Canada signing the ban treaty. It appears that Canada's decision about the Ban Treaty is constrained by a range of domestic and external factors. The latter primarily involves the Alliance structure that Canada is part of, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which includes what has often been called a nuclear umbrella.

The role of NATO in shaping Canada's positions came up repeatedly in our interviews. NATO officials view the Ban Treaty as posing a fundamental challenge to the alliance, although others disagree. Some of the academics we interviewed argued that the Ban Treaty itself poses a challenge to creating a consensus among all countries because it seeks to explicitly stigmatize nuclear weapons, making it impossible for nuclear weapon states to sign the treaty unless they decide to get rid of their arsenals. An interviewee who had a long career with the Canadian Department of National Defence, criticized the Ban Treaty for "imposing a transactional solution on countries that don't trust each other". His way of explaining this was that "we would have to wait for tectonic and chaotic events and see that as an opportunity to further push for change". He criticized the Ban Treaty for its "removal of the legitimacy to possess nuclear weapons, and outcasting of opponents instead of casting them in prominence".

Some interviewers also commented that the timing of the treaty was not conducive to its acceptance, we return to this point later.



DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

There was evidence of institutional inertia within the bureaucracy and federal government, particularly from those appointed during the Harper era. Our interview with a retired Canadian foreign services diplomat revealed that within the current setup at Global Affairs Canada “policy silos [had] emerged and Canada’s foreign policy [was] no longer a unified whole nor was it well directed”. According to the ex-diplomat “[GAC had] failed to find a place or a role in this new and much more complex diplomatic world, [which forced us to ask] how can expertise be reestablished so that Canada is no longer merely reactive to developments?”

The reactive nature of Canadian foreign service stands in stark contrast to bureaucracy’s proactive behaviour during earlier periods. For example, it has been well documented that the Canadian bureaucracy had a large role to play in Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s 1978 “strategy of suffocation” address.³³ Within the current GAC setup, it was mentioned by a respondent that the status-quo is intensified by movement of ambitious officials away from the nuclear disarmament desk to other promising career trajectories like trade policy, which are seen as an active area for career advancement.

To break this institutional inertia, policy entrepreneurs like former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau or former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy are direly needed. However, there is a lack of a policy window for potential policy entrepreneurs to surface in today’s Canada to push for nuclear disarmament. The lack of policy entrepreneurs, who could be managers, directors or above within the federal bureaucracy and who have an active interest in furthering nuclear disarmament is a major constraint faced by the Ban Treaty movement.



This implies that the short term chances of Canada signing the Ban Treaty are low.

The New Democratic Party (NDP), an opposition party in the federal government, has strongly and openly supported the treaty. On August 23rd 2016, a few days after Canada voted against the adoption of a report recommending negotiations of a global treaty banning nuclear weapons at the UN General Assembly, H  l  ne Laverdi  re, NDP Foreign Affairs Critic, and Linda Duncan, Co-Chair of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament-Canada, made the following statement: “The NDP supports efforts to create a nuclear weapons treaty, and commends the work of many civil society groups across Canada, including the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, who have devoted years to this campaign. We will continue to support efforts for a nuclear weapons treaty as this issue goes to the UN General Assembly this Fall”.


More recently, NDP Defence Critic and Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence, Randall Garrison, [symbolically] signed the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, to demonstrate that Canada can, and must, take a leadership role in the movement for nuclear disarmament. Mr. Garrison said that “Doing nothing to prevent nuclear war is not an option, and the NDP will continue to call on the Liberals to finally show courage and step up to protect people around the world from the horrors that nuclear weapons can cause”.³⁴ Privately, some Liberal party politicians have also expressed their support for the Ban Treaty to their NDP counterparts. Publicly, current Liberal MP Pam Damoff has recently sponsored a petition calling the federal government to sign and adopt the Ban Treaty. Despite her support for the government’s decision she also encouraged the petition initiator, Barbara Birkett, to bring it to Parliament.³⁵ Therefore, there is scope for political change on this issue, and a policy entrepreneur could emerge with sustained public pressure.


Public awareness and pressure is another major constraint. Unfortunately, in recent years, Canadians have not taken to the streets or indulged in other forms of activism to advance nuclear disarmament. The lack of public pressure means that there is no strong incentive for politicians to advocate for the Ban Treaty in the parliament.

