Building Cooperative Security in Asia Pacific:

Canadian Track-Two Initiatives

1989-2005

Paul Evans, David Dewitt and Brian Job 30 November 2024

Research Report



THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA School of Public Policy and Global Affairs

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SYNOPSIS

For a period of roughly fifteen years between 1989 and 2005 at the heart of the Asia Pacific era, Canadian academics and officials initiated more than a dozen ideas-driven programs intended to promote cooperative security and human security with Asian partners. The distinctive feature of these efforts was the leadership, resource commitments, and ambition to advance inclusive "track two" multilateral dialogues on a wide range of security issues with the objective of promoting the habit of dialogue, broadening the scope of security discussions beyond conventional defence matters, and strengthening Canadian links with the region.

This is a chronicle of those efforts beginning with the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue and extending into a wider set of Asia Pacific activities primarily with partners in southeast and northeast Asia. It describes the evolving objectives and institutional forms of these projects at both the regional and domestic levels. It analyzes their impact and possible implications for contemporary Canadian positioning in a very different Indo-Pacific setting.

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DEDICATION

We dedicate this recollection to the hundreds of individuals and dozens of organizations in Canada and around the Pacific who collaborated in support of the cooperative security agenda of the era.

Appendix one lists some of them.

This period of Canadian activism in Asia Pacific benefitted in various ways from the interests and involvement of three senior public figures. Throughout his time in the Senate and after his retirement, Jack Austin provided steady encouragement and wise counsel that set a tone and agenda for melding academic research with the Ottawa world. His foresight had particular resonance for Canada's evolving relations with China. Joe Clark, as Minister during the transitional period at the end of the Cold War, recognized the need for Canada to formulate new thinking and action on foreign policy and international security, as well as saw the looming significance of the Asia Pacific region. Lloyd Axworthy, in his role as an active globalist foreign minister, led Canada's commitment for responsible humanitarianism through the pursuit of Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect.

About the Authors

During the period 1989 to 2005...

Paul Evans was professor at York University and then UBC with stops in residence at the East-West Center in Honolulu, the Asia Center at Harvard University, and the National Institute for Research Advancement in Tokyo. Director of research centres and programs in both Toronto and Vancouver, he was the co-director of the NPCSD, a co-founder of CSCAP and initial co-chair of both its Canadian Member Committee and its North Pacific Working Group. He directed three major projects funded by CIDA as well as the Dialogue and Research Monitor program funded by the Ford Foundation. He co-founded the Canada-Korea Forum and the Canadian Consortium on Human Security and served as Co-CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2005-08. He is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum's Experts and Eminent Persons Group. His full academic profile is available at https://sppga.ubc.ca/profile/paul-evans/. Particular thanks to Shirley Yue for her administrative skills and unflinching commitment to so many projects over fifteen years.

David Dewitt was professor of international relations at York University as well as a visiting professor at Tel-Aviv University. He served as director of York's Centre for International and Security Studies, co-director of the NPCSD, a co-founder of CSCAP, later co-chair of the Canadian Member Committee, and co-founder and initial chair of CANCAPS. He also co-directed the CIDA and IDRC-funded project, Development and Security in Southeast Asia. He served as chair of the executive committee for PISA, then the Program for International Studies in Asia, an academic NGO based at the Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU. He concurrently led projects on Canada's international security policy, and on conflict management and CSBMs in the Middle East. He acknowledges the superb support provided by Heather Chestnutt and Sarah Whitaker for their budgetary, administrative, and project management roles.

Brian Job was professor of political science at UBC. He served as director of the Institute/Centre of International Relations, director of UBC's Security and Defense Program, and interim director of the Liu Institute for Global Affairs. Job directed the Canadian Consortium for Human Security. Engaged in regional Track 2 processes and institutions, he was a member and chair of Canada's CSCAP Member Committee, as well as regional Co-Chair of CSCAP, and editor (2007-2012) of CSCAPS's Regional Security Outlook. He was a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum's Experts and Eminent Persons Group. His thanks to Anwen Rowe-Evans, Shannon Seline and Wendy McAvoy for their administrative support.

Paul Evans did most of the documentary excavation, wrote Chapter 1, contributed to Ch. 2 and was lead author of the Conclusion. David Dewitt was the principal author of Ch. 2 and a contributor to the other sections. Brian Job provided judicious comments and inserts throughout based in part on a separate essay he is preparing on the global impact and domestic dynamics of Canada's human security agenda, aspects of which are embedded in Ch.1 and the conclusion.

We appreciate comments from nine colleagues who read an earlier draft, especially Amitav Acharya, Julia Bentley, David Capie, Sorpong Peou, and David Welch. We thank Gary Andraza at UBC's Arts IT for assistance in accessing long-lost e-files.

GLOSSARY

ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
AICP	ASEAN ISIS Cooperation Program
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group
APFC	Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARF EEP	ARF's Experts and Eminent Persons Group
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN ISIS	ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
CANCAPS	Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security
CCHS	Canadian Consortium on Human Security
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIIPS	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CIIS	Chinese Institute for International Studies
CIR	Centre for International Relations (UBC)
CJSPSC	Canada-Japan Symposium for Pace and Security Cooperation Security
CRSO	CSCAP Regional Security Outlook
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific
CSCAP – CMC	Canadian Member Committee
CIIPS	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
DEA	Department of External Affairs ("The Department")
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence

EAITC	External Affairs and International Trade Canada.
	Note: The foreign ministry changed its name in 1993 (formalized by
	parliament in 1995) from External Affairs and International Trade Canada
	(EAITC) to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
	(DFAIT). To avoid confusion, we refer throughout to "the Department"
	except in our Note on Sources where we identify EAITC documents as
	such.
EAS	East Asia Summit (ASEAN)
IAR	Institute of Asian Research (UBC)
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IIR	Institute of International Relations (UBC) later CIR
JCAPS	Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies (York University and University of
	Toronto)
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
JCIE	Japan Centre for International Exchange
MSSP/SDF	Military and Strategic Studies Program/Security and Defence Forum
	(Ottawa)
NIRA	National Institute for Research Advancement (Tokyo)
NORPAC	North Pacific Advanced Research Centre (Hokkaido)
NPWG	North Pacific Working Group (CSCAP)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
RIPS	Research Institute for Peace and Security (Japan)
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SSEA	Secretary of State for External Affairs (The Minister)
t1	Track One
t1.5	Track One Point Five
t2	Track Two
t3	Track Three
UN	United Nations
YCISS	Centre for International and Strategic Studies (York University)

INTRODUCTION

At a moment of rising geopolitical tension and international conflict, it is valuable to recall Canadian efforts to define and promote the discourse and practices of cooperative security in an earlier Asia-Pacific era. These efforts over more than fifteen years involved officials and academics in a sustained and productive interaction to advance an agenda that accorded with regional needs and resonated with Canadian Middle Power interests and ambitions of the day.

It was a period of Canadian creativity and diplomatic entrepreneurship at the intersection of government and academia which achieved results by working with Asian and American partners in novel ways. It gave Canada access to influential institutions in Asia and gave Canada a distinctive reputation as a constructive and informed player shaping inclusive multilateral track two processes.

This is an account written by three academics who were principal organizers of more than a dozen major projects between 1989 and 2005 that involved scores of diplomats and academics and all connected to what can be described as "track-two" processes. The multiple forms that track-two took in both the region and domestically proved to be path breaking and constructive.

It is less a celebration than a case study of diplomatic entrepreneurship at a creative moment at home and in Asia. We write aware that the climate of security relations in our current Indo-Pacific era is vastly different, increasingly tied to aspects of Cold War logic and realist strategies. Great power relations are increasingly antagonistic; national security, military, and defence issues are paramount; defence spending is spiking; minilateralism is more popular than inclusive multilateralism; hope for confidence and trust building is ebbing; and the aspiration of open and free trade is fragmenting.

We begin the account in the late 1980s, the initial period of adjustment and experimentation as the Cold War in Europe was ending and the Asia-Pacific ambition was taking institutional form. An uncertain yet creative and optimistic moment, it provided opportunities for a proactive and distinctive Canadian role with a strong emphasis on inclusive multilateral processes.

We end the story in 2005. The regional institutions and norms that developed over a decade and a half did not disappear then and most of them remain in place today. But the scale of financial support had declined. A new government in Ottawa shifted the focus of Canadian priorities to the war in Afghanistan, anti-terrorism, and Latin America. The human security agenda associated with a former foreign minister was terminated.

There is significant controversy about whether the human security agenda was a natural extension of cooperative security or a distinctly different undertaking with a different referent point and philosophy played out principally on a global rather than regional stage. Here we focus principally on the early period of interplay between the two concepts. From the perspective of the Canadian academics, they were siblings if not twins.

The opening chapter provides an overview of the strategic setting and the multiple initiatives undertaken by Canada in those fifteen years, focusing on their objectives and design, the key players and institutions, and their outcomes as seen at the time.

The second chapter looks in more detail at one major project, the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (1990-93), which was the boldest, highest profile and most ambitious of the Canadian-generated cooperative security initiatives. It set the conceptual and institutional foundations for Canada's distinctive role in regional debates and activities that extended beyond Northeast Asia and that quickly resonated with Southeast Asian partners in the promotion of Asia-Pacific wide security thinking and arrangements. In many respects it sparked and defined a distinctive Canadian perspective.

The conclusion offers a series of observations about the longer-term impact, limits and overall contribution of the cooperative security agenda and draws out some lessons for contemporary policy actors at the intersection of the government and academic worlds.

It remains to be seen if this account is just a window on a past moment in time, a proverbial trip through memory lane. Our more ambitious hope is that it functions as an *aide mémoire* and arsenal of ideas for those trying to shape peace at a less hopeful juncture in world affairs when the hopes for inclusive multilateral cooperation are in eclipse. Asia Pacific multilateralism and the cooperative security agenda benefited from, and helped sustain, a comparatively benign moment in great power competition but also contributed to it. Looking back may help in looking forward and averting the current slide toward Indo-Pacific conflict.

CHAPTER 1

THE COOPERATIVE SECURITY AGENDA, 1989 - 2005

Ab Initio: The Asia-Pacific Setting

Cooperative security as an idea and undertaking was catalyzed in Europe as the Cold War ended but eventually found a fertile home in an area that came to be defined about the same time as the Asia-Pacific. Asia-Pacific was born of the activities of businesses and governments starting in the mid-1980s, with the realization of the rise of Asian economies, and with trade and investment possibilities around the Pacific rim underpinned by a burgeoning belief in globalization. The launch of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in 1989 first pushed by Australia and Japan built on the ambitions of ASEAN and its dialogue partners to create a new kind of organization committed to the agenda of deeper economic integration, open regionalism, and trade and investment liberalization.

The formal governmental processes had in part been inspired by networks of independent economists also interested in multilateral cooperation. Indicative of the ambition and institutional innovations of the period, The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) had

been in operation since 1980 with about a dozen members, each with a national committee, Canada among them.

In the security domain, the ending of the Cold War coincided with a widespread feeling in Asia Pacific that despite dominant US military power Pax Americana was also ending or at least being altered. In a time of what Gerald Segal called "relative peace," the global balance of power was shifting toward multipolarity and interdependence was rising. "Where countries were once relatively isolated, there are now complex webs of economic interdependence that link the people of the region and also tie the region to the outside world…there has been a marked shift in attention toward economic, and away from military, issues."

Segal's view reflected the optimistic impulse across much of the Asia Pacific. The coincidence of the demise of the Soviet Union, the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy, South Korea's democratic consolidation, a vibrant ASEAN, America's self-confidence in its unipolar moment and hub and spoke alliance structure, and the subdued aspect of great power confrontation provided a window of opportunity even as major security problems related to North Korea, Myanmar and Cambodia were far from resolved.

Canadian and other Western diplomats and academics were flushed with the European experience and experiments in building new security processes including inclusive forms of multilateralism like the OSCE that worked across ideological divides. Arms control, confidence and security building measures, and the concept of "common security" were generating attention and support.

Gorbachev's speech in Krasnoyarsk in 1986 that launched a Russian diplomatic initiative in Asia, opened the door for Asia-Pacific actors to explore multilateral options in addition to collective defence and alliances. Proposals for multilateral dialogues and a new or at least modified architecture followed from Mongolia, Australia, South Korea, Malaysia and Japan.

The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union exposed the limitations of the prevailing balance of power realist logic and the need for theory to capture the revolutions of practice apparent in Europe and beyond. Western academic circles were in a moment of intellectual ferment. Constructivism was challenging realism by exploring the social construction of identities and the role of norms in framing interactions as social processes with potentially transformative impacts on the understanding of contemporary intrastate war and ethnic conflict. Ideas about how to envision and create "security communities" in Europe and Southeast Asia as well as "security regimes" elsewhere were flourishing. Critical security studies were broadening the scope of international relations beyond national defence and taking seriously ideas like international society. Peace research centres in Australia and Europe were making their mark. International political economy (IPE) emerged as a principal means to understand the interactive effects of economics, politics, and diplomacy in the age of globalization.

