India’s Emergence as a “Responsible” Nuclear Power
Karthika Sasikumar, Former Liu Postdoctoral Fellow, UBC
October 1, 2007
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Source: International Journal, Vol. 62, No. 4, Autumn, 2007, pp. 825-844
After years of careful diplomacy aimed at establishing its identity as a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons and forging a closer alliance with the US, the nuclear deal between the US and India was announced in 2005. An article on the provisions of this agreement (tightening military bonds after the 9/11 attacks; highlighting of ties between Kashmiri and Islamic militancy by India; containment of China by the US) and its global (a model for other developing countries with growing energy needs; economic growth through ceased electricity shortage and alleviation of global warmth; friendship between the world largest democracies), regional (apart from a little likely vicious circle of Asian arms competition, China seems to have excepted the deal), and domestic implications mentioned by strategic analysts, politicians, and technocrats, highlighting the power of the concept of responsibility (and comparing the policy options available to the Canadian government in responding to this deal (will it be worth to break ranks with the US, to put at risk the partnership in a new strategic alliance in Asia, and loose India as a customer for the CANDU design at a new break in nuclear commerce). In general, it seems that in view of the inevitably of nuclear proliferation in which multilateral mechanism are ineffective, India, a stable, economically dynamic democracy that is increasingly close to the US, does not pose a threat to international peace.