Public awareness and pressure is another major constraint. Unfortunately, in recent years, Canadians have not taken to the streets or indulged in other forms of activism to advance nuclear disarmament. The lack of public pressure means that there is no strong incentive for politicians to advocate for the Ban Treaty in the parliament. Championing the issue will not draw public attention, nor will it be a political winner. Young people, the most active in grassroots movements, are not sensitized to the dangers of nuclear weapons because they have not witnessed the Cold War, when public discourse on concerns about nuclear dangers was more prevalent. Younger activists generally focus on climate change and other environmental issues. Similarly, indigenous communities or feminist leaders lack the capacity and are often mired in issues more pertinent to their own communities.

Canada's decision to sign the Ban Treaty is also dependent on perceived national security threats. The main countries which are seen to pose a security threat to Canada are Russia, China and North Korea. Russia is perceived as a perennial threat to Canada because of their Cold War relations and geographical proximity which includes the contentious Arctic region. China is also perceived as a threat, as a rising global power both militarily and economically. China is perceived as a revisionist state that has the potential to destabilize the Liberal World Order. The third country, North Korea, poses a more eminent and direct threat to North American security particularly because of its intercontinental missile capability, combined with its nuclear capability which can hit US allies. According to many of our interviewees, the present circumstances make it extremely hard to advocate for a nuclear ban treaty.

Another factor that came up during our interviews was lobbying by defence contractors, which forms an important source of pressure in Ottawa. One example given by an interviewee was the US defence contractor Lockheed Martin, which had in the past displayed pro Canadian Military posters at bus stops and transit stations in Ottawa. It was mentioned by a few respondents that there exists a nuclear establishment in Ottawa which funds a new wave of young people to join academia and bureaucracy. Their mandate is to exert their influence in think tanks and prominent universities and strengthen the security establishment.





MAP OF CONSTRAINTS ON CANADA'S DECISION

EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

International alliances strongly affect Canada's decision making process. In particular, there was consensus among our interviewees that the US exerts a significant influence on the Canada's decision making process, in large part because of geographical, historical and trade reasons. Canada and the US both depend on each other and strongly value their mutual relationship.

The United States also has a history of directing some policies of its NATO allies, a recent example occurring in October 2016 where the US circulated a document (referred to as the "non-paper") to all NATO allies strongly encouraging them to vote against starting negotiations for a nuclear ban treaty. Some interviewees felt the "non-paper" was critical to the boycott of the negotiations by Canada; others felt that the document was just reaffirming Canada's position and did not influence the decision to not participate in the treaty negotiation process.

The significance of the NATO alliance structure and its implication on Canada's policy on nuclear weapons as discussed by many of our interviewees is consistent with the current administration's perspective. In the June 2017 Parliamentary debate session, former Canadian Lieutenant General and Parliamentary Secretary to the Foreign Minister Andrew Leslie stated that as a NATO member, Canada had relied on and stood on the shoulders of states with nuclear weapons deterrent capabilities. Leslie also expressed the belief that current security circumstances implied that nuclear weapon states would be unwilling to disarm. Therefore the Canadian government would be uncomfortable in straying too far from NATO's nuclear deterrence and defence strategy.³⁶

Nuclear sharing is part of NATO's deterrence strategy, which goes against Articles 1, 2, and 4 of the Ban Treaty that prohibits signatory states from embracing a nuclear umbrella for its protection. Canada also has strong cultural ties with both the United Kingdom and France. Both countries are nuclear weapon states and form an integral part of NATO's nuclear defence strategy in Europe. Many respondents asserted that Canada's nuclear posture will always factor in the UK and France.




Another factor fuelling Canadian apprehension was the unpredictability of the current US administration under President Donald Trump. Several interviewees mentioned the prevailing times are the most challenging for the US-Canada relationship in recent history, largely because of the contentious disputes over the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Some respondents felt that Canada is unlikely to go against the US position on the Ban Treaty in the prevailing conditions.

As mentioned earlier, some of our interviewees insisted that states like Russia, China, and North Korea were threats to the security of Canada. However, other interviewees disagreed on the significance of that threat. One interviewee outlined the geographic military advantage that Canada had: its only land border was with an allied country and it was separated from potential adversaries like Russia and North Korea by an entire ocean.