In Asia, particularly Southeast Asia but also Japan, governments were eyeing diplomatic possibilities for expanding the purview of existing institutions, especially ASEAN, and strengthening their intellectual and social base. New non-governmental or semi-governmental networks and institutions sprouted in several countries and were building international

connections. A new grouping known as the ASEAN Institutes of International Studies (ASEAN ISIS) was created in 1988 involving independent but government-informed or governmentconnected organizations in Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Regional thinking reflected several aspects of the ASEAN experience that took form in the concept of comprehensive security. Comprehensive security framed security in a holistic way to include both military and non-military threats to overall well-being of a state and addressed both external and internal threats including economic underdevelopment. It emphasized the importance of non-military policy responses, and grew to include the vital interests or core values of the person, the community, and the state. It tended toward non-alignment in great power competition, was regime agnostic and underlay specific agreements including the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration on a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Never conceiving of itself as a a formal mechanism for dispute settlement or conflict resolution, it rather aspired to create an atmosphere and set of arrangements in which problems did not arise or at least could be managed or contained diplomatically without military confrontation.

As Asia-Pacific institutions evolved through extensive consultations at governmental and think tank levels, these emerging new security ideas became relevant and took shape in Southeast Asia. In a series of inter-linked meetings in Southeast Asia between 1989 and 1991 the foundations were set for forming some kind of new multilateral arrangement for regular consultation and dialogue on political and security affairs. This eventually took concrete form in the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1993/94, led by Southeast Asian diplomats, but supported at every step by outside powers, especially Japan.

This was a fertile, energetic and optimistic moment featuring multiple initiatives and constructive debates about the definition of the region, the adequacy of existing institutions and understandings, the vision of the security architecture, and criteria for participation. On security matters discussion also focused on the right fora for linking concrete confidence building measures and arms control proposals to wider dialogues, and the definitional and conceptual matters around the scope of security. In addition to the effort to seed closer interaction between Southeast and Northeast Asia as part of an Asia-Pacific agenda, integrating China into any expanded regional institutional architecture was widely endorsed.

Then, as later, regional ambitions did not disregard the logic of great power competition, interstate rivalries, and nationalism. What they did have in mind was creating a new layer of norms, practices and institutions that could constrain them in the short run and potentially transform them in the longer run.

Buoyed by optimism about possibilities for increasing prosperity, for at least a moment the allure of geoeconomic cooperation prevailed over the primacy of geopolitical competition.

The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue

Amidst the major geostrategic shifts as the Cold War in Europe was ending, officials in Ottawa were vigorously debating how to position Canada in them. While remaining fully engaged in ongoing global issues such as weapons of mass destruction, arms control regimes, trade matters,

and actively supporting international institutions, Ottawa began refining many of its foreign policy concerns focused on individual geographic regions. The main focus continued to be the United States and Europe, but East Asia was considered to be of rising importance with considerable significance for Canada's commercial interests as a Pacific trading nation.

After several months of intensive discussion in Ottawa, false starts and adjustments, a key product was the initiative that came to be titled *The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue* (NPCSD). Canada was entering the Asia Pacific regional security equation not just as an observer and supporter but as an initiator and player.

Announced in the Fall of 1990, the inspiration and drive came from an ambitious and ASEANfriendly Canadian foreign minister Joe Clark. As Chapter 2 recounts, the NPCSD drew on careful thinking inside the ministry, discussions with Clark's ministerial counterparts dating back to 1988, soundings with diplomats in the region, and exchanges with a handful of Canadian academics themselves involved in regional discussions.

The core foundation and conceptual innovation was the concept of "cooperative security" which had been initially incubated in the CSCE process in Europe, further developed and recontextualized by a high-level security task force inside the Canadian foreign ministry, and then redefined based on regional conditions in Asia-Pacific. In its Canadian version it had three main elements:

- first, the philosophic premise that security needed to be built with other states rather than against them including the ambition to work across ideological and national divides;
- second, the belief in the power of inclusive multilateralism as a way of addressing shared problems, entrenching the habit of dialogue, building confidence and trust, reducing tensions and muting rivalries without replacing or supplanting national defence or replacing existing alliances and partnerships;
- third, the expansion of the idea of security beyond traditional military and defence matters to include a host of new threats including environmental degradation, illegal migration, natural disasters, and infectious disease.

As regional momentum developed through additional actors and initiatives, cooperative security was applied across a wide spectrum of activity. In conceptual terms, cooperative security underpins a particular kind of security order with an overarching normative aspiration in which "war is unthinkable". This would entail norms of practice, including the inclusion of all relevant actors, engagement of the non-likeminded, habits of dialogue, extension of the scope of security beyond external threats, and a multi-actor, multi-dimensional approach to problem solving. For practitioners, cooperative security resonated with practices of comprehensive and common security and the long-held ASEAN dream of creating its own regional security community. For Ottawa, cooperative security became an agenda of diplomatic activities intended to further Canadian interests and reorient regional security architecture.

The geographic scope of ambition was Asia-Pacific but the specific focus was an area traditionally identified as Northeast Asia, but intentionally redefined as the "North Pacific." It included Canada, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and the United States.

Mongolia was added later. This configuration imagined Canada as an integral component and explicitly tried to remove the connotation of a region previously defined as an area of geostrategic competition, Cold War rivalries, and failed efforts at multilateral cooperation.

In organizational terms, the NPCSD broke new ground in two ways. The first was that it was led by two academics at York University (Dewitt and Evans). Following extensive discussion with them, the Department agreed to provide a mandate, support, and resources to organize what was anticipated to be an ambitious series of dialogues over three years involving players from seven North Pacific countries and observers from other parts of the Asia-Pacific region. More than two dozen other Canadian academics were eventually mobilized as core participants.

The second was taking advantage of a novel approach to regional discussions, so called "track two" (t2) that involved gatherings of experts and academics participating in collaboration with officials who helped in shaping the agenda but did not control it and who would participate in meetings in their private and personal capacities, a fiction that not all felt comfortable with but that subsequently proved to be popular in many other settings.

In very few instances were senior officials actually at the discussion table but the fiction of "private and personal" participation and the presence of policy-connected individuals from diverse countries with domestic and international networks created to support them became a signature characteristic of Asia-Pacific aspirations. While the practice of non-official or un-official dialogues and the concept of "track-two" had been in circulation for more than a decade, its application in Asia and with Asian partners had some Canadian tweaks. These included a commitment to including both friends and the "non-like-minded" at the table, a high degree of autonomy for the academics and experts to shape the agenda, and a penchant for building atmosphere rather than attempting conflict resolution. The line between government-led t1.5 and academic-led t2 was blurry, with Canadian-led initiatives straddling both and made possible by extensive consultations before, during and after events.

Chapter two deals in detail with the origins, objectives, agenda, participants, organization and impact of the NPCSD meetings which included an initial and concluding conference in Victoria and four workshops in Honolulu, Ottawa, Yokohama, and Beijing. It did not aim to generate another formal governmental organization, but focused on the norms, principles, the habits of dialogue and an operational agenda that included confidence and security building measures and topic areas of common concern where new forms of cooperation were needed and appeared achievable.

The timing couldn't have been better. Though the NPCSD only lasted as a self-standing program from the fall of 1990 until the spring of 1993, it scored major successes evident in the quality and breadth of the participants, and the "full house" involvement of Chinese, Russian and North Korean partners. Enthusiasm about its core concept and ambition resonated long after the initiative itself concluded, generating attention in the participating countries in Southeast Asia and Europe. It helped catalyze other "cooperative security" initiatives with a similar playbook across the wider Asia Pacific. It boosted ASEAN in its broader regional agenda. And it established an institutional base for further activities and initiatives involving governmental and academic players in Canada for an additional decade.

Canada wanted a seat at the table and was committed to help construct it even if the eventual design was different than initially imagined and did not produce that Canadian seat.

The Southeast Asian Connection (1988-2003)

The push in the North Pacific coincided with ASEAN-led steps to create the Asia-Pacific wide consultative body that eventually took form as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Canadian academics had been part of discussions in Southeast Asia about regional security architecture since 1988. York University, for example, had organized meetings with Thai and regional colleagues in Chiang Mai that year. Channels were opened that later led to Southeast Asian participation in the NPCSD that signaled an "open" process and ASEAN's continued relevance and leadership function.

A seminal meeting in Jakarta in July 1991 with the leaders of the ASEAN ISIS network unexpectedly established the foundation for a partnership, initially supported by the newlycreated Canada-ASEAN Centre based in Singapore, that would run for more than a decade. Initially composed of one institute from each of the six ASEAN member countries (later expanded as new members joined ASEAN), independent or at least semi-independent from government, and led by dynamic figures including Jusuf Wanandi and Hadi Soesastro in Jakarta, Noordin Sopiee and Jawhar Hassan in Kuala Lumpur, and Carolina Hernandez in Manila, ASEAN ISIS came to play an important role in policy discussion and advocacy in each country and at the regional level on economic, security and societal issues.

At least some in the region, especially in Singapore, were originally skeptical about Canadian credentials to play a leadership role in regional discussions. They feared that cooperative security could be a Trojan horse for a Western human rights and democracy agenda, and worried that the NPCSD might deflect attention away from the plans developing for an ASEAN-led dialogue forum. The July meeting allayed those concerns. It quickly emerged that the Canadian effort to engage China and North Korea was a common concern and that the vocabulary of "track two", "inclusive multilateralism," "confidence building", "inclusive dialogue", "security with rather than against", and broadening opening the concept of security beyond conventional national security and defence all resonated well.

In conceptual terms, this new thinking around cooperative security meshed closely with wellhoned ideas in Southeast Asia about comprehensive security and national and regional resilience. The instinct was to leverage relationships with rising powers instead of balancing against them. ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation emphasized peaceful dispute settlement, noninterference, inclusivity and a preference for non-alignment. Community building and specifically creation of a security community were long-term ambitions based on a collective identity in which differences would be settled without resort to force.

Thus began a durable partnership based on a commonality of purpose and ideas. It was an easy fit in style, concepts and objectives. It opened Canadian access into influential institutions in virtually every ASEAN country including the new members that joined later in the decade, the one exception being Myanmar. It opened opportunities with their partners around Asia and in

the United States, and some top-flight minds in academic circles and especially research institutes who had served or would serve in senior government posts. And it demonstrated Canadian capacity and resolve to be a constructive and informed player in regional affairs.

The core of the Canadian partnership was support for the ASEAN ISIS secretariat and agenda including meetings and conferences, policy dialogues, research, training and exchanges. Parallel activities with individuals and institutions outside the ambit of ASEAN ISIS were also included. All had promotion of cooperative and comprehensive security ambitions as central pillars. With the Canadian International Development Agency's embrace of cooperative security as part of its wider development agenda, major funding was available for more than a decade. The commitment of multi-year funding, regularized participation, and consistent political attention operationalized the core notion of "habits of dialogue" as a building-block of cooperative security, leant credibility to Canada's sustained presence as an Asia Pacific partner.

First was the *Economic Regionalization in Eastern Asia Project* that began in 1992 and ran until 1995. In addition to supporting exchanges of senior researchers, it financed a dozen meetings in five countries ranging from small workshops and the annual Human Rights Colloquium to the annual Asia Pacific Roundtable (APRT).

The APRT held annually in Kuala Lumpur since 1986 was the anchor event for the Canadian connection for more than a decade. Hosted formally by ASEAN ISIS after 1989, at its height it attracted more than 300 participants and consistently maintained a focus on comprehensive and cooperative security that distinguished it from its later competitor the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that focused heavily on military security, national positions and contentious issues. A key date on the annual calendar, the APRT provided an opportunity to feature high profile Canadian speakers and support the participation of a large contingent of Canadian academics, advanced graduate students and region-based diplomats.

Panels frequently focused on institutional architecture, domestic politics, non-traditional security issues, conventional security issues including great power relations and arms control, and conflict points including the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. Special efforts were taken to include participants from North Korea, China and Taiwan. From the outset in regional meetings the participation and status of Taiwan was a point of contention with Chinese officials It led to a number of creative work arounds in which scholars from Taiwan were invited as individuals. Taiwanese participation became an even more difficult issue in the context of track-two meetings that would follow, at once a caveat to "inclusiveness" and symbol of the hard security issues in play.

In 1995 the project was recast as the *ASEAN ISIS Cooperation Program* that continued to expand the range of participants with additional attention to confidence building measures and the emerging concept of human security. It also targeted capacity building for the expanded membership in ASEAN ISIS as Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999) joined ASEAN. In addition to North Koreans, special resources were committed to attracting Indian participants to the APRT. A "Strategic Visitors Program" supported by the Canada-ASEAN Centre in Singapore allowed the hosting of several key thinkers for visits to Canadian universities and Ottawa.

In the wake of the 1997-98 economic crisis, the project was restructured in 1999 as the *Southeast Asian Cooperation Program*. ASEAN ISIS remained a principal partner but there was new support for additional institutes and networks and efforts to mainstream gender related issues. The roster of activities was expanded to include the ASEAN People's Assembly (a "Track Three" experiment focused on civil society leaders), commissioned research on the challenges facing Cambodian peace and reconstruction, and specialized training programs for internet use for research institutes in the new members. One creative outcome was the introduction of ideas around gender and security that laid the foundation for later discussions and partnerships related to Women, Peace and Security.

The series concluded in 2003. With funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) of about \$6 million, it had supported more than sixty events, involved more than 130 Canadian academics and dozens of Canadian officials in them and produced a stream of publications. It had retained an abiding focus on cooperative security but introduced a set of Japanese and Canadian generated ideas about the new agenda of human security.