Some constraints also flowed from the nature of the Ban Treaty. Our interviewees echoed some of the ideas stated by the Trudeau government, namely that the Ban Treaty is ineffective, because it will not rid the world of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, because Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are not parties to the treaty, which originated among non-nuclear and non-aligned states, it would be impossible to compel NWS to give up their nuclear assets. Within this view, the Ban Treaty was inherently an unlikely candidate to fully succeed in its aim.

In the same vein, the nature of the Ban Treaty and what it had set out to accomplish was seen to be too grandiose or ambitious to realistically affect the domestic drivers that can influence change in policy. Quite a few of our interviewees thought that the Ban Treaty was not a “political winner”. Generally politicians have championed popular causes that will win them votes. Spending political capital on a project that was seen as unlikely to be successful was not perceived as a good strategy.



ELEMENTS WE ASSUMED WOULD PLAY A ROLE IN CANADA'S DECISION, BUT ACTUALLY DO NOT

Prior to our interviews one of our assumptions was that trade agreements, NAFTA in particular, would play a major role constraining Canada's decision. However, several of our interviewees clearly stated that trade affairs were very distinct from military/strategic defence affairs. Although there have been ups and downs in trade relations between Canada and the United States, the fundamental strategic relationship has never been put into question because of them.


Another assumption that we started out with was that Canada's Pacific identity would be a driver of Canadian security policy. Despite the fact that nuclear risks and threats exist in acute form in the Asia-Pacific, respondents agreed that Canada's Atlantic identity dominated its security thinking due to historical links with Europe. Canada's relationships with Asian countries were more bilateral than multilateral and Asia-Pacific in general was too fragmented and politically unstable. Although someone from Vancouver would be biased in its appreciation of Canada's Pacific identity, as Vancouver is known as being the Pacific gateway, for the rest of Canada, the Pacific is still a "mystery" as one of our interviewees said.

A third element we were expecting to play a role was that of Canada's international reputation as a middle power, a peace keeper and an honest broker. We thought this image might be compromised by Canada's lack of engagement on the Ban Treaty. But this changed with our interviews and we realized that in recent years Canada's reputation was built around different issues.

UN VOTING PATTERN

One consistent message we heard from our interviewees was that Canada has always acted in harmony with its traditional allies, the United States (US), France (FR) and the United Kingdom (UK). We decided to understand if this was true by looking at whether Canada has always voted the same way as these countries at the United Nations (UN).

THIS GRAPH SHOWS DATA SOURCED FROM THE UN. THE Y-AXIS REPRESENTS THE DEGREE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA AND ITS ALLIES (US, UK OR FR) ON HOW THEY VOTED ON RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO NUCLEAR ISSUES.



To do this, we used a dataset of roll-call votes on various resolutions at the UN General Assembly between 1946 and 2017, compiled by Erik Voeten.³⁷ We used the March 2, 2018 version, the most recent update of the dataset. The subset included the votes of Canada, the US, France and the UK, on resolutions related to nuclear issues.

We quantified the degree of bilateral agreement between Canada and each of its main ally, for each year. There are four choices or categories for the roll-call votes at the UN General Assembly: Yes, No, Abstain, and Absent. We assumed that being Absent had the same weight as Abstaining in terms of commitment to an issue, so we pulled them together in the category Abstain. If both parties voted Yes or No or abstained on the resolution, it was counted as 1. If one party voted Yes or No and the other Abstained, then the agreement was considered as unsure and was counted as 0.5. Finally, if one party voted Yes and the other party voted No, that was taken to express complete disagreement and counted as 0. The measure we used was the average across the degrees of agreement for all resolutions per year. Hence, if in a given year, the final general agreement score is 1 it means that the two countries voted identically on each resolution. Similarly if the score is 0 it means the parties disagreed consistently that year.

The graph plots the degree of bilateral agreement between Canada and each of its main allies, for each year from 1948 to 2017. Since 1977, there has not been a single year when Canada fully agreed with even one of its three allies. Indeed, there have been periods of considerable divergence. In the last four decades, the rate of agreement is around 75% and even less with the United States. A table of the dataset can be found in the Appendix.