CIDA's role extended beyond multi-year funding and included opening channels to CIDA's contacts in the region, its regional expertise and its development focus that was a natural companion to the wider conception of security.

Paralleling the ASEAN ISIS programs were several other major projects funded by CIDA that fit closely with the cooperative and non-traditional security agendas. The best known was the *Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea*, a cooperative venture, between Canada (UBC) and Indonesia that operated between 1990 and 2001 and continued under other sponsorship for a further decade. Including Chinese and Taiwanese legal experts, it sustained a complex dialogue on maritime issues without putting matters of sovereignty and territorial claims on the table.

A second program on *Development and Security in Southeast Asia* (DSSEA) 1996-99, run through York University in cooperation with institutes in the Philippines and Indonesia, aimed at establishing links between junior scholars and civil society organizations in the region. It explicitly focused on a broad definition of security including (in-)securities such as food, environment, climate, and demography (labour, population, and migration). It sponsored several meetings, commissioned research, generated a newsletter, and eventually produced three volumes of essays covering local and regional issues largely on what came to be known as "Non-Traditional Security" at the intersection of cooperative and common security.

It was disappointing to many that these efforts with ASEAN in particular did not lead later to Canadian participation in the East Asia Summit process (2005-) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus process (2010-). The termination of funding for Canadian track-two partnerships with regional think tanks may have been one of the reasons for Canada being excluded. Probably a bigger one was the absence of a sustained military presence and role in the region, coupled with the Department of National Defence (DND) largely having eschewed engagement in the inter-laced regional security dialogues. But the experience and contacts did help equip Canadian participants for roles in the ASEAN Regional Forum meetings and the ASEAN Regional Forum's Expert and Eminent Persons Group (created in 2006) that included several veterans of the ASEAN ISIS events.

Asia Pacific Track Two (1994-)

Multilateralism came to Asia-Pacific born of new realities and regional-led processes rather than through imposition by an external power, the leadership of a single country, or imitation of instruments more maturely developed elsewhere.

The proliferation of multilateral and transnational networks in the 1990s often involved a Southeast Asian component but, as with the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, involved many others, often middle powers including Canada, Australia and Japan in particular, and frequently American academics and think tanks. As measured by the Dialogue Monitor and its successor Dialogue and Research Monitor maintained by the JCIE, the number of multilateral non-governmental meetings on security issues each year jumped from about eight in 1990 to more than sixty by the end of the century.

The NPCSD had helped to popularize a particular form of track-two dialogue. During the 1990s the options expanded to include Track 1.5 (government directed Track 2 with tight control of participants and agenda items) as well as Track 3 which addressed policy matters but without government involvement and extended beyond experts and academics to non-governmental organizations representing civil society groups. At the peak of dialogue season in the late 1990s, one Southeast Asian participant quipped that Track 1 was composed of government officials, Track 1.5 of surrogate and retired officials, Track 2 of experts informed by government policies, and Track 3 of individuals intent on overthrowing governments.

The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was the most ambitious example of track-two processes in its level of institutionalization, scope of participation, and structures for domestic support. Born out of a series of meetings involving think tanks and academics in the fecund years of 1991 and 1992, and loosely modelled on the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council that supported APEC, it was conceived in 1993 and formally launched in 1994 with 11 initial member committees, Canada among them. Other member committees joined in due course from China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and the European Union and South Asia.

With a secretariat based at ISIS Malaysia, and two rotating co-chairs (one from ASEAN and one from elsewhere) it aimed to stimulate inclusive dialogue, expert studies, consultation and publication leading to policy recommendations to governments and inter-governmental groupings. Although it did not have any formal connection to the ARF, the ARF's agenda and its Experts and Eminent Persons group were of special attention as CSCAP members grappled with moving from regional confidence building to preventive diplomacy and approaches to conflict resolution.

CSCAP functioned around four initial Working Groups focused on comprehensive and cooperative security, maritime cooperation, confidence and security building measures, and the North Pacific, along with a study group on transnational crime. This list later expanded to

include preventive diplomacy, regional responses to terrorism, the responsibility to protect, and the Rules Based Order.

Present at the creation and an active leader for fifteen years, Canada created a robust Canadian national member committee (discussed below). A Canadian professor (Brian Job) served as regional co-chair, and later editor of CSCAP's annual Regional Security Outlook. Widely distributed within and beyond CSCAP itself, including at the APRT, the CRSO, showcasing regional experts, presented an annual overview of regional security, covering national viewpoints and pointedly drawing attention to the need to address the plight of civilian populations caught up in conflict and human security crises.

Based on the connections established during the NPCSD before its conclusion in 1993, CSCAP Canada also co-chaired with Japan the North Pacific Working Group (NPWG) between 1995 and 2004. In that time the NPWG organized 9 meetings around the region, two of them in Canada. Subjects included "Frameworks for Stability in the Korean Peninsula" and "The Relevance of Southeast Asian Experience to Conflict Management in Northeast Asia." In some ways it was a clone of the NPCSD though without the same level of government support or senior official involvement. It aimed at "full house" participation for all of the countries in the region, generally avoided controversial issues especially in its formative years, and focused most often on approaches to confidence building, security perceptions and frameworks for stability.

To supplement further activities in the area alternatively defined as the North Pacific and Northeast Asia, and building on the success of the various programs focused on Southeast Asia, UBC collaborated with CIDA to create a *Northeast Asia Cooperation Program* (NEACP) that ran between 1998 and 2002. With a budget of \$1.8 million from CIDA and Japanese partners (for North Korean connections), its main aim was to strengthen relations with research institutes and track-two players in China, North Korea, Russia and Mongolia.

No one doubted the immensity of the challenge. All of the indicators of a coherent region were missing including common topographic boundaries, transportation infrastructure, or shared identity. Northeast Asia was more a "cockpit of battles" and an "anti-region" where national political cultures largely defined themselves by virtue of their differences and in opposition to their neighbours. The Cold War had not ended and it was a veritable graveyard of failed and flickering regional schemes.

The NEACP worked with multiple partners in these countries rather than with a single organization, there being no ASEAN ISIS equivalents. It commissioned research and publications, including a North Pacific Policy Series, and supported an electronic distribution service on developments in North Korea (CANKOR) that published 350 editions in its eleven-year history. It hosted bilateral and multi-country workshops and conferences in Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa, Beijing, Sapporo, Ulan Bator, and Vladivostok. And it organized capacity building activities in Mongolia, the Russian Far East, China and North Korea.

North Korea was a special focus of Canadian efforts as a legacy of its NPCSD experience and supportive of bilateral objectives of engagement of officials and research institute staff in international gatherings focused on regional security and some development matters. For

example, the NEACP sponsored North Korean participants in attending events in Southeast Asia including the Asia Pacific Roundtable and CSCAP meetings. In collaboration mainly with the Institute for Disarmament and Peace inside the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UBC and Canadian partners provided research materials and training programs and participated in or organized five Canadian "academic" delegations to Pyongyang and hosted five delegations to Canada between 1991 and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2000-01. Here academic work was a precursor and facilitator of Ottawa's national agenda and at the same time a means of socializing North Korean participants in regional ways, a difficult and painstaking undertaking.

Some of the channels opened in the track-two meetings reinforced formal governmental connections. A small flurry of activity to create educational and civil society links and seed a possible Canadian role in the UN efforts focused on the Tumen River Area and in support of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Office ended in 2002. Revelations about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, escalating tensions on the peninsula, and the virtual collapse of bilateral diplomatic activity led to the termination of funding from Ottawa. Small scale training programs and humanitarian activity have continued but otherwise the academic side-door to relations with North Korea, and t2 dreams and connections, has closed.

In a different form of engagement, this time bilateral, Canada's reputation for establishing connections with North Korean institutes at the time of the NPCSD and later in the NPWG and NEACP were particularly appreciated in Seoul. Working with some of the South Korean participants in the NPCSD and affiliated with the Seoul Forum, the Canada-Korea Forum was formed in 1996. On a roughly annual basis it continues to host a bilateral discussion involving senior government, academic, business and societal leaders. Until the mid-2000s the opportunities and obstacles to engaging North Korea were staples of discussion.

Similarly, the Canada-Japan Symposium for Peace and Security Cooperation was launched in 1998 with the specific purpose of broadening the scope of the Canada-Japan relationship, beyond its transactional, economic component. A commissioned report authored by the directors of UBC's IIR and Japan's RIPS, inaugurated sessions bringing together a combination from each side of academics, analysts, and officials—a t1.5-t2 format. Meetings were held biennially, then annually, alternately in Tokyo and Ottawa/Vancouver. Agendas proceeded from regional security overviews to cover a wide spectrum of traditional and non-traditional security topics of mutual interest, including advancement of cooperative security and debate over human security. In recent years, CJSPSC meetings have been coincident with t1.5 bilaterals at the ADM level. A continuing legacy has been the introduction of junior and senior academics on both sides to Japan and Canada, respectively, thus broadening understanding beyond traditional security concerns and sparking relationships beyond the Symposium.

Engagement of China into regional processes, including those focused on security matters, remained a core objective through the 1990s and until very recently. This was consonant with broader Canadian engagement policies and those of the ASEAN states and our allies. One element was three rounds of bilateral meetings with representatives of our respective CSCAP committees under the CSCAP umbrella. More ambitious was a four-part seminar series "*The Canada-China Seminar on Asia-Pacific Multilateralism and Cooperative Security*" (1996-2000) in cooperation with the Asia Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and funded

by CIDA and DFAIT. Each session lasted about a week and involved eight core participants from each side including academics and officials in their private capacities. Several of these participants went on to leading positions in their respective foreign and defence ministries. The sessions were one-part policy dialogue and one-part research program on the usage and evolving meanings of widely-utilized concepts in regional discussions. The list of about thirty terms included cooperative security, comprehensive security, common security, and ideas like consensus, the tracks (t1, 1.5 and 2), and preventive diplomacy. The core material eventually was published as *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* in two editions subsequently translated into five languages (two in Chinese, one from mainland China, the other in Taiwan) and distributed widely in the region. Something of a surprise, its two biggest consumers were the US Pacific Command and the People's Liberation Army in China which circulated (without royalties) some 20,000 reproductions.

The Chinese capacity for assessing and selectively adopting regional concepts and processes was formidable. This was apparent in both the bilateral and multilateral context and involved both senior officials and academics as their more junior colleagues who were being groomed for future roles.

Cooperation with China on investigating the value and limits of cooperative security and multilateralism continued well into the 2000s. Some of the most engaging discussions of the Canadian conception of human security were with Chinese counterparts curious about the idea but intent on resisting and transforming it by narrowing its scope to a defined range of international crimes for which states had the primary obligation to address. Funded by a private Canadian corporation and the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, two rounds of discussion in early and late 2013 were organized in China on "Cooperative Security 2.0", again focused on key security concepts including trust and trust-building measures, reassurance, self-restraint, empathy, and managing maritime resources as well as the Chinese ideas of community of human destiny, "opportunity engineering" for creating models of cooperation among the great powers. These discussions eventually prepared the ground for an unsuccessful joint Sino-Canadian proposal for an ARF-EEP study group in 2015 on the idea of a Consociational Security Order. And they helped set the ground for a Canada-China bilateral seminar in Beijing in 2017 on potential Canada-China collaboration in peacekeeping operations.

A final arena of Canadian presence was the participation of Canadian experts in multiple projects organized in the 1990s on parallel themes including, for example, those organized by the University of California at San Diego, the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, the National Institute for Research Advancement in Tokyo in combination with the North Pacific Research Center in Hokkaido, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Asia Society in New York as well as a score of meetings and series in Southeast Asia. A project initiated by the Ford Foundation, inspired by Asia-Pacific accomplishments, looked at the state and future of regional dialogues in South Asia and led to the publication in 1997 of an influential report.

Human Security (1997-2005)

The end of the Cold War brought a relaxation of geostrategic tensions, but also a growing realization of a less secure and volatile world facing a new set of threats and challenges.

Traditional state-centric notions of national security were no longer adequate conceptually or in policy terms for addressing acute problems raised by the deadly impacts on civilians of ethnic conflict, civil wars and the impoverishment of vulnerable populations lacking the basic necessities of life usually in failed or failing states.

In the mid-1990s human security emerged as a new frame for identifying these threats to human well-being and proposing remedies. The term generated significant global interest around the world in the wake of the 1994 UNDP's Global Development Report. By the end of the decade it also came in a second variant, Freedom From Fear, that culminated in the Responsibility to Protect.

In the Asia Pacific, Japan and later Canada both came to embrace human security as a major feature of their foreign policy agendas. However, they did so with significant differences that underlined the tensions inherent in the concept and that provoked diverse regional reactions.

In the case of Japan human security was greatly influenced by the 1994 UNDP report. Triggered in part by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Japan bolstered its developmental assistance programs, established in 1998 the Trust Fund for Human Security at the UN, and created the UN-affiliated Commission on Human Security chaired by Ogata Sadako and Amartya Sen. Its 2003 report stated that the aim of human security is "to protect the vital core of all human lives" and protect "people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations", thus acknowledging the crucial link between Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear. Japan continued to support UNGA activities including thematic debates on human security (2008), the appointment in 2010 of a Special Advisor on Human Security, and regular Reports of the Secretary General on Human Security (2010, 2012, and 2013).