This exercise shows that the widespread assumption that Canada always follows its allies, in particular the United States, on nuclear matters does not hold up to scrutiny. At least at the UN General Assembly, Canada has made choices that are different from its close allies. More research is needed to understand this pattern and it would be worthwhile to investigate the type of resolutions for which there was disagreement. But, even this analysis forms an adequate basis to challenge the notion that Canada is tied to the positions of the United States, France, or the United Kingdom, on all nuclear issues. The question is whether we can allow ourselves to see, in the not too distant future, the Ban Treaty becoming another “datapoint” of bilateral disagreement between Canada and its allies.

CASE STUDY

On March 2, 2018, Kazakhstan signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This decision has some relevance to Canada's case because some similarities do exist between the two countries. Both Canada and Kazakhstan border nuclear weapon states: China and Russia in Kazakhstan's case. For both countries, their larger neighbours, namely the United States and Russia, play a key role in shaping their foreign policies and defining their defence choices. Therefore the decision by Kazakhstan to sign the Ban Treaty under such circumstances, could offer some valuable lessons for Canada.

Kazakhstan has a commendable past of nuclear disarmament. After its independence in 1991, it surrendered over 1400 nuclear warheads, the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, to Russia. Despite this act, it was by no means certain that Kazakhstan would sign the Ban Treaty. It took the efforts of the Centre for International Security and Policy, a partner organization of ICAN in Kazakhstan, to create the necessary movement for the government to sign the treaty.

The Centre for International Security and Policy drew upon the country's experiences at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, which was ground zero for more than 450 Soviet atomic tests from 1949 to 1989, to build public pressure against nuclear weapons. It was not an easy task by any means, but the fact that over a period of four decades, more than 1.5 million had people suffered from terminal radiation exposure that polluted an area roughly the size of Germany, made it a huge contributing factor.

The question for Canada is whether its vibrant and robust civil society can learn from the Kazakhstan's example and whether Canada can also draw upon its history to chart a path forward to signing the Ban Treaty.

The photograph (retrieved from <https://bit.ly/2rgY1Lf> on May 2nd, 2018) shows the former Semipalatinsk test site, which was the primary nuclear testing site for the Soviet Union, and the environmental impacts associated.




AVENUES FOR CHANGE & RECOMMENDATIONS

There are 3 potential non-exclusive avenues for change:

1. GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS WHICH CAN HELP GENERATE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO SIGN THE BAN TREATY

In the Canadian context this avenue has viability because Canada has a history of following public perception when it comes to nuclear weapons. Although our interviewees didn't talk about it, we think there are examples of strategies that Reaching Critical Will can adopt to target Canadian public and help them develop greater awareness on nuclear issues. This includes:

1. Push for more public polls, surveys and petitions. In January, Pam Damoff, the Liberal MP for Oakville North-Burlington, sponsored a parliamentary petition calling on the government to sign and ratify the Ban Treaty. The petition was initiated by a local academic from Oakville Ontario, Ms. Barbara Birkett, and presently has over eleven hundred signatures.³⁸ Similarly, favourable results from public polling and surveys on nuclear disarmament can provide impetus to lobbying efforts in Ottawa.
2. Greater role in Academia. Projects like RCW's collaboration with UBC School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, can be replicated at both the undergraduate and graduate levels across Canadian universities. Potential projects can include Canada/US trade policy voting versus nuclear policy voting comparison.
3. Calling for divestment from companies involved in nuclear weapons development; this is a strategy advocated by the Don't Bank on the Bomb campaign. Identify those Canadian banks and investment firms that handle individual, retirement and pension funds for millions of Canadians and that continue to invest in US defence contractors engaged in nuclear weapons related business.
4. Seize on events like the false alarm that occurred in Hawaii in January 2018 and recent nuclear weapons tests by states like North Korea, to generate social media trends favouring the Ban Treaty.
5. Seize on political events like the JCPOA/Iran Nuclear Deal, North Korean denuclearization deal, low yield nuclear weapons development and deployment by United States and Pakistan, and the Doomsday clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, as issues to help raise public awareness on the risks associated with nuclear weapons in the Canadian context.



2. INVOLVEMENT OF A PRIME MINISTER OR A FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER TO TURN THE BAN TREATY INTO A POLITICALLY IMPORTANT SYMBOL

Because decisions on nuclear treaties are made at the highest levels, leadership by a future Prime Minister or Foreign Affairs Minister can result in Canada signing the Treaty. The NDP leadership has openly supported the Ban Treaty³⁹ and so has the Green Party of Canada,⁴⁰ therefore some political pressure in Ottawa exists. In her address to the Conference on Disarmament in February 2018, Foreign Minister Freeland's acknowledgement of the "popularity" of the Ban Treaty and the "legitimacy" of its criticism on the 'pace' of nuclear disarmament,⁴¹ is a sign that the Ban Treaty is gaining relevance and traction in Canada. It must be pursued to its logical end: a political leader embracing it as a cause to champion.