Human security in its Japanese formulation was received positively across the Asia-Pacific, its tenets in tune with the ASEAN notion of "people-centred security." Some governments, however, were reticent to embrace human security's engagement of civil society, concerned that these groups were in effect seeking to alter or reform their state-centric agendas. These criticisms were not unanimous among Asian participants, especially in the context of the devastating social impacts of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and among those democracies and newly democratizing countries intent on seeing more civil society agency in policy making. It provided a tool for acknowledging that even two decades of economic growth and state building had not eliminated severe vulnerabilities for large numbers of Asians. And it at least hinted at the growing role of non-state actors as alternative service providers when states were unable to provide social welfare and protection for their own citizens and as bigger participants in the policy process. As an example, in 2002 Thailand established a domestic Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, having previously in 2000 joined the Human Security Network, which included Canada and ten other countries,

The term itself was widely used in regional fora. Senior officials in the East Asia Study Group and the ASEAN Plus Three heads of government used it after 2001, mainly in the context of the need to address a range of "non-traditional" security issues including environmental degradation, illegal migration, piracy, communicable diseases and trans-national crime. APEC used it first in official meetings in 2002 and then as part of the Leaders' Declaration on 21 October 2003 pledging "not only to advancing the prosperity of our economies, but also to the complementary mission of ensuring the security of our people." APEC's prescriptions for "enhancing human security" concentrated on dismantling terrorist groups, eliminating the danger of weapons of mass destruction, and confronting other direct threats to security including communicable diseases, especially SARS, protection of air travellers, and energy security.

Canada's variant of human security, with a heavy emphasis on freedom from fear, proceeded from an alternate perspective and adopted a distinctively different strategy. As with cooperative security before it, Ottawa embraced human security energized by the determined push of an activist foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, for whom "assisting people in highly insecure situations, particularly in the midst of violence conflict [was] a central objective of the human security agenda". Axworthy first used the term human security in a speech at the UNGA in 1996 and found it a useful rubric under which to pursue numerous initiatives that stressed the protection of individuals and groups in situations of armed conflict in failed states (particularly women, children and refugees), humanitarian intervention, peace keeping and post-conflict peace building, and the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. Human security, as Axworthy defined it was results-driven, advanced through practice that in turn advanced theory, a strategy that he referred to as the formation of norms through "institutionalization of conscience."

By sidestepping established institutional channels, including the UN, and instead mobilizing and supporting *ad hoc* coalitions of officials, experts, and notably, committed civil society NGOs, the early results of Canadian-supported efforts were significant, benchmarked by the Ottawa landmines convention in 1997 (which Japan signed despite considerable domestic opposition), continued support for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, all leading to the 1998 Treaty of Rome that created the International Criminal Court, and the Lysoen Declaration in 1998 creating the Human Security Network.

Where Japan concentrated largely on Asia, Canadian thinking was global from the outset, problems in Asia just one component. And where cooperative security was driven by track-two combinations of governments, think tanks and transnational academic communities, human security was driven by a new "flexible multilateralism" involving governments and activist NGOs usually focused on human rights and humanitarian assistance.

The Canadian focus on conflict and humanitarian crises experienced by victimized populations, often at the hands of their own governments, inevitably drew attention to issues of responsibility, accountability, and intervention. This led to Canadian sponsorship of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that was generated by the request of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Anan was seeking a normative and operational framework to reconcile the tension between principles of sovereignty and non-interference and the need for international actions to protect civilian populations in situations like the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. Its final report, *The Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) published in 2000, became a central focus of Canadian priorities and the subject of extensive debate and disagreement.

The report explicitly eschewed the vocabulary of "humanitarian intervention" and "the right to intervene" and instead focussed on the needs of people at risk by framing the issues of sovereignty and intervention in terms of the responsibility to protect. State sovereignty was no longer absolute, but rather contingent on the state meeting its primary responsibility to its population, which, if failing that, opened the prospect of outside intervention. The report extended the responsibility to protect to include the responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild when faced with human protection crises in states that are either unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibility. And it provided a precise definition of the just cause threshold as well as precautionary principles, right authority and operational principles.

Human security in its Canadian variant, and especially R2P, found approval mainly among Western governments and on the global stage. Unlike cooperative security, which fit easily with core ideas and norms in Southeast Asia and the new Asia Pacific regionalism, R2P in Asia quickly proved divisive and sharply politicized. Stretching definitions of security to extend beyond traditional understanding of protection of sovereignty and territory against military threats proved a difficult undertaking. India and China immediately and unreservedly rejected any moves to qualify the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention. Japan felt that R2P's potential for outside intervention would erode support for the developmental agendas that required state consent. Others resisted what the Canadian academic Stephanie Martel has termed the "siren calls of human security," viewing R2P as a cover for advancing Western-centric notions of human rights and good governance that had the potential to undermine governments. It was seen as out of tune with regional realities and norms and a new form of colonialism targeting the Global South.

The threshold criteria in the report were on the one hand too narrow and too demanding, ruling out their application in a country like Myanmar where the level of killing is low but persistent, and raising false hopes of those in distress. On the other hand, the criteria were too broad, with rationales for intervention manipulable to suit the national interests of intervening states, as seen in American officials justifying the 2003 invasion of Iraq as an application of R2P.

In the immediate aftermath of publication of the report in 2002, unfortunately timed close on the events of 9/11 and the US attack on Afghanistan, gaining regional and global support for R2P proved tough sailing. Initiatives such as an academic effort supported by Ottawa to promote R2P among think tanks in Bangkok, Singapore and Delhi in March 2003 proved dismally unsuccessful. The strenuous efforts by the Gareth Evans (co-chair of the ICISS) and others denying the claims of bias and rejecting false appropriations of R2P, including by the US and Russia, did little to allay suspicions.

Developments at the United Nations, however, substantially altered both the nature of R2P and its international reception. Active diplomatic efforts, including those of China, led to the World Summit of 2005 articulating a reformulation of R2P placing it under the auspices of the United Nations (thus subject to P5 determination), limited to four existing categories of international crimes, and with tempered expectations of members' responsibilities to take interventionary action.

As observed in several track-two bilaterals with Chinese academics, with these "guardrails" in place, Chinese attitudes towards protection of civilians in conflict moderated. While still defending the fundamentals of sovereignty and nonintervention, and viewing R2Pas a "concept", rather than a principle or norm, Beijing did not stand in the way of UN peacekeeping ventures, indeed contributing its own troops, with tacit acknowledgement of the role of international action in contexts of state failure, such as Somalia. India, on the other hand, remained adamantly opposed to any suggestion of qualifications to state sovereignty.

Asian states, in general, proved supportive of the underpinnings of human security, including the need to address the atrocities and crimes against humanity covered by R2P, but not of actions, individually or collectively, to intervene in intra- or inter-state crises. State centric security and nonintervention remain central pillars. ASEAN as an organization has not endorsed R2P, the Philippines and Thailand intermittent exceptions under select governments. ASEAN's failure to respond to humanitarian crises within member states has subjected it to sharp criticism from outsiders. Feeling the need to demonstrate attention and exercise initiative, led by one of its Secretary Generals, ASEAN has attempted a variety of non-coercive conflict resolution strategies—all, however, as with Myanmar, with very limited success.

As identified in the *Dialogue and Research Monitor*, between 1998 and 2002 R2P was a subject of some 30 regional t2 and academic meetings. Rarely did they find common ground on core principles. Instead, they gravitated towards a spectrum of non-traditional security threats, often focused upon enhancing state capacities for warning and response. This was true of key regional t2 venues, including the APRT and CSCAP's ongoing agenda of working groups. R2P, however, did gain attention in CSCAP in two instances, both motivated by Canadian committee members. The first involved Canadian-led editorship (2007-2012) of the widely distributed *CSCAP Regional Security Outlook*, (CRSO) which regularly drew attention to human security crises that called out for redress. The second was the initiation and organization of an *ad hoc* CSCAP Working Group on R2P. Its report on "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" was published in 2011, and while not resolving residual concerns, did illustrate the range of regional attitudes evident a decade after R2P's launch.

The advancement of human security was a major initiative of the Canadian government to which it committed significant human and financial resources. It coordinated DFAIT's efforts through creation of the specifically mandated Human Security Division within the Global Issues Bureau, responsible for all of the inter-governmental activities including the ICTR, ICTY, ICC and ICISS, and ventures with Norway and fellow members of the Human Security Network.

At the non-governmental level Ottawa supported the ICISS and encouraged and underwrote the participation of academics and civil society groups in participating in efforts to ban antipersonnel landmines and facilitated Canadian participation in Track 2 forums (e.g., CSCAP, the APRT) when addressing human security issues.

Ottawa provided major funding for two flagship human security initiatives at home, the *Human Security Report* and the Canadian Consortium of Human Security. The first, directed by Andrew Mack, was based at the University of British Columbia, and later from Simon Fraser University from 2002 until 2010. With funding from Ottawa, the UK and Norway, the Centre produced major reports between 2003 and 2010 that drew attention to the ongoing record of global violence.

In the second, between 2002 and 2008 the Department funded the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS), also based at UBC, to support research and teaching on human security topics in Canada and globally. With funding of \$2 million, it supported research fellowships, an on-line data based focused on teaching human security, a website, a Bulletin, and a series of international workshops. While several of the Canadian leaders of the CCHS had earlier been active in Asia Pacific activities, Asia and Asians were only a small component of an overall Canadian initiative that was global rather than regional in scope.

CIDA encouraged inserting both cooperative security and human security into its programs it funded, including its *Development and Security in Southeast Asia* (DSSEA) and ASEAN ISIS projects. However, it refrained from giving a precise definition of what either term meant, presumably to avoid debate over the role of security in development programming.

With the election of a Conservative government, Ottawa's support for the human security agenda effectively ended in 2006, with its abandonment of global advocacy efforts and the expunging of the term from departmental communication. Ongoing projects with multi-year financial commitments in place, including the CCHS and the Human Security Report, continued through 2008. Funding for Canadian participation in CSCAP was suspended, possibly to be reinstated, but continued for the officially-appointed ARF EEP group.

Human security and R2P live on in UN circles and have abiding supporters in Asia Pacific, the torch being carried by Australian academics and think tanks. Based at the University of Queensland, the very active Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect focuses on early warning and atrocity prevention. Additionally, the *Global Responsibility to Protect* journal, founded in 2008, and jointly funded by UQ and Australian DFAT, is the sole academic journal devoted exclusively to R2P.

Over the last decade, the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, at Nanyang Technical University, Singapore has rapidly risen to become a leading think tank and school of graduate education in Southeast Asia. Two of the active centres it hosts cover matters of human security, without using the term in their titles. The Centre for Multilateralism Studies has included human security in its focus on cooperative multilateralism. The Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies is mandated to consider "challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise from non-military sources".

Whether human security Canadian-style should be regarded as a companion and logical extension of cooperative security, a supplement, or a disruptor will continue to be debated. In some ways it connected easily with thinking about comprehensive and cooperative security by enlarging the range of unconventional or non-traditional security threats that needed attention. Inclusive multilateralism, confidence building, and strengthening of the state, key elements of cooperative security centred on engaging and reinforcing states with t2 as its partner, not its challenger. This rubbed against human security's more radical and controversial normative aims.

Domestic Canadian Infrastructure

Behind these multiple activities starting in the late 1980s, many of them conducted in track-two and academic settings, lay an institutional infrastructure that grew to involve several dozen academics, several universities, and frequent interactions with policy makers in Ottawa and diplomats at almost every Canadian mission in capitals around the region. This wasn't the product of a grand master plan or the sponsored agenda of a single funder or organization. Its scope expanded and evolved based on a variety of different projects and a wave of opportunities and ideas, funded by multiple agencies, and involving an expanding core of academic and governmental players around the Pacific in a dynamic era of ASEAN-inflected Asia Pacific networking.

This broad agenda had support from bureaucrats who found the new unofficial networks useful in advancing official Canadian interests and opening policy issues and advice to a wider circle of outside expertise. Several diplomats reported that participation in these non-official networks introduced them to a wider set of policy actors and academics in their host countries helping with day-to-day activities beyond the t2 processes themselves. It had the support of academics who saw intellectual enrichment and career opportunities in activities that explicitly connected scholarly research with foreign, defence, and security policies. It cultivated academics who understood security to refer to more than the military, strategic, and intelligence nexus traditionally defining international conflict and national defence. And it helped recruit and assist a new generation of graduate and post-doctoral students in pursuing their research and establishing regional connections.

The principle of inclusive involvement was applied in Canada as well as the region. While York University and UBC were the central nodes, the web of partnerships in organizing events, spotting financially supporting young talent, and participating in meetings was extensive with the involvement of faculty and advanced graduate students from more than a dozen institutions including the University of Victoria, Simon Fraser University, the University of Alberta, the University of Manitoba, the University of Toronto, Brock University, Queen's University, Université de Quebec à Montreal, Université Laval, University of Ottawa, Dalhousie University, and St. Mary's University as well as the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

The NPCSD was administered mainly through York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies with responsibility for financial matters, the publication series, travel arrangements and for coordination with five other universities in the organization of the individual conferences and workshops. Its co-directors were in frequent contact in person and by fax with multiple players in Ottawa, in Asia and across the country.