3. THROUGH THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL COALITIONS

As many of our respondents emphasized, if there is a coalition within NATO countries that want to sign the Ban Treaty and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons within the alliance, Canada could find itself supporting such a move and become a key player. International coalition building for such a measure will require both avenues 1 and 2, i.e., increasing public support and political leadership. Two such countries which featured in our respondents' answers were Japan and Norway. The impact of Japan signing the Ban Treaty could have multiple ripple effects and it would not escape Canada. Japan has a lengthy history with nuclear weapons being the only country to suffer the impact of these weapons. Japan enjoys close bilateral relations with Canada, and both countries share remarkably similar security dynamics vis a vis the need for US protection. If Japan decides to forgo US nuclear protection despite the North Korean threat, it will signify a major boost to Ban Treaty movement and compel nations like Canada to sign. Similarly, Norway signing the treaty will signal a major rift in the cohesiveness in NATO on this issue. Norway has divested its Government Pension Fund, one of the largest in the world away from producers and developers of nuclear weapons.⁴² Norway signing the Ban Treaty could create a movement within Scandinavian and/or Nordic countries, and may include like minded middle-powers like Canada.



WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER 2 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Continue to build alliances with similar minded organizations in key countries. Our interview data and analysis shows that Canada believes in alliances. Canadian diplomats and officials could be persuaded to join an alliance of middle powers, either within NATO or other major non-Nato allies, aimed at reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

2. Continue lobbying campaign to increase public awareness by building a narrative based on humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and how nuclear weapons pose a collective danger to the planet and its people.

LIMITATIONS

A major limitation of our study was the lack of input from politicians and bureaucrats within the current federal government on how they arrived at their decision to not sign the Ban Treaty. GAC's refusal to entertain our interview request closed off a channel that could not be substituted, as plenty of our interviewees stated that GAC plays a key role in Canada's disarmament policy with regard to nuclear weapons. Therefore, there was a lack of primary data on the internal workings of the government with regard to matters like the Ban Treaty.

Another limitation was a lack of consensus on how much influence allies of Canada and other countries whom Canada shares friendly relations with, have on Canada's decision making on nuclear weapons. Discussions about Canada trying to shift focus towards a Pacific identity instead of an Atlantic identity with our interviewees did not reveal any concrete indication of whether that shift would lead to Pacific countries like Chile or New Zealand (both of whom signed the Ban Treaty) being able to influence Canada to sign the Ban Treaty.

A different limitation was the lack of recent and detailed public opinion polling in Canada on nuclear disarmament. When we asked our interviewees about the Canadian public's perception of nuclear weapons and disarmament, some of them noted that historical polls have shown Canadians to be pro-nuclear disarmament. They also indicated that in the present day, nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament were not salient issues among the citizenry. The results of a well designed poll that surveys Canadians on what they thought of the specifics of the Ban Treaty, whether it is of low or high priority to them, and how conscious they are of the destructive nature of nuclear weapons compared to conventional weapons, would result in more public attention towards the matter. The results produced from such a poll could be used to educate activists on the need for nuclear disarmament.




CONCLUSION

In this report, we have tried to identify and analyze Canada's past and present in light of expert opinion on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, Canadian history, activism, public perception, international diplomacy, alliances and constraints.

We have also identified our own limitations and assumptions and described what we think can be credible avenues for change. We have also provided quantifiable evidence of what we think is a source of divergence between Canada and its allies, whilst acknowledging that as an area for future research.

Our Literature review has provided an overview of stated positions of Canadian Foreign Ministers and officials from Global Affairs Canada. Our interview responses have been more varied and have covered the issues with a wider spectrum of understanding.

Canada has not signed the Ban Treaty but its history of being proactive on nuclear arms control and disarmament sets it apart from other NATO countries. The current Canadian administration and bureaucracy have opted for status-quo positions on nuclear disarmament, however, there are a number of factors which have been identified in this report that have the potential to affect the constraints faced by decision makers in Canada. One such example is changing public perception. Canadian federal elections are slated to be held in 2019 with the slight chance of the introduction of a proportional electoral system. We believe such a change bodes well for the Ban Treaty movement. Even if proportional representation does not take effect, the sensitivity of public perception on all issues will be heightened, therefore there is greater incentive for RCW and ICAN to stay engaged in Canada.



The Ban Treaty is based on strong arguments about the potentially devastating humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Its comprehensiveness in addressing principles of victim assistance, positive obligation and environmental remediation make it an exemplary treaty. Our respondents have identified many concerns with the treaty, some of which are time bound (for example, volatility in global security dynamics), while others are based on realism and realist foreign policy, for example, Canada's alliances. Currently Canada's nuclear agenda is based on US's directive, however a greater understanding and popularization of the treaty in the Canadian people and what it is trying to achieve can prove to be decisive. Academia and students can also play a role.

The complexities of international negotiations and constraints on decision makers have been a constant and will remain so. Although Canada depends on its neighbour to provide security needs it also exemplifies a modern state with a robust civil society, rule of law and a highly educated and vibrant population. Therefore, increased public awareness and sustained effort can create hope for radical change in the future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank all our interview respondents, those who have been named and those wished to stay anonymous, for their invaluable input. Without their candour and impassioned feedback this report would not have been where it is today.

We would like to thank the faculty and staff at the UBC School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, particularly Shashi Enarth, Moura Quayle, Marcelo Bravo, Milind Kandlikar, Kerry Ross, Alex Brzezinski and Paul Evans for their continued support. We would also like to thank our peers in GPP 590B with whom we shared this experience and who kept us hopeful at all times.

We would also like to thank our Client Ray Acheson, whose contagious passion and drive for this cause continued to motivate us throughout the project.

Lastly, we would like thank our mentor and friend M. V. Ramana without whom this would have not been possible. Through the ebbs and flows of this project, Ramana kept us focused on the task, always making himself available and answering every question. Thank you!

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APPENDIX

Interviewees	Title	Date
Dr. Sean Maloney	Associate Professor, History, Royal Military College of Canada	Fri, Feb 9 th
Dr. John Clearwater	Author and Military Strategic Analyst	Tue, Feb 13 th
Dr. Richard Price	Professor, Department of Political Science, UBC	Wed, Feb 14 th
Dr. Brian Job	Faculty Associate, Liu Institute for Global Issues, UBC	Fri, Feb 16 th
Dr. Tom Sauer	Associate Professor, International Politics, Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium	Tue, Feb 27 th
Mr. Paul Maillet	President, Civilian Peace Service Canada	Tue, Feb 27 th
Anonymous	Professor, International Relations	Wed, Feb 28 th
Dr. Kim Richard Nossal	Professor, Political Studies, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University	Thurs, Mar 1 st
Mr. Marius Grinius	Former Ambassador to South Korea, Government of Canada	Thurs, Mar 1 st
Dr. Ramesh Thakur	Professor, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU	Thurs, Mar 1 st
Dr. Jennifer Pedersen	Legislative Assistant to MP H��l��ne Laverdi��re	Fri, Mar 2 nd
Dr. Allen Sens	Professor, Department of Political Science, UBC	Mon, Mar 5 th
Mr. Doug Roche	Former Ambassador for Disarmament, Government of Canada	Tue, Mar 6 th
Mme. H��l��ne Laverdi��re	NDP Member of Parliament for Laurier-Saint Marie	Tue, Mar 6 th
Ms. Peggy Mason	Former Ambassador for Disarmament, Government of Canada	Wed, Mar 7 th
Ms. Erin Hunt	Program Coordinator, Mines Action Canada	Thu, Mar 8 th
Ms. Elizabeth Renzetti	Journalist, The Globe and Mail	Thu, Mar 8 th
Dr. John English	Professor, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto	Thu, Mar 8 th
Dr. Daniel Livermore	Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa	Mon, Mar 12 th
Mr. Sven Jurschewsky	Former Foreign Service Officer, Government of Canada	Mon, Mar 26 th
Mr. Konstantin Zhigalov	Ambassador to Canada from the Republic of Kazakhstan	Fri, Mar 30 th