The string of Southeast Asian focused projects was administered first (1992-98) by the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies and then (1999-2003) by the Institute for Asian Research at the University of British Columbia. This involved oversight over some 60 meetings and training programs mainly in Southeast Asia, communication with more than a dozen partners, and complex interactions with the funders,

principally CIDA but also DFAIT and several foundations. At one point a senior CIDA official was embedded at the Joint Centre to assist with program design and execution.

UBC's Institute of Asian Research also administered the Northeast Asia Program, principally funded by CIDA, with its string of events, commissioned research, publications, and engagement activities between 1999 and 2003.

The Toronto-Vancouver partnership extended to several other projects. Participation in CSCAP required the creation of a member committee that served as a forum for elite-level discussion on priorities, agenda setting, advice on Canadian participants for international meetings, and exchange. First formed in 1995 it was co-chaired initially by a former senior official and an academic, then a business leader and an academic, finally by a Senator and an academic. At its peak it had roughly 30 members including senior academics, officials in their private capacities, business people, senior officers in the armed forces, journalists and senators. Funded mainly by DFAIT, private sources and later the Asia Pacific Foundation, it played a unique role as a place for strategic discussion and implementation advice on a wide spectrum of regional issues centred mainly on multilateral institution-building and defence and diplomatic priorities.

Organization of the 20 meetings with North Koreans began in Toronto but shifted to UBC in 1999. Similarly, the bilaterals with China and Indonesia had both a Toronto and Vancouver base; CSCAP's NPWG was supported through both.

Perhaps the most original domestic institutional innovation was the creation in 1995 of the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS). Parallel to the CSCAP Canadian Member Committee, it was far larger in size and sponsored a program of specialist meetings, annual conferences, and publications, including a regular newsletter and the *CANCAPS Papiers* series of policy-relevant research papers. Organized through York University's Centre for Security Studies, it had upward of three hundred participants across the country, mainly academics, government officials from a variety of departments, journalists, and consultants. It took special aim at identifying and assisting the career development of graduate students, some of whom now hold faculty appointments or serve in government. For a brief period, CANCAPS also facilitated opportunities for younger scholars to participate in the annual Asia Pacific Round Table held in Kuala Lumpur. Funding from Ottawa did not survive the change of government in 2006.

The *Canadian Consortium on Human Security* was created in 2002 and based at UBC with a cross-national board, broad mandate, and government support that eventually totaled \$2 million. It aimed to stimulate creative ideas and create networks among academic experts, NGOs, and officials that would expand the basis of understanding and the ways to advance human security and provide relevant input to policy makers and policy making. CCHS was singularly successful in supporting the careers of young scholars through provision of research fellowships. It facilitated communication among instructors of human security courses at 33 Canadian universities and several dozen more overseas, as well as organizing two international conferences.

Funding for all these activities, as itemized in the appendix, came from a variety of sources. The largest were the Department and CIDA which in total contributed about \$13 million. This figure does not include *ad hoc* meetings on parallel themes like the September 1997 conference on regional security and prosperity in Asia organized by UBC's Institute of International Relations and Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters with thirty-five participants from the academic, governmental and business sectors, most of them participants in CSCAP and CANCAPS activities.

Canadian, Japanese, US and European foundations contributed about \$1.5 million. Canadian universities provided matching funds for some activities, release time and travel, demonstrating a new commitment to assisting work that fell beyond the boundaries of traditional academic scholarship. To these figures can be added in-kind and matching support from partners in Asia totaling several million dollars more.

Viewed 20 years after the conclusion of most of the cooperative security agenda, its enduring domestic legacy lies in the human capital it helped nurture and an array of publications including books, journal articles and reports.

Its impact on the regional security order of the day is the subject of the final chapter.

CHAPTER 2

THE NORTH PACIFIC COOPERATIVE SECURITY DIALOGUE

Context and Conception

After four decades of Cold War security architecture, the world faced another disruption. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, followed in 1991 by the breakup and eventual dismemberment of the Soviet Union, signaled a transition in international affairs that affected countries well beyond Europe and the North Atlantic arenas. Scholars and practitioners alike sensed better days ahead. For some, this was to be the unipolar moment that liberated people from authoritarian or autocratic regimes; an inevitable transition from state-planned demand to liberal capital economies with democratic political systems. Others imagined a "new world order" led by Washington supported both by a consensus among established as well as emerging democracies and by the forces of globalization, heralding "the end of history".

Canadian government documents reveal that officials in the Department were far less sanguine. For them, the sudden transition into the post-cold war world meant uncertainty. In 1988 they turned to the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), then led by former senior Canadian diplomat Geoffrey Pearson, in cooperation with research initiatives at several Canadian universities, to examine the implications of changes occurring across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While retaining an appreciation of the roles to be played by major powers, including the use of force, and recognizing the continuous impact of state interests and perceived threat, this effort was anticipatory, focussing also on management, collaboration, cooperation, and regionalism. This was complicated by the growing recognition that threats to national security were not solely from an adversary's military or necessarily best addressed by the military.

In March 1990, the Department established a high-level task force to address issues of international security. Composed of ten of its directors-generals, later joined by a senior official from the Department of National Defence and the CEO of the CIIPS it was based on a healthy skepticism of the "peace dividend" pronouncements but also a recognition that post-Cold War events provided limited time and opportunity to affect further changes in the approach to interstate relations.

In July 1990 the Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark received a memorandum from his senior officials titled "Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy for Canada." The new concept drew on ideas in Europe in the late 1980s on common security and in the US around security cooperation in the nuclear arena, but had a distinctive meaning and intent. Produced by the task force, it built on the lessons and implications from Canada's foundational experience and leadership in the Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which included the operational importance of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in the pursuit of threat reduction and enhancement of cooperation. Academics had already been brought into the discussion of CSBMs, in part through the Department's Verification Research Unit.

Clark and his senior officials were simultaneously considering Northeast Asia, an area where Canada had major interests but which remained volatile, subject to great power competition, and bereft of the kind of multilateral institutions and attitudes that had developed in Southeast Asia for regional connectivity and cooperation.

In April and May 1990, departmental officials prepared and debated a series of analytic papers along with recommendations and possible action plans that together informed the July memorandum to the Minister. Individual papers covered sovereignty and security, Canadian security, regional conflicts and the United Nations, nuclear deterrence, unconventional threats, arms control, maritime defence, the economics of security, Canada-United States security, Europe, and Asia Pacific security. Together they formed the empirical basis for the proposed Cooperative Security framing of Canada's post-cold war approach to international security.

In the July 9th memorandum and noted in the detailed but undated "Security Paper draft #10", the Task Force members underlined the challenges faced by the Department of National Defence as expressed in the 1987 Defence White Paper and reflected in more recently budget constraints. Nevertheless, the Department perceived the necessity of ensuring that defence leaders recognized the implications of the changing and uncertain international circumstances that underlined the continuing centrality of Canada's defence capabilities. The Task Force expressed concern about the directions of American policy and operations globally, noting that "the end of superpower regional rivalry does not mean that regional conflicts themselves are over." They reiterated the fundamental importance of allied cooperation in collective defence, collective security,

continental (especially Arctic) defence plus the opportunities in pursuit of cooperative security, an additional layer of the architecture.

While the new cooperative security agenda contained a complex set of diverse concerns and functional areas, the role of the Canadian military was viewed as fundamental for Canadian interests. The Task Force argued that cooperative security was a realistic goal broader than military defence as it exemplified an expression of mutually beneficial political will. But to be a realistic goal it still required countries to feel militarily secure. Cooperative security would serve as an "architectonic concept based on an incrementalist approach to building international security." It was not a grand strategy nor a new architecture, but an acknowledgement that all countries would find opportunities to enhance their own security interests through cooperation in areas of common concern.

The Task Force recommended that, in coordination with DND, public consultations be planned for September 1990 in Ottawa and fifteen other sites across the country. Two documents, "Towards a Working Definition of Security" and "A Changing World Order" were prepared. Differences between the Department and DND were then to be addressed. Broad public consultations never occurred but the Minister did convene several roundtables in Ottawa during that same period involving experts drawn from within the department along with a few individuals from universities and other institutions to discuss the documents. This included two focused on the Asia Pacific in the post-cold war era.

The Minister with the support of his senior officials reconfirmed Canadian commitments to further strengthen the CSCE as well as the North Atlantic relationship. While various other regions were noted, there was a marked turn to the Asia Pacific as an arena of Canadian interest and western strategic importance. The Task Force observed that the place of biggest need was northeast Asia, and that the time might be opportune for a Canadian initiative. All of this fed into the Minister's participation in meetings in Victoria, Tokyo, and Jakarta that July. DND did not play a visible role.

The principal organizing construct of the Task Force was the breadth and depth of the implications for Canadian foreign, security, and defence policies and operations of the evolving changes in the international security architecture. As stated in the foundational July 9th, memorandum,

The new approach to security which the Task Force puts forward can be called "cooperative security":

- Consists of countries, including former adversaries, joined voluntarily in a variety of institutions, organizations and agreements which, taken together, cover the range of issues that impinge on security;
- Focuses on the pragmatic, not on grand strategic blueprints; it recognizes that international relations are more like a patchwork quilt than an architectural blueprint;

- Allows that military confidence (based on voluntary collective defence and nonthreatening defence postures) remains important as the core from which nations can reach out to cooperative efforts on other security issues;
- Recognizes that regional webs of complementary political, economic, environmental and other arrangements work best.

Canada's central role and ongoing commitment to the CSCE addressed the challenges of establishing and then consolidating security cooperation in the European arena of protracted distrust, insecurity, and new post-cold war uncertainty. That experience along with the Department's long-standing belief in the value of mixing bilateral relations with multilateral diplomacy provided a comfortable framing of what and how new security arrangements could and should evolve. The anticipated release from bipolarity signaled both uncertainty and opportunity. It offered new benchmarks – inclusion of the non-likeminded, non-reliance on traditional alliances, multilateral networks invoking trust and confidence – in order to promote cooperation on areas of common security challenges, thereby reducing threat. Northeast Asia became the new focus of concern and opportunity, informed by the European experience as well as the positive perceptions of the regional efforts at community-building with shared values in Southeast Asia's ASEAN.

The Asia-Pacific Focus

While Canada had some history in parts of East and South Asia, an "Asia Pacific" region had become been a more formal aspect of Canadian foreign and trade policy only in the mid-1980s when the government enunciated the Three-Ocean maritime policy in recognition of the increasing strategic importance of the Arctic and Pacific oceans. With the creation of the Task Force on security policy, the Asia Pacific emerged as one of the principal points of interest and concern. Two working papers, "Asia-Pacific Security" dated May 3, 1990, followed two days later by a slightly enhanced revision, "Action Plan: Asia-Pacific Security," were premised on the geostrategic significance of the region for Canada and the world. Both versions opened by observing:

The global "security balance" is changing. While the European security situation is improving rapidly, Asia-Pacific security is not improving and certain medium/long term trends are deeply disturbing.

The history and nature of Canada's relationships with Asia are such that Canada may be able to avoid direct involvement in Asian wars, though its last war was in Asia (Korea). It cannot, however, avoid the consequences of Asian insecurity because they will affect directly and continually most of Canada's foreign policy interests in the area.

The first paper concluded that the regional security problems are varied and pose widely different threats; that Canada must be far better informed; and that Canada should be more involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping, institution-building, and developing more intensive bilateral relationships.

The second working paper focused on regional dynamics and Canadian interests, concluding that:

To have any influence on these relationships Canada must have credibility and that can only rest on Canada becoming a full partner in Pacific defence with a role at least comparable to that in the Atlantic and on Canada devoting sufficient resources to the underlying causes of insecurity to be seen to be a credible player. That should be Canada's security policy in Asia-Pacific.

Closed-door discussions with selected academics produced a lively and creative exchange, unusual in Canadian diplomatic practice, amidst considerable bureaucratic pulling and hauling and skepticism about the ability of the academics to deliver a successful dialogue program in a region characterized by ongoing rivalry and tension and where the Cold War was far from over.

The speeches given by Clark in Victoria, Tokyo and Jakarta in July and then at the UNGA in September highlighted his conception of cooperative security.

... [S]ecurity is more than the absence of war; it is the presence of a stable and prosperous peace. Security has ceased to be something to be achieved unilaterally or attained through military means alone and instead has become multidimensional. This is, fundamentally, the Canadian concept of cooperative security. To achieve this requires a shared sense on all sides that the survival of others is in the mutual best interest, and this in turn is dependent on building trust and confidence.

... [O]ne means of enhancing regional stability in the Asia Pacific region would be the establishment of a "system" of cooperative security which would be self-reinforcing through the fostering of habits of cooperation, negotiation, and compromise – in short, a habit of dialogue – across the broadest possible spectrum of issues.

The Canadian concept of cooperative security accepts that links exist between threats; it requires dialogue and compromise and builds on the link between stability and change.

The concept of cooperative security that underlies the Canadian initiative is not intended to be an alternative to traditional security arrangements. Rather, it is intended to address all issues of regional concern, and then to focus on areas where progress in developing regional approaches is possible.

During his trip, the Department released on July 27th through the Embassy in Jakarta a "Backgrounder on Canadian Asia-Pacific Dialogue Proposals", intended to keep ASEAN states informed of Canada's agenda. It made clear that Canada wanted to promote confidence and security and that there was a gap in Northeast Asia that needed to be filled. By the time the Minister returned to Ottawa from New York the ingredients of a major initiative were in train for a new process focused on a region reconceived as the North Pacific.

The thought underlying this initiative was clearly visible in the Asia Pacific section of departmental analyses. The rationale was that Canada's status as a Pacific nation, its historical presence, and its ongoing and anticipated interests warranted greater commitment to and within

the region even as "the power equations in Asia are being rewritten," referencing countries in both northeast and southeast Asia, while both the United States and Russia were scaling back their engagements. As they wrote, "[t]here is virtually no prospect for a pan-Asian security instrument; the differences are too great, the interest too low, and the powers in each Asian region reject institutional limitations...." Hence there is both a need and an opportunity for Canadian action.

Ottawa assessed that the North Pacific was the most worrying because of the interests and the countries involved. They also stated that with the exception of North Korea, there was considerable political experience and sophistication in the North Pacific which constrains behaviour, but much more had to be done before the region's security problems could be stabilized.

Northeast Asia was the problem and a North Pacific framing appeared part of the solution.

Designing Track Two

In his UNGA 29 September 1990 address, Clark's Asia-Pacific initiative was presented as having two tracks, non-governmental and official. The NGO track was intended to explore issues and prospects for dialogue among regional actors, drawing from experts in Canada and around the region, bringing new knowledge about and focus on the North Pacific. It also would facilitate sustained Canadian regional presence at a time that there seemed to be less enthusiasm among regional partners for any higher-level official activity. As reported in an internal Departmental briefing note, professors at York University in Toronto had agreed to organize a series of international conferences to discuss options and approaches in developing improved relations among North Pacific countries.

The initial idea was that these conferences could prepare the ground for some kind of regional mechanism at the governmental level in a not-defined future. The commitment to the NGO t2 process was a recognition that both traditional and non-traditional areas of concern had potential security consequences, and that academics could provide both the research and the discussions region-wide whereas officials would be constrained. This academic-led t2 process was intended to contribute to a more transparent environment in which potentially sensitive issues could be explored, potentially creating opportunities for government-to-government and even region-wide discussions, all in the pursuit of creating trust and confidence and the promotion of establishing habits of dialogue.

The urgency expressed in the Task Force work was equally reflected in Clark's UNGA speech in September. It identified "uncommon times" replete with risks sufficient to embolden the UN to pursue its foundational missions of peace, security, and development. While these were global concerns, he argued for a new focus on regional approaches given that the new absence of East-West tensions provided the space "to pursue solutions to local problems on local terms". Given the successes of CSBMs in Europe, he argued that the countries of the North Pacific might benefit from similar approaches to confidence building, and specifically to establish a "system" of cooperative security through habits of dialogue that would enhance trust and confidence.

The first consultative meeting occurred at York University on 23rd November 1990. It produced a lively and productive exchange among twenty participants, roughly balanced between officials and academics, about a three-year program There was consensus that the proposed initiative's agenda should include the "hard military" issues such as naval arms control, nuclear proliferation, and military capabilities but would also include "non-conventional" security issues including energy, climate, refugees, and human rights. All of these could be considered sensitive, but the vehicle of a t2 dialogue offered space to discuss matters that otherwise were absent from official track-one conversations. The program would be co-directed by two York Professors, David Dewitt, a specialist on international security, and Paul Evans a specialist on Asian affairs.

Following the York University workshop, the key challenge was soliciting the participation of core individuals from each of the North Pacific countries. With the support and assistance of the Department, the Canadian co-directors travelled in December to Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Hong Kong to meet with officials as well as academics and other experts, followed in January by trips to Washington and New York.

These discussions with a wide array of academics, other experts, and officials revealed considerable enthusiasm for a track-two dialogue process and guarded curiosity about the concept of cooperative security and its application. Of obstacles, there were many. The academic culture within each country required consideration. Diplomatic isolation of the DPRK presented significant communication challenges. Selecting the best possible Russian partner was difficult in the face of churn as the USSR collapsed. Several Japanese and American officials and academics were worried that a multilateral dialogue, especially one that was to be all-inclusive, was not just premature but might erode bilateral alliances and complicate bilateral management of some of the hard security challenges including arms control.

The scoping mission produced a cluster of observations. A variety of existing bilateral and subregional agreements or arrangements existed that could pose obstacles to yet another, even more inclusive, multilateral process. Within this, the t2 aspect was cautiously viewed as novel and promising, but potentially complicating. Each country had its own culture of academicgovernment relations, requiring a novel t2 initiative to work within those constraints.

And it generated a tentative agenda for the proposed cooperative security initiative. Most central was whether inclusivity would be possible in a region embedded with deep existing hostilities? Would cooperative security, when operationalized, be sufficient to enable states to focus on common interests rather than historical threats? How might this occur? In what ways would regional cooperative security be different than bilateral security cooperation? And how would this Canadian initiative differ from Australia's CSCA, or existing APEC and ASEAN organizations? Even more so, why a Canadian initiative given Canada's overdetermined focus on the North Atlantic and North America? Is this a signal for a new Canadian commitment to being present in Asia Pacific? Canada is neither an economic nor a military power in the region and has no observable major interests in the Asia Pacific. Would this new diplomatic initiative be durable and sustainable, to usher in a more serious and significant political presence?

Throughout the series of consultative meetings held by the Canadian co-directors, the novelty and promise of an inclusive t2 initiative gained traction. A formally informal process was viewed by numerous officials, academics, and think tank researchers as a positive and creative multilateral regional opportunity. Some of the initial skepticism was dissipated by the fact of the support from the Minister and senior officials and the active involvement of Canadian diplomats in the region.

The inaugural meeting, "The NPCSD: Setting the Research Agenda," took place in April 1991 in Victoria, British Columbia involving 30 participants from all 7 North Pacific countries (Canada, China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia, USA) along with a representative from the ASEAN ISIS group. A number of officials from Canada as well as individual experts from Australia, the UK, Russia, and Mongolia participated in their personal and private capacities.

The fact that the conference took place at all with full regional participation was an unprecedented achievement.

Minister Clark, served as the keynote speaker at the opening banquet and hosted an informal breakfast discussion. As in his speeches the previous summer and fall he outlined the challenges and opportunities presented by the new and uncertain post-cold war international environment, the rising significance of the Asia Pacific region in global affairs, its importance in trade and investment, and the common imperative to ensure peace and security in a region of still-contested territorial boundaries and enduring rivalries.

A key objective was framing a flexible and inclusive approach that would inculcate "habits of dialogue" for forming an evolving cooperative security framework. Track two diplomacy, he argued, could facilitate research and discussion, contributing to informed policy and improved understanding among governments within the region, thereby leading to trust and confidence in bilateral as well as region-wide relations. These conversations, it was inferred, were in Canada's national interest and would solidify Canada's middle power role as an integral part of a North Pacific region.

Cooperative security was presented neither as a new security architecture nor even an Asia Pacific version of the CSCE, but as an enabling approach that could strengthen existing bilateral relationships while enhancing a set of common goals. The continued strategic interests and capabilities of external powers was a fact both in the North Pacific as well as in Southeast Asia, albeit one in flux. The critical challenge was to better manage if not reduce perceived threat in a time of uncertain change while enhancing trust and confidence through shared information, discussion, and cooperation.

The summary report on the meeting describes the mood as warm and the discussion as lively and constructive, touching on:

• Emerging trends in international security: end of the cold war, interests of the four great powers (China, Russia, Japan, the United States); emerging globalization; "micro-nationalism" and domestic fragmentation, roles of international institutions; arms buildup throughout the region

- Reducing military tensions: diplomacy, CSBMs, arms control, naval arms control, incrementalism to induce trust, focus on the Korean Peninsula, other border/territorial issues, nuclear and missile technologies, possible Chinese and Japanese militarization, need of basic information and data transparency
- Broadening security: environment, demography and migration, refugees, human rights, illicit drugs, official development assistance, terrorism, marine management including SLOCs, broadening the concept of security, appropriate unit of analysis
- Multilateralism: new to a region based on bilateralism, why now, underlying conditions and are they present, is the CSCE the appropriate model, where would the four great powers fit, how to promote a security-focused multilateralism, should it be institutionalized

Although fundamental military matters were raised including contentious issues such as naval arms control, China-Taiwan, and the Korean peninsula, the main focus was more diverse. What were called "unconventional" security issues, later relabelled as "non-traditional," generated considerable discussion. Confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), what Yukio Satoh later expanded to include "trust building measures," were discussed, less at the operational level than at the conceptual as stepping stones toward broader regional cooperation.

After two days of discussion there was as consensus that the track-two initiative was worth pursuing. It produced broad agreement that, with Canadian government support, discussion among academics and researchers should be expanded; that selected participants would be commissioned to draft basic research and informed policy papers for future meetings, with the immediate emphasis on the latter; and that the appropriate mechanism in the next stage would be a series of workshops leading to a major conference.

Four overarching themes were deemed sufficiently central that each would be the focus of an international workshop to be informed by commissioned papers: evolving security perceptions and national responses in the North Pacific; the prospect of arms control and CSBMs in the North Pacific; unconventional security threats in the North Pacific; and history, culture, and the prospects of multilateralism in the North Pacific.

Perhaps the biggest success of the inaugural NPCSD conference was simply having individuals from seven core countries and three others at the same table. While North Korean, Chinese as well as others including Americans were occasionally not as forthcoming in the plenary sessions, all found value in the gatherings that included opportunities for private discussions, especially important in North Korean and South Korean interactions.

The Workshops

With the credibility of the NPCSD established, each of the principal countries committed to ensuring that the Canadian organizers could deal directly with key institutes and individuals in each country. The t2 process was to draw from among the best academic and other non-governmental expertise, recognizing that some participants from the PRC and all from the DPRK would be affiliated with institutions from within their respective governments.

The NPCSD was designed to ensure that the distribution of analyses and views exchanged at meetings would be received as credible, and that the workshop participants over time would establish a network for sharing research and analysis amongst themselves and with their respective governments (here North Korea posed some special challenges). This would be important in stimulating the "habits of dialogue".

Over the next two years, four workshops and a concluding conference explored many of the issues first raised in April 1991. Again, process melded with substance. Along with Canada, each of the United States, Japan, and China agreed to provide host funding to convene an NPCSD workshop.

- December 1991 in Honolulu, workshop on "Unconventional Security Issues in the North Pacific"
 - The very language of this workshop was contested. Many preferred "nontraditional" over "unconventional". Issues such as environment, ecology, human rights, democratization, economic changes, and demography each posed challenges. Some raised the issue of civil-military relations. There was a preference among many to recognize that these issues were more about threats or challenges within rather than between states.
- May 1992, Ottawa, workshop on "Arms Control and CSBMs in the North Pacific"
 - A principal focus was the Korean Peninsula, notably North Korea's intentions just a few months after its withdrawal from the NPT. The majority expressed the belief that this was a global-level concern and had to be linked to the global nonproliferation regime. The primary concern was how to bring the region and specifically North Korea back into compliance with the IAEA and the NPT.
 - Conventional arms buildups in both northeast and southeast Asia received attention, including initiatives such as arms registries and CSBMs could be pursued regionally and sub-regionally.
- June 1992, Beijing, workshop on "History, Culture and the Prospects of Multilateralism in Northeast Asia and the North Pacific"
 - Historical and cultural factors have inhibited the growth of multilateralism in the Asia Pacific and especially in the North Pacific. These posed significant constraints on pursuing regional rather than bilateral instruments. The absence of trust, the ongoing realities of contested borders, and strong assertions of national sovereignty mitigated against a deep commitment to multilateral institution building in the region. Yet participants argued in favour of pursuing these efforts through focussing on both contested as well as functional issues, while ensuring sensitivity to traditional Asian statecraft. Trade-dependent economic cooperation were powerful foundations for regional cooperation. Even while arguing that multilateralism in Asia Pacific had to be sensitive to Asian culture, traditions, and characteristics there was an acknowledgement that a re-considered version of multilateral instruments and approaches in areas such as CSBMs, could enhance interstate regional relations.
- August 1992, Yokohama, workshop on "Evolving Security Perceptions and National Responses"

- Identified three sets of security concerns in the North Pacific: those resulting from the realignment of major powers following the end of the cold war, assuming a gradual disengagement by the United States and a likely new assertiveness by China and possibly Japan; the Korean Peninsula continuing as a contested and threatening site, plus anxieties in Japan about a still-powerful Russian military; a general worry about the implications of domestic instability in China, North Korea, and Russia.
- Participants emphasized the need to tackle deterrent-based "old" security thinking with a new conception of security based on reassurance. There was guarded optimism about multilateral security dialogues, recognizing that both the US and Japan seemed more receptive even if they were concerned about weakening their bilateral security ties. There also was some discussion about North Pacific countries becoming more involved in responsible UN actions such as peacekeeping.

Each meeting included commissioned papers circulated in advance. These 27 research papers were made available as the *NPCSD Working Paper Series*, published by the York Centre for International and Strategic Studies (January 1992 to April 1993).