II. UN NUCLEAR RESOLUTIONS

Year	# res	Canada			USA			France			UK		
		Yes	No	Abstain	Yes	No	Abstain	Yes	No	Abstain	Yes	No	Abstain
1948	3	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	0
1949	3	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	0
1957	3	2	1	0	2	1	0	2	1	0	2	1	0
1958	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
1959	9	8	0	1	1	6	2	0	8	1	1	6	2
1960	3	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	2	0	1
1961	8	3	4	1	2	5	1	1	5	2	2	5	1
1962	9	9	0	0	6	1	2	0	0	9	6	1	2
1963	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
1965	3	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0
1966	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
1967	3	2	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	3	2	0	1
1968	5	4	0	1	4	0	1	1	0	4	4	1	0
1969	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0
1970	3	3	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	3	2	0	1
1971	5	2	0	3	0	0	5	0	2	3	0	0	5
1972	8	6	0	2	3	1	4	1	3	4	3	0	5
1973	5	5	0	0	2	0	3	1	2	2	2	0	3
1974	12	11	0	1	6	1	5	3	2	7	7	1	4
1975	12	10	0	2	4	2	6	4	1	7	6	1	5
1976	10	8	0	2	5	1	4	3	0	7	5	0	5
1977	10	8	0	2	8	0	2	4	0	6	8	0	2

GP2 POLICY REPORT / CANADA AND THE BAN TREATY

Year	# res	Canada			USA			France			UK		
		Yes	No	Abstain	Yes	No	Abstain	Yes	No	Abstain	Yes	No	Abstain
1979	18	7	2	9	5	8	5	2	7	9	4	7	7
1978	15	11	2	2	7	2	6	3	3	9	8	2	5
1980	17	5	5	7	2	10	5	0	7	10	1	8	8
1981	19	3	10	6	1	13	5	2	10	7	1	11	7
1982	26	7	10	9	2	17	7	4	11	11	3	13	10
1983	32	10	12	10	4	22	6	4	13	15	4	15	13
1984	25	8	10	7	3	17	5	3	12	10	4	14	7
1985	25	8	11	6	4	19	2	2	16	7	4	17	4
1986	24	9	7	8	2	16	6	1	14	9	3	12	9
1987	20	8	7	5	2	13	5	1	13	6	4	11	5
1988	21	8	6	7	3	14	4	2	11	8	4	10	7
1989	20	8	5	7	3	12	5	1	9	10	4	9	7
1990	17	8	4	5	3	11	3	1	7	9	3	8	6
1991	11	4	3	4	1	7	3	1	4	6	1	5	5
1992	10	4	3	3	2	7	1	3	3	4	2	5	3
1993	5	2	2	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	1	3	1
1994	10	4	2	4	2	6	2	2	4	4	2	5	3
1995	11	5	3	3	4	5	2	4	4	3	4	5	2
1996	12	5	4	3	5	6	1	6	5	1	6	5	1
1997	9	4	3	2	4	4	1	4	4	1	4	4	1
1998	11	4	4	3	3	7	1	4	6	1	4	6	1
1999	10	3	3	4	2	7	1	2	6	2	3	6	1
2000	11	5	3	3	4	6	1	3	5	3	5	5	1
2001	10	4	3	3	1	8	1	4	5	1	4	5	1
2002	12	5	3	4	0	11	1	4	7	1	4	7	1
2003	11	4	3	4	0	10	1	3	7	1	3	7	1
2004	12	6	3	3	0	11	1	4	6	2	4	6	2
2005	11	5	4	2	0	10	1	3	7	1	3	7	1
2006	13	6	3	4	1	12	0	5	7	1	5	7	1
2007	12	4	4	4	0	12	0	2	8	2	2	7	3
2008	13	4	4	5	0	13	0	4	8	1	3	7	3
2009	13	6	4	3	2	8	3	2	7	4	4	6	3
2010	13	6	3	4	3	9	1	4	8	1	4	7	2
2011	12	5	5	2	4	7	1	5	6	1	5	6	1
2012	15	8	4	3	3	10	2	4	9	2	4	7	4
2013	12	4	6	2	2	9	1	3	8	1	3	8	1
2014	14	7	5	2	2	10	2	2	9	3	2	9	3
2015	19	5	9	5	3	14	2	3	13	3	3	13	3
2016	18	6	8	4	4	13	1	3	12	3	3	12	3
2017	16	4	8	4	2	12	2	3	11	2	3	11	2

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