The concluding conference, "The Agenda for Cooperative Security in the North Pacific," took place in Vancouver in March 1993. Participants noted that in the two years since the founding conference, there had been a significant increase in region-wide track-two activities. Prospects for deepening economic integration within East Asia, along with anxiety about the existing security environment produced greater receptivity to multilateral dialogue. While some disagreement remained about the scope inclusiveness of the term "security", there was general agreement that unconventional or non-traditional issues such as the environment and resource scarcities that might become national security concerns and should be monitored with the intent of developing early warning capabilities. There was no consensus on the propositions that more transparency was essential for building confidence or that human rights and democracy were essential preconditions for practical cooperation. Traditional security challenges, notably both conventional arms build-ups in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, continued to be a serious concern, while the main arms control challenge remained North Korea's apparent quest for nuclear weapons. Sub-regional CSBMs should be encouraged, but some participants saw this as premature, intrusive and a source of insecurity.

The conference agreed that t2 activities had provided a rich conceptual discussion of what security meant within the North Pacific. In the near-term future, participants favoured seeing the ASEAN PMC become more inclusive and fully multilateral, and strongly supported CSCAP as a region-wide t2 non-governmental process. Participants agreed that a second phase of the NPCSD should be established and would benefit from a way to involve military voices in its discussions and a rolling set of participants to ensure new and critical perspectives. Arms control, transparency, the regional-global interface, and the links between economic development and security were offered as priorities for continued cooperative security work. For the longer-term, further conceptual development, security cultures and language, conflict prevention and management, and human rights along with democratization were proposed.

Process, Substance, and Outcomes

As a Canadian financed and led initiative the NPCSD formally concluded in spring 1993. Officials in the renamed Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) faced the weight of post-cold war budget cutbacks and competing priorities in Europe and East Africa. When Joe Clark shifted cabinet positions, his successor as minister, Barbara McDougall, shifted focus to conflicts in central and eastern Europe in the wake of the Soviet breakup, as well as the domestic repercussions of the Canadian Airborne debacle in Somalia.

For a brief period, the Department continued to use the vocabulary of cooperative security. It remained a vital part of regional discussions including in Southeast Asia and numerous t2 and academic circles, some receiving Canadian funding through CIDA and EAITC, as outlined in Ch. 1. But the termination did signal the end of determined Departmental leadership in Northeast Asian multilateralism. Ottawa provided a financial contribution in 1996 to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) but demurred from a front-line role that officials calculated would be too expensive in time and money.

With the t2 concept seeded, the Institute for Global Cooperation and Conflict at the University of California in San Diego, members of which had participated in the Canadian-led meetings, launched its own Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) with a roughly similar agenda and approach. The two substantial differences were that Canada was not included and that it was constructed as a t1.5 process with officials in their official capacities along with academics and other experts. NEACD aimed to provide non-governmental inspiration and support for what eventually became the Six Party Talks on the Korean peninsula. This was a case study in how a Middle Power initiative could be taken over by a major power both amplifying its impact but with the risk of it being subsumed to great power interests.

What did the NPCSD achieve?

At the level of the state practice in addressing specific hotspots and regional problems, results were thin and far from immediate. Redefining the region as the North Pacific did not produce magical outcomes. The NPCSD did not eliminate regional tensions or directly incubate a mechanism for regional dialogue or functional cooperation. As reported by a Canadian diplomat in Washington, the meetings may have helped provide a positive atmosphere and personal connections that facilitated the push for the KEDO, the Six Party Talks, and the Tumen River projects. At minimum, the NPCSD provided evidence that cold war strictures were loosening, if only momentarily, that the non-like-minded had reason to engage in a more involved manner on a more varied agenda, and that sometimes t2 allow opportunities otherwise unavailable to officials.

The NPCSD stimulated, if incompletely, the habits of dialogue, inclusivity among states and among actors within states, and diversification of issues beyond the military domain in a region where they were rarely discussed as part of the security agenda. Cooperative security provided a scaffolding of ideas and activities that highlighted regional possibilities as well as problems. It foreshadowed and supported stirrings in Southeast Asia for a wider Asia-Pacific dialogue process at the governmental and t2 levels.

In terms of process, the NPCSD helped pioneer a specific form of t2 diplomacy, including the concept of participation of officials in their private or personal capacity. This may have contributed to what norm theorists label socialization around the common habit of peaceful conduct. It was a proving ground for inclusive multilateral dialogue involving the allies and the like-minded with the non-likeminded. In the Canadian case, this extended to extensive efforts to bring North Koreans into more regional meetings and engaging China in issues of cooperative security, an ambition that ran for more than 25 years. The efforts to socialize North Korean participants clearly had some effect as was evident in their subsequent, if intermittent, participation in regional t2 dialogues including CSCAP and ASEAN ISIS events.

At home, the NPCSD generated extensive coordination, cooperation and interactions across the government-academic divide and highlighted what academics could contribute. Partly as laboratory and partly as observatory, the NPCSD improved the quality of research and Canadian leadership capabilities for participating in fast-developing networks and projects. In doing so it raised the visibility of Canada and Canadians in the region. In demonstrating Canadian capacity to kick-start inclusive multilateralism in a tough neighborhood and to then pass the baton, it was a successful example of creative diplomacy in Middle Power mode combining proactive senior political leadership, innovative ideas, academic talent, and diplomatic agility at a ripe moment.

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSION: IMPACT AND LESSONS

In its multiple forms as a philosophy, perspective, slogan, ambition, and string of initiatives, what began as a t2 dialogue program focused on the North Pacific widened into a broader agenda of projects mostly connected to activities centred in Southeast Asia and connecting across the Asia Pacific region.

In their time and place the various ideas and activities that we have grouped under the umbrella of cooperative security (including elements of human security) were a distinctive part of the regional landscape for a decade and a half. The fact that we are operating now in a very different strategic setting should not detract from what was attempted and accomplished.

Cooperative security approaches certainly took advantage of a comparatively benign moment in regional affairs when the prospects of mutual economic gain were appealing, the relationship between the US and China encouraging, and ASEAN expanding its membership and role as facilitator of region-wide multilateralism. At home, the political inclinations of both Progressive Conservative and Liberal governments were consonant with a Middle Power commitment to order building focusing on inclusive multilateral organizations, working across ideological divides, engaging China with an eye to its deeper participation in regional processes, and playing a constructive role in conflict mediation and peacebuilding.

What was their impact, what mark did they leave, and what lessons can we draw from them?

Impact

Quantifying impact isn't easy. Looking at specific outputs, the various cooperative and human security activities produced hundreds of essays, some 75 commissioned working papers, several books, a dozen widely circulated conference reports, assistance or leadership in more than 50 meetings in the region and an equal number in Canada, and involved well over a hundred Canadian academics and only slightly fewer Canadian officials engaged in assorted projects connected to a common enterprise. Cumulatively they generated at least three nation-wide networks -- CANCAPS, CCHS, and CSCAP. After a few years of suspended membership, under APFC sponsorship Canada is again participating in CSCAP activities but the Canadian member committee has disappeared. At home they sparked the careers of a score of junior scholars and widened the opportunities and networks for policy-related interactions for senior academics.

In Asia, proactive promotion of a cooperative security agenda lifted the profile of Canada as a committed, capable and informed regional actor. The biggest impact may have been in China, at least in the late 1990s. The later forays into promoting human security provoked more divided regional reactions but also indicated a capability for leadership in developing regional norms and principles.

The public impact in Canada was minimal, slightly greater in Asia through public meetings in Japan and occasional stories in regional newspapers and magazines. Track-two efforts were not part of Canada's public diplomacy in the region or messaging at home, their soft power attributes not widely promoted.

Cooperative security as an idea and project never lacked for critics in academic and diplomatic circles. Meetings were occasionally derided as "talking shops". Scholarly skeptics took aim at the broader notion of security threats embodied in both cooperative and human security thinking as analytically fuzzy and missing the core issues of military and defence, alliance structures and military preparedness that were the real foundations of national security and regional stability. Some officials, especially on the defence side, warned against a diversion of resources from core defence priorities. Some in civil society feared that securitization of issues like environment, human rights, and pandemics would make management of them more difficult and that humanitarian issues needed to be de-securitized. The commitment to working across ideological divides was sometimes dismissed as wishful thinking, bound to fail in finding common ground and instead providing leverage and legitimacy to real enemies.

Critics correctly underlined the abiding tension at the core of cooperative security thinking about whether it should be seen as a supplement to balance of power means or rather as the pathway to some kind of security community. The Canadian officials behind the original NPCSD thinking in the summer and fall of 1990 were certainly of the mind that hard core security and military balances were fundamental. So were most of the participants in the activities of the era. The basic calculation was that stability could be maintained while building confidence among rivals and seeking common ground. The more ambitious objective of seeing cooperative security as a

stepping stone to building a security community was the province of some of the academics influenced by the discourse and ambitions of ASEAN.

The concept of t2 itself also had its critics. Professors and other experts were sometimes portrayed as amateurs useful only when they could be used as messengers to float ideas too sensitive for official channels. Some officials rejected the idea that officials ever could operate outside their official roles and shouldn't. And some academics criticized their colleagues who sat at track-two tables as abandoning their true academic calling of speaking truth to power and instead behaving as surrogate diplomats.

These criticisms did little to dent the momentum or achievements of the undertaking. But in substantive terms did Canadian-assisted efforts bend the arc of regional affairs?

Looked at from the perspective of the 2020s, the answer is "no" or at least "only marginally". The grandest ambitions have not been met. Northeast Asia remains riven by geopolitical and ideological confrontation, inclusive multilateral institutions non-existent, the only form of multilateralism some soft three-way collaborations and intermittent dialogues. Southeast Asia has not turned into a security community and the ASEAN-grounded institutions including the ARF and EAS are either stagnant or stalling.

The emerging Indo-Pacific world is a far cry from its Asia-Pacific predecessor. Great power rivalry is back with US-China competition casting a Cold War-like shadow. The securitization of trade and technology is undercutting globalization and regional integration. Non-traditional security challenges like pandemics, climate change, and anti-terrorism are being securitized in ways that make regional cooperation far more difficult. Minilateral coalitions of the like-minded have more momentum than the inclusive multilateral ones conceived in the 1990s. "Inclusive" has been redefined as working with like-minded friends and allies.

If Asia Pacific was fundamentally about engaging China, Indo-Pacific is about confronting and constraining China. Dreams of changing China through interconnections have vanished as have expectations of convergence around Western conceptions of a rule based international order. The search for commonalities and common ground has largely disappeared, replaced by a search for, at best, instruments of crisis management. Even the battery of CSBM's discussed at the end of the Cold War period do not now seem feasible. Middle power roles across ideological divides are hard to reprise but are being taken up by several countries in Southeast Asia accompanying their diplomatic orientations toward what regional scholars describe as non-alignment or multi-alignment in the face of sharpening US-China strategic competition.

At home, Ottawa's new Indo-Pacific Strategy lines up with the main lines of American-led thinking and positioning. It places a premium on constraining a "disruptive" China, aligning with friends and allies, and constructing mini-lateral coalitions of the like-minded to advance cooperation largely against rather than with adversaries. The channels for serious bilateral dialogue are at least temporarily closed. Though rhetorically supporting ASEAN centrality, there is little discussion of the cooperative and human security issues of old. The institutions for regular and deep interactions between Ottawa and the expert community have largely atrophied.

Ironically, Ottawa has recently revived the North Pacific frame, this time with the intention of promoting cooperation on a bilateral and mini-lateral basis with friends and allies *against* new threats emanating from China, Russia and North Korea.

Yet cooperative security still resonates in four important ways.

First, ASEAN remains the champion of cooperative security. It still has an ability, albeit incompletely, to straddle US-China and great power rivalries. The multilateral dialogue platforms it has created continue to make marginal progress, for example, on some practical matters of military cooperation through the ADMM+ process related to natural disasters. ASEAN dialogue machinery at the governmental and track-two levels remains intact. Several key countries in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, are pursuing some form of non-alignment or multi-alignment in the US-China strategic competition, attempting to dampen the rivalry and preferring issue-by-issue positioning rather than *a priori* bloc commitments. While it uses the vocabulary of Indo-Pacific, ASEAN's own "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific" makes clear its preference for and commitment to an Asia-Pacific economic and security architecture. Canadian participation in the ARF process is consistent even if not featured in the Indo-Pacific strategy or supported by Canadian-led t2 programming.

Second, track-two has become such a routinized part of contemporary diplomacy that it is almost invisible. Inclusive multilateralism may be diminished but the form is integral to an active field of bilaterals and the new flotilla of minilaterals. While individual academics may be involved, the prime organizers tend to be non-governmental or semi-governmental think tanks and institutes. The major regional events --the Asia Pacific Roundtable and the Shangri-La Dialogue –have different agendas and philosophic underpinnings--the SLD at least attempts to be inclusive while featuring statements of national positions and discussions of areas of conflict; the APRT continues to emphasize areas for cooperation and confidence building.

Third, if the normative aspects of cooperative security are at least temporarily in eclipse and the term itself only rarely used, aspects of its human security twin have a long tail in both security discourse and, to some extent, practice. It has become an accepted concept referring to the wellbeing of civilian populations, now ubiquitous in the texts of national security strategies and policy statements. It has relevance in international humanitarian law, institutional form in the International Criminal Court, and delivery through UN agencies and development programs. ASEAN continues to use the term.

R2P is a more complicated story. While the 2005 World Summit document, accepted by the UN membership (including Asia-Pacific states), endorsed a carefully qualified definition of R2P, its elements related to sovereignty and intervention remain deeply contested in the region. While accepting in principle the condemnation of atrocities against civilian populations and the attendant responsibilities of states and the international community, many remain unwilling to proactively implement their obligations, often citing the priorities of regional cultures and norms.

Finally, cooperative and human security proved to be a fertile field for Canadian academic contributions working on Asia Pacific matters. Practice has informed theory as seen in the

influential work of Amitav Acharya (a field leader), David Capie, Pierre Lizee, Stephanie Martel, and Sorpong Peou as well as the authors of this chronicle.

Much of cooperative security thinking runs orthogonal to the tenor of today's Indo-Pacific. The possibility of defining security *with* rather *against* neighbours, engaging the non-like-minded, and focusing on unconventional security threats including climate change and pandemics common to all rather than defence preparedness seems more difficult than even a decade ago. In this slide to Cold War-like strategic confrontation, mechanisms for confidence and trust building, tension-reduction, and inclusive dialogue are needed more than ever.

Lessons

In the heart of the Asia Pacific era Canada played an effective niche role in regional security matters. Subsequently it has been a marginal and intermittent participant in both dialogue and military affairs. It has not hosted a major security-related initiative with an Asian focus or partner in almost two decades. The Halifax Security Forum is the highest profile event supported by Ottawa but has minimal Asian participation or flavour.

What can Canadian academics and officials learn from the 1990s playbook that would be relevant if and when Canada seeks a more pro-active role whether that be in pursuing inclusive multilateralism or minilateral coalitions with our like-minded friends.

At the most basic level, picking the right issue, the right partners and the right time remain essential. So does having the right coalition of forces. Earlier Canadian success in Asia depended upon conducive conditions in the region and an unusual level of coordination and cooperation across departments and sectors at home. The vehicle that was created operated on three engines: senior-level political support, vision and inspiration; bureaucrats who supported the vision, wished to see it implemented and could see in it career advancement and value in bringing Canada and Asia closer through shared interests; and an academic leadership group committed to activities beyond the confines of traditional scholarship and able to provide intellectual, entrepreneurial, and administrative leadership on a national basis. The expanded presence of independent research institutes can offer a supplement and perhaps even a successor to the collective efforts of university-based academics and their networks.

Regularized interaction between officials and the academics and experts proved to be essential. This involved extensive consultations with key individuals throughout the period but also the creation of mechanisms for including several dozen others in regular discussion through instruments including the CSCAP Canadian Member Committee, CANCAPS and frequent *ad hoc* consultations in Ottawa and across the country. The absence today of some kind of government-academic consultative group scanning issues, identifying regional opportunities, and surveying Canadian talent and capabilities is a real handicap.

Here something that was certainly useful but has disappeared was CSCAP's CMC. The combination of senior academics, parliamentarians, business leaders, journalists and retired and serving officials generally operated well. Beyond supporting Canadian participation in regional activities, it symbolized the commitment to a multi-sectoral collaboration and provided a forum

for informed discussion of regional security trends and Canadian options. The need for that common thinking space remains.

Funding is of course critical. The NPCSD and the other initiatives at home and in the region were made possible by major support from the Canadian government supplemented by a variety of foundations and donors in Canada and abroad. The total of roughly \$14 million was a tiny figure compared to total Canadian operations in the region (developmental, diplomatic, and military) but did permit a broad-gauged effort over a decade and a half. The Pacific 2000 fund administered by the Department and CIDA's willingness to see cooperative and human security as important parts of its development and poverty alleviation mandate were critical. Replicating the level and duration of multi-year funding is a challenge.

Ottawa's current Indo-Pacific Strategy is intended to address that challenge with a commitment of \$2.3 billion for multiple activities over 5 years including t2 dialogues with like-minded Asian countries. \$25 million has been apportioned to the Asia Pacific Foundation to promote activities through a new office in Singapore, reminiscent of the Canada-ASEAN Centre of the late 1980s. How far security matters and multilateralism will be core parts of the agenda remains to be seen.

Intra-departmental and inter-departmental coordination were and remain necessary for success. The NPCSD benefited from an alignment between the Department's Pacific branch and International Security branch in its design and launch. Unfortunately, DND did not participate and this later proved costly as Canada tried to find a seat at key regional tables. What did work well was later coordination between the Department and CIDA in lining up activities and networks as the Asia-Pacific agenda unfolded.

One other critical ingredient of the right coalition was involvement of Asian and other international partners that included institutions and individuals from like-minded partners in Japan and the US with collaborators from a broader range of non-like-minded countries. The partnerships with ASEAN ISIS, itself a diverse grouping, increased the complexity of planning but dramatically improved the impact and longevity of the initiatives. Organizations like CSCAP in security matters or the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council on economic ones were the products of Asia Pacific ambitions as well as an instrument for generating genuine international collaboration in producing and implementing ideas.

The final element, essential in building durable bipartisan political consensus, is public understanding. However active and successful some of the Asian initiatives were, most scarcely registered with the attentive Canadian public or engaged civil society groups, the one exception the human security advocacy work that did connect with groups including lawyers, human rights activists and organizations including the Canadian Red Cross. A better branding and communications strategy is *de rigueur* and a new set of "influencers" needed.

NOTE ON SOURCES

One of the motives for writing this study was to take advantage of several thousand pages of files still in our possession including correspondence, planning memos, meeting reports, and working papers generated by the cooperative security activities described in the manuscript.

As archives become less accessible and both hard and digital holdings evaporate, we are creating a special collection of key unpublished materials, some of them listed below, that that can be accessed on request.

In mid-2025 an archive of materials relevant to the work presented here will be available at the Trinity College Library Archives, the University of Toronto. The collection will include government documents, correspondence, materials related to the specific projects noted in this paper, along with other reference materials. As of this writing, the archive has the working title, "Canada and Cooperative Security in Asia Pacific, 1989-2005".

Chapter One

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NPCSD

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APPENDIX I. KEY PLAYERS, INSTITUTIONS AND FUNDERS

I. Canadians (or Canadian based)

Political

Joe Clark, Jack Austin, Lloyd Axworthy

Officials (DEA, DFAIT, GAC)

Howard Balloch, Julia Bentley, Fred Bild, Don Campbell, Joseph Caron, Thomas W. Delworth, Daniel Dhavernas, Earl Drake, Weldon Epp, Ingrid Hall, Stephen Heeney, Stewart Henderson, Gordon Houlden, Margaret Huber, Don Hubert, Bruce Jutzi, Joanne Kouryati, Ann Leahy, Peggy Mason, Ron MacIntosh, Jean McCloskey, Paul Meyer, Mark Moher, Bob Paquin, Art Perron, Evelyn Puxley, Andre Simard, Jill Sinclair, Michael Small, Gary Smith, Hugh Stephens, Sarah Taylor, John Tennant, Manfred Von Nostitz, Don Waterfall

Officials (CIDA and IDRC)

Ann Bernard (IDRC), Susan Davies, Brian Hunter, Bob Johnston, Janet Lam, Norm Macdonnell, Jean-Marc Metivier, Jeff Nankivell, Sajad Rahman, Ian Robertson, David Spring, Hau-Sing Tse

Officials (DND)

Michael Cole, Louis Delvoie, Bruce Donaldson, Bernie Gaetz, Bruce Johnston

Canadian Academics and Experts

Amitav Acharya, Leonora Angeles, Rick Barichello, Margaret Beare, Robert Bedeski, Jacques Bertrand, James Boutilier, David Capie, Jennifer Clapp, Jocelyn Coulon, Chris Dagg, Simon Dalby, Peter Dauvergne, David Dewitt, Paul Evans, Peggy Falkenheim, Bernie Frolic, Geoff Hainsworth, Gerard Hervouet, Wenran Jiang, Brian Job, Peter Jones, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, Edna Keeble, Isabelle Kelly, Keith Krause, Frank Langdon, Pierre Lizee, Stephanie Martel, Graeme McDonald, Terry McGee, Shaun Narine, Wayne Nelles, Bill Neilson, Cameron Ortis, Kyung-Ae Park, Sorpong Peou, Margaret Purdy, Ron Purver, Don Rickerd, Douglas Ross, Tim Shaw, Richard Stubbs, Ian Townsend-Gault, Erich Weingartner, Miranda Weingartner, David Welch, Bernard Wood, Yuen Pau Woo, David Wurfel, Giselle Yasmeen, Mary Young, Jing-dong Yuan

60 Canadian graduate students and post-docs who participated or wrote papers

Canadian Business and Journalists

Thomas Bata Sr., David Crane

Staff

Carina Blafield, Ken Boutin, Heather Chesnutt, Shannon Seline, Sarah Whitaker, Shirley Yue

II. Principal Asian and International Players and Supporters

Australia: Desmond Ball, Sam Bateman, James Cotton, Peter Drysdale, Gareth Evans, Stuart Harris, Peter Hayes, Andrew Mack, Ramesh Thakur, William Tow, Geoff Wiseman

Cambodia: Kao Kim Hourn

China/Hong Kong: Chen Dongxiao, Chu Shulong, Fu Ying, Guo Zhou Lie, Li Luye. Shi Chunlai, James Tang, Tong Xiaoling, Wang Jisi, Wang Yi, Yang Yangyi, Yuan Ming

Europe: Rosemary Foot, Francois Godement, Gerry Segal

Indonesia: Devi Fortuna Anwar, Kusnanto Anggoro, Clara Joewono, Hadi Soesastro, Rizal Sukma, Jusuf Wanandi

Japan: Fukushima Akiko, Kikuchi Tsutomu, Nishihara Masashi, Sato Seizaburo, Satoh Yukio, Watanabe Akio, Yamamoto Tadashi, Yamamoto Yoshinobu, Yakushiji Taizo

Malaysia: Tan Sri Mohamad Jawhar Hassan, Johan Saravanamuttu, Noordin Sopiee

Mongolia: T.S. Batbayar, Mendee Jargalsaikhan

New Zealand: David Dickens, David Capie

North Korea: Chang Il Hun, Choi U Jin

Philippines: Aileen Baviera, Carolina Hernandez, Herman Kraft, Francisco Magno, Amada Mendoza, Noel Morada, Maria Socorro

Russia: Gennady Chufrin, Sergei Goncharov, Vladimir Ivanov, Victor Kremenyuk

Singapore: Mely Caballero Anthony, Barry Desker, Ralph Emmers, Kwa Chong Guan, Simon Tay

South Korea: Choi Yong-jin, Han Sung-Joo, Kim Dalchoong, Kim Kyung-won, Lee Chung Min, Lee Hong-koo

Taiwan: Lee Chung-lee, Liu Fu-kuo

Thailand: Sarasin Viraphol, Sukumbhand Paribatra, Suchit Boongkonbarn, Surin Pitsuwan, Kusuma Snitwongse, Pranee Thiparat

United States: Alice Ba, Donald Emmerson, Peter Geithner, Harry Harding, Iain Johnston, Amos (Joe) Jordan, Paul Kreisberg, Gilbert Rozman, Robert Scalapino, Susan Shirk, Scott Snyder, Ezra Vogel

Vietnam: Pham Cao Phong

Principal Institutions

Canada

-York University Centre for International and Strategic (as of 1994, Security) Studies, University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, University of British Columbia Institute of International Relations and Institute for Asian Research

International

-ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies, Institute for Security and International Studies Malaysia, Centre for Strategic and International Studies Jakarta, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines, National Institute for Research Advancement (and NORPAC) Japan, Japan Center for International Exchange, and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Japan

III. Major Funders

CANADIAN

External Affairs and International Trade Canada / Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

-NPCSD, 1990-93, \$720,000 -Canadian security policy research, 1993-96, \$186,000 -CSCAP and CANCAPS, 1993-2005 \$616,000 -Canadian Consortium on Human Security, 2002-08, \$2 million -Ad hoc events in Canada and Asia, 2000-03, \$190,000

Canadian International Development Agency

- -Regionalization Eastern Asia, 1990-94, \$500,000
 -ASEAN ISIS Cooperation, 1994-99, \$2.4 million
 -Development and Security in SEA, 1996-98, \$1.49 million
 -Chinese bilaterals, 1997-2000, \$145,000
 -Southeast Asian Cooperation, 2000-04, \$2.3 million
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- Canadian International Institute for Peace and Security -Regional meetings in Southeast Asia, 1998-1999, \$59,000
- International Development Research Council -DSSEA, 1995-96, \$75,000
- Max Bell Foundation -CSCAP and CANCAPS, 1995-98, \$135,000

INTERNATIONAL

Ford Foundation

- -Dialogue and Research Monitor, 1994-2000, \$300,000 -Rebuilding American security, 2004-06, \$195,000
- United States Institute of Peace -Research on t2 in Asia Pacific, 1998-99, \$75,000
- Rockefeller and Rockefellers Brothers Foundations -Conference support, 1993-94, \$40,000
- Asia Foundation -Conference support, 1993-94, \$35,000

Japan Foundation


-Asian security architecture research, 1998-99, \$60,000

Japan Center for International Exchange -Dialogue and Research Monitor, 1998-2002, \$30,000

National Institute for Research Advancement and the North Pacific Advanced Research Center -Northeast Asia meetings, 1994-2005, \$150,000

APPENDIX II. ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Source: CSCAP Regional Security Outlook, 2009-2010, http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CRSO/CRSO%202011%20-%20Revised%20Version.pdf



Source: Adapted from earlier editions of the CRSO